Abstract
Richard Swinburne has argued that “we could have good reason to suppose that an event E, if it occured, [and if it met the criteria given below] was a violation of a law of nature L.”6 The result of Swinburne’s argument is that if an event E occurred, and we knew that it occurred, we could have good reason to believe it was a violation of a law of nature rather than supposing that the law required revision. We would have good reason to believe this if we also had good reason to believe it “… was a non-repeatable as opposed to a repeatable counter-instance to a formula L which we have on all other evidence good reason to believe to be a law of nature” (p. 20).
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Levine, M.P. (1989). What is Involved in Knowing That a Miracle Has Occurred. In: Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2245-7_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2245-7_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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