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’Twixt Method and Madness

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The Process of Science

Part of the book series: Science and Philosophy ((SCPH,volume 3))

Abstract

For years I have urged that there is more to scientific method than meets the philosophical eye. Some highly touted conceptions of method — the hypothetical-deductive (H-D) method, for instance — are remarkably thin when it gets down to details. For when one studies real scientific cases of problem solving and theory construction, the methodological features are almost always more substantive and more interesting than what one reads in general methodological accounts. There are more things in heaven and earth...’

My title is not intended as an allusion to Alan Musgrave’s interesting paper, ‘Method or Madness’ (1976). I thank Jim Woodward for stimulating conversations on these topics. He is not responsible for my excesses. My work was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation.

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  1. University of Nevada, Reno, USA

    Thomas Nickles

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  1. Dept. of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 817 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260, USA

    Nancy J. Nersessian

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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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Nickles, T. (1987). ’Twixt Method and Madness. In: Nersessian, N.J. (eds) The Process of Science. Science and Philosophy, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3519-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3519-8_2

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