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Time, Space, Other

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Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice

Part of the book series: Contributions to Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 1))

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Abstract

Most broadly expressed, the phenomenological theme investigated in the preceding chapters is: “being in the real, objective world pertaining to my mental living as transcendental mental living in the natural attitude.”1 More narrowly expressed, this theme was developed with respect to the “genesis” of the ideas of time and space as products of subscientific-philosophic thinking and experiencing that take for granted the positing of the naturalness belonging to the natural attitude2—a development that consciously set aside the “naturalistic conception” of the ideas of time and space with respect to their specifying assumptions exercised in modern philosophy and science.3 In particular there were two central specifying assumptions singled out for attention and on which the epistemic and ontic claims of modern scientific and philosophic thinking and experiencing rest (section 38ff.). The first is the idea that geometry and kinematics define space, and if space defines reality it would seem to follow that geometry and kinematics define reality.4

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Notes

  1. See above, pp. 28, 95.

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  2. See above, pp. 32f., 107f.

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  3. See above, pp. 108ff., 121ff.

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  4. This situation has made itself felt in recent discussions of so-called “medical ethics;” see F. Kersten, “The Life Concept and Life Conviction: A Phenomenological Sketch,” pp. 11 Off.

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  5. This leads to the substitution of concepts of scientific thinking for those of subscientific thinking and experiencing; see in this connection, F. Kersten, The Constancy Hypothesis in the Social Sciences,’ pp. 524ff.

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  6. See above, p. 109.

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  7. See above, pp. 155ff.

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  8. See F. Kersten, “The Life Concept and Life Conception,” pp. 112f.

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  9. In this connection, see Claesges, Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution, section 9, pp. 45ff.; Elisabeth Ströker, Philosophische Untersuchungen zum Raum, especially III. Abschnitt.

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  10. See above, pp. 43ff., 71.

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  11. See above, pp. 55, 89ff.

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  12. See above, p. 89.

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  13. See above, pp. 92f.

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  14. See above, p. 93f.

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  15. See above, p. 92. For a detailed review of Husserl’s discussion, see Claesges, sections 5–10.

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  16. Claesges, p. 34. The translation is mine.

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  17. See Ideas, I, sections 23f.; 12.

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  18. Ibid., section 15.

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  19. Ibid.

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  20. Ibid., section 72.

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  21. Ibid., section 73.

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  22. The analogy has its origin in the Third Logical Investigation, section 3ff., and especially section 25, p. 289 (second edition): “Die Zerstückung der quasi-räumlichen Ausbreitung eines visu-allen, unverändert dauernden, aber in Abstraktion von dem zeitlichen Moment betrachteten Inhalts bestimmt auch eine Zerstückung dieses Inhalts selbst.”

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  23. See Ideas, I, section 88.

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  24. Ideas, I, section 49.

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  25. Ibid., section 50.

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  26. Ibid., section 53; see above, pp. 12ff., 55f., 111.

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  27. Primarily in Carl Stumpf, Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, pp. 106ff.

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  28. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology of Thematics,’ p. 262.

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  29. Ibid., pp. 266ff. It should be noted in this connection that Gurwitsch avoids Husserl’s reformulations in Ideas, I, sections 12 and 15, and that he does not consider the distinction between discrete and non-discrete parts.

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  30. See above, pp. 15f.

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  31. To be sure, Gurwitsch wants to understand something different by “ego” than does Husserl; see Gurwitsch, “A non-egological Concept of Consciousness,” Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, pp. 287ff. For a more Husserlian account of the “ego,” see Robert W. Jordan, “Being and Time: Some Aspects of the Ego’s Involvement in his Mental Life,” in Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism, pp. 105ff.; for a more conservative view, see F. Kersten, “Privatgesichter,” pp. 128f.

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  32. This would seem to be the gist of Ideas, Second Book, section 64. In this connection, see Ludwig Landgrebe, “Seinsregionen und regionale Ontologien in Husserls Phänomenologie,” in Ludwig Landgrebe, Der Weg der Phänomenologie, pp. 143ff.

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  33. Landgrebe, p. 148.

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  34. For another version of this criticism, see F. Kersten, “Heidegger and Transcendental Phenomenology,” pp. 211ff.

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  35. Landgrebe, p. 153. The translation is mine. For Landgrebe’s role in the preparation of Ideas, Second Book, see Husserliana IV, pp. xviiif.

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  36. Landgrebe, p. 153; Husserl, Ideas, II, p. 208. See also Alfred Schütz, “Husserl’s Ideas, Volume II,” in Collected Papers, edited by I. Schütz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 27ff.; and Paul Ricoeur, “Husserl’s Ideas II: Analyses and Problems,” in Paul Ricoeur, Husserl. An Analysis of His Phenomenology, pp. 76ff.

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  37. See above, pp. 298ff.

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  38. Husserl, Ideas, II, p. 208.

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  39. Ibid., section 2. See Landgrebe, p. 154.

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  40. Ibid., section 49ff.

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  41. Ibid., pp. 297f.

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  42. Ibid., pp. 299, 301 f. The translations are mine.

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  43. See the “Einleitung des Herausgebers,” Husserliana IV, pp. xviiiff.

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  44. Landgrebe, p. 157.

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  45. Ibid., p. 158. The translation is mine.

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  46. Husserl, Ideas, I, sections 78, 79.

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  47. See above, section 4, p. 14.

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  48. See above, pp. 27f.

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  49. See above, pp. 19f., 24f., 28f., 35f.

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  50. Descartes, Philosophical Essays, translated with an Introduction and Notes by Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1964), pp. 100, 102. See above, section 38.

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  51. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, translated by Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker, p. 6.

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  52. See above, section 39.

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  53. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, p. 65.

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  54. Ibid., p. 66.

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  55. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 629f. The translation is by Norman Kemp Smith, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 506f.

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  56. Ibid., B 626; translation, p. 504. See also Eugen Fink, Alles und Nichts, Ein Umweg zur Philosophie, pp. 140ff.; Roman Ingarden, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, p. 61. See above, section 40f.

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  57. Ingarden, pp. 60f.; see also Roman Ingarden, Das Literarische Kunstwerk, section 15. In addition, see H.J. Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, II, pp. 358ff.

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  58. See above, pp. 27f.

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  59. Jules Vuillemin, Physique et Métaphysique Kantiennes, p. 343. See also pp. 345ff. Exactly what, by implication, are the “postulates of the epoché” Vuillemin does not say.

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  60. For a review of Brentano’s ideas in this connection, see F. Kersten, “Franz Brentano and William James,” pp. 177ff.

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  61. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 2 II, 1, p. 428; II, 2, pp. 139f. English translation, pp. 598f., 780ff.

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  62. Ibid., II, 1, p. 430; translation, p. 599.

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  63. That is to say, Kant, like Brentano, holds that there is but one generic feature of mental living; accordingly, as Gurwitsch has shown, there is likewise but one meaning of “objectivity” in Kant. See Aron Gurwitsch, “La Conception de la conscience chez Kant et chez Husserl,” pp. 73ff.

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  64. See above, p. 287.

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  65. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, II, 1, p. 437. The translation is mine.

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  66. See Ideas, I, section 104.

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  67. See Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, II, 2, section Iff.; Adolf Reinach, “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils,” Gesammelte Schriften, pp. 57ff.

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  68. See Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, II, 2, section 43; see above, pp. 89ff., and F. Kersten, “Can Sartre Count?” pp. 343f.

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  69. See above, p. 28.

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  70. See above, p. 286.

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  71. See above, pp. 15f.

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  72. Ideas, I, section 90, p. 185.

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  73. See above, pp. 14ff., 33ff.

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  74. Ideas, I p. 186.

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  75. Ibid.

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  76. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 627; translation, p. 505.

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  77. Ibid., B 629; translation, p. 506.

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  78. Ideas, I, p. 187.

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  79. Ibid., p. 188.

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  80. Ibid., section 102, p. 214; cf. section 103ff.

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  81. Rudolf Boehm, “Zum Begriff des ‘Absoluten’ bei Husserl,” p. 221. Translation in R.O. Elveton, The Phenomenology of Husserl, p. 179.

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  82. See Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, Zweiter Teil, (Husserliana XIX/2), pp. 851f. for the distinction between spread and extension.

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  83. See Ideas, I, section 44ff.

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  84. See above, pp. 302f.

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  85. Boehm, translation, p. 180.

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  86. Ideas, I, section 46.

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  87. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Philosophy, Part II, Chapter VII. Also see above, pp. 120ff.

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  88. Ideas, I, p. 110.

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  89. Boehm, translation, pp. 181, 182.

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  90. See Ideas, I, section 103ff.

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  91. Or to express the situation as Husserl does in Logische Untersuchungen, II, 12 pp. 400ff., especially pp. 435f. (translation, pp. 578ff., 604f.), the distinction is between the object which is intended to and the object as it is intended to; see also Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, pp. 185ff.

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  92. Nor is this yet a case of predication; see Gurwitsch, “Perceptual Coherence as the Foundation of the Judgment of Predication,” pp. 84ff.

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  93. See above, pp. 27f.

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  94. Above, pp. 30f., 34f.

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  95. Above, pp. 28f.

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  96. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 272f. Translation by Cairns.

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  97. See above, p. 70.

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  98. Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 273. See above, sections 20, 34, 78f., 80.

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  99. See above, p. 325.

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  100. Boehm, translation, pp. 196f.

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  101. Some indication is given above, p. 226, in the discussion of Becker; see also Becker, “Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung,” pp. 419ff., 457ff. See also above, pp. 60ff., 119, 154f., for some indication of the scope and nature of the problems that arise at this juncture.

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  102. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 294f. Translation, p. 257.

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  103. Husserl, Ideas, I, p. 235.

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  104. Ibid.

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  105. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 132.

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  106. Ibid., p. 142.

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  107. Ibid., p. 146.

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  108. Ibid.

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  109. Ibid. Also see above, sections 17, 18. In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl gives a yet broader scope to his formulation of transcendental aesthetics and analytics. He proceeds to disclose what he calls the “logos of the aesthetic world” and the “logos in a higher sense” that belongs to the real, objective world and to science, an “analytic logos.” The same “distribution” of dimensions or oriented constitution is to be found as in the Cartesian Meditations, but now set in a specific historical context, namely the context of modern science. This context emerges when Husserl concludes a discussion of the transformation of traditional logic into transcendental phenomenological logic by observing that all the material a priori disciplines the nature of which he developed under the heading of “logic” are developed in the pregnant sense of the term, “logic.” Transcendental logic or, equivalently stated, ontology, elaborates the universal Apriori of a possible world. Such elaboration gives rise at various stages to the problem of a “world-logic” or “ontology of the world” (“mundane Ontologie”). As the study of the underpinings of that structure we find, again in a new sense of the term, transcendental aesthetics which “deals with the eidetic problem of any possible world as a world given in ‘pure experience’ and thus precedes all science in the ‘higher’ sense; accordingly it undertakes the eidetic description of the all-embracing Apriori, without which no Objects could appear unitarily in mere experience, prior to categorial actions..., and therefore without which the unity of a Nature, the unity of a world, as a passively synthesized unity, could not become constituted at all.” (Translation by Dorion Cairns, p. 292.) To be a genuine science, this “logos of the aesthetic world” requires its own appropriate constitutional investigations that eventually lead to “logics” in another sense “among which the highest and most inclusive would be the logic of the absolute science, the logic of transcendental-phenomenological philosophy itself.” (Ibid., p. 291) In another connection, I have tried to formulate the same situation in a rather different way; cf. “Phenomenology, History and Myth,” pp. 262ff.

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  110. See above, section 10f.

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  111. See F. Kersten, “The Life-World Revisited,” pp. 48ff. See also Grathoff, “Das Problem der InterSubjektivität bei Aron Gurwitsch und Alfred Schütz,” pp. 96ff. and the distinction between the life-world and the “work-world;” the former pertains constitutively to the aesthetics and the latter to the analytics (see ibid., pp. 104ff. for an inventory of those sorts of actional intendings included in the analytics). To express the relationship between them in transcendental terms, we may say that the work-world is the “appearance” of something primordial, the life-world, thus something secondarily constituted. The work-world then includes in its essence the life-world, but the converse in not necessarily the case.

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  112. Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 289.

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  113. See ibid., section 95; Cartesian Meditations, section 55. Husserl tends to use the term, “Ichgemeinschaft” (equivalently, “Allgemeinschaft”), “community of egos,” to designate something similar to the constituting of what Tönnies called Gemeinbesitz, the possessing in common of a shared world in common. See Gurwitsch, Encounters in the Social World, pp. 117ff., 125ff.

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  114. See Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, section 95; Ideas, I, section 135.

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  115. See Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, sections 17ff., 34, 40ff., 61ff.

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  116. See above, pp. 38ff.

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  117. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 270f.

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  118. Ibid., p. 272.

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  119. Ibid., p. 275

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  120. Above, pp. 17f.

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  121. Cartesian Meditations, P. 156.

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  122. Above, p. 106.

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  1. University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, USA

    Fred Kersten

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Kersten, F. (1989). Time, Space, Other. In: Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2265-5_9

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