A Better but Less Interesting Humean Argument

Abstract

Given Hume’s analysis of causation, can a unique series of non-repeatable events be considered a causal series? I shall argue that given Hume’s definitions and analysis of the causal relation, no judgment that A caused B can ever be warranted on either logical or epistemological grounds, where A and B are a unique series of non-repeatable events.26 Miracles are assumed, by Hume at any rate, to be a series of this type. (Locke, on the other hand, thought that miracles were themselves repeatable instances of some higher or non-natural laws.) Logically, one cannot even call such a series “causal” given Hume’s analysis of causation. However, supposing that one could call such a series “causal” it would still be impossible, epistemologically speaking, to justifiably assert that A caused B in such a case — again on Hume’s analysis of the causal relation. If one can never justifiably assert that A caused B, where A and B are a unique series, then a fortiori one can never be justified in believing that such assertions are true on the basis of either testimony or direct experience — assuming that one knows such assertions can never be justified. In short, I intend to give a considerably stronger Humean argument against the credibility of testimony to the miraculous than Hume explicitly gives in his “Essay.”