Skip to main content

The Millian Theory of Names and the Problems of Negative Existentials and Non-Referring Names

  • Chapter
Philosophical Analysis

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 39))

Abstract

A theory of the meaning of proper names must provide an answer to this question: “what kinds of propositions are typically expressed by uses of sentences which contain proper names?” There are two major types of theories of the meaning of proper names: Millian and Fregean. The Millian Theory (type) entails that typical uses of sentences which contain proper names express singular propositions; singular propositions have individuals — rocks, chairs, planets, and persons — as well as qualities or relations as constituents. The Fregean Theory (type) entails that such uses express qualitative propositions; qualitative propositions have qualities or relations, but not individuals, as constituents. Each theory (type) has its apparent successes and failures, and, often, what is regarded as one’s failure is viewed as its rival’s success.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Thomas C. Ryckman [1986], ‘Belief, Linguistic Behavior, and Prepositional Content,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XLVII 2,277 – 87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Thomas C. Ryckman [1986], ‘On Saying What We Say Because We Believe What We Say,’ presented at the December meeting of the American Philosophical Association.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Bertrand Russell [1912], The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press) page 54.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ryckman, T.C. (1988). The Millian Theory of Names and the Problems of Negative Existentials and Non-Referring Names. In: Austin, D.F. (eds) Philosophical Analysis. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_14

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-3150-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2909-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics