Abstract
Most of us learn of science first through text books, and these as a rule present their subjects — electricity, heat, etc. — as complete and empirically verified systems. This is not done dogmatically, in that open problems are sometimes noted in passing, or limitations are implicitly admitted by labelling their subject matter as ‘Classical’ or as ‘Introductory’. The students who go on to research find themselves immersed in quite a different world. They are first of all required to find a research problem — a place where science is incomplete or unclear — and they become aware that there are, in their field, contending programs for research — different ideas about what is important and what direction research should take. Those things which, in the text-books, seemed on the periphery of science now become central to it.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Berkson, W. (1987). Research Problems and the Understanding of Science. In: Nersessian, N.J. (eds) The Process of Science. Science and Philosophy, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3519-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3519-8_4
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