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Belief and Responsibility

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Computers, Brains and Minds

Part of the book series: Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science ((AUST,volume 7))

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Abstract

Few would deny that folk psychology embodies some essential components of our view of ourselves as persons. The specific element of personhood that interests me is moral agency, the feature that grounds judgments of moral responsibility. An agent is morally responsible for a state of affairs only if he is the sort of being who can generally direct his behavior towards (and away from) states of affairs. Thus, we need a psychological theory that permits effort directed to an end or action guided by an intention. This would certainly not be possible unless human beings have beliefs and behavior is a function of belief.

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Notes

  1. B. Berofsky (1987) Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility, Routledge & Kegan Paul. chap. 2.

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  2. Davidson has criticized various attempts to link intention with belief, but none affects this claim (`Intending’. Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press (1980), pp. 91–96). He notes, for example, that an intention to do A does not imply a belief one will do A, and that one can do A intentionally without knowing (or even believing with any confidence) that one is doing A. My claim, distinct from these, is that B cannot be a person’s intention in doing A unless he believes A has some chance of eventuating in B. If B is important and A is the only possible means to B. a person may do A with B as his intention, even if, due to the unlikelihood of success, he does not believe he will do B.

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  3. Some philosophers actually endorse this approach for cognitive psychology. Stalnaker, for example, goes even further, recommending that beliefs be identified with propositions, abstract entities related to, but identical to neither sentences nor neurological states. (Robert Stalnaker (1976) ‘Propositions’, Issues in the Philosophy of Language, A. MacKay and D. Merrill. (eds.), Yale University Press, pp. 79–81.)

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  4. Daniel Dennett (1978) ‘Brain Writing and Mind Reading’, Brainstorms, Bradford, p. 47.

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  5. John Vickers (1969) ‘Judgment and Belief’, The Logical Way of Doing Things, Karel Lambert. (ed.), Yale University Press, pp. 39–64; Ronald de Sousa, (September 1971) How to Give a Piece of Your Mind; or the Logic of Belief and Assent’, Review of Metaphysics XXV, pp. 52–79; Daniel Dennett, `How to Change Your Mind’. op. cit. (note 4). pp. 300–309.

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  6. See op. cit. (note 4), p. 48.

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  7. See Dennett, op. cit. (note 5), pp. 306–307.

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  8. Christopher Cherniak (April 1981) `Minimal Rationality’, Mind XC, No. 358, pp. 163–164.

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  9. Colin McGinn (1982) ‘The Structure of Content’, Thought and Object, Andrew Old-field, (ed. ), Clarendon Press.

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  10. Ibid. p. 211.

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  11. Hilary Putnam (1975) ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, Language, Mind and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. vol. VII, Keith Gunderson (ed.). University of Minnesota.

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  15. ’The Structure of Content’, p. 215.

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  17. Daniel Dennett, ‘Beyond Belief, in Oldfield, op. cit. (note 9). pp. 38–52.

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  19. This is true on the assumption that descriptions of behavior are not intentional so that they are not infected by the same problems. One must describe Robinson’s behavior not as the seeking of relief from arthritis. For a discussion of the nature and importance of this requirement, see Stich, op. cit. (note 13), pp. 165–170, 194–198.

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  20. Donald Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, op. cit. (note 2), pp. 207–227.

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  21. René Descartes (1979) Meditations on First Philosophy, (tr. Donald A. Cress ), Hackett. pp. 20–22.

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  22. This ‘property’ might represent a combination of many other properties.

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  23. See op. cit. (note 13), p. 151.

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  24. Hartry Field (July. 1978 ), ‘Mental Representations’. Erkenntnis XIII, No 1. p. 44.

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  25. Hilary Putnam, (1983) ‘Computational Psychology and Interpretation Theory’, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, vol. III, Harvard University Press. pp. 139–154.

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  26. For a related critique, see Alvin I. Goldman (1986) Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, pp. 173–177.

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  27. Donald Davidson (1986) ‘Judging Interpersonal Interests’, Foundations of Social Choice Theory, J. Elster and A. Hylland, (eds.) Cambridge University Press. pp. 195–211.

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  28. Perhaps it follows that I must also suppose most of your beliefs are true. But talk of truth complicates matters unnecessarily. It certainly does not follow from these considerations that most of your beliefs are true. There might be - or I might believe there is - a Cartesian demon who deceives you and me about most matters. To he sure. Putnam has raised issues that hear upon such skepticism. Sec his (1981) Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–21. For a similar criticism of Davidson, see Goldman. op. cit. (note 26), pp. 175–176.

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  29. See op. cit. (note 27). p. 206.

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  30. Philosophers have finally come to realize that we are not nearly as rational as they have 3portrayed us. See, for example, op. cit. (note 8).

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  31. Here again. Goldman agrees. See op. cit. (note 26). pp. 173–177.

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  32. P.N. Johnson-Laird (1983) Mental Models, Harvard University Press, pp. 163–164.

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  33. See op. cit. (note 13). pp. 237–238.

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  34. ’A Cure for the Common Code?’ op. cit. (note 4), p. 107.

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  35. See op. cit. (note 13). p. 243.

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  36. Ibid. pp. 244–245.

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  37. For a defense of the view that we are unlikely to construe the nonmodular theories which emerge as necessitating the abandonment of belief, see Terence Horgan and James Woodward (April, 1985 ) ‘Folk Psychology is Here to Stay’. Philosophical Review XCIV, No. 2, pp. 197–226.

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  38. Paul Churchland (February. 1981) ‘Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes’. The Journal of Philosophy LXXVIII, No. 2, p. 85.

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  39. Ibid.

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  40. Ibid. 86.

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  41. Terry Winograd (1981) ‘What Does It Mean to Understand Language?’ Perspectives on Cognitive Science. Donald A. Norman, (ed.), Ablex; the observation by Patricia Church-land appears in ‘A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research’ (1980), The Journal of Philosophy LXXVII, p. 207.

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  42. See op. cit. (note 13). p. 231.

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  43. Ibid.

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  44. In defense of the corrigibility of causal judgments in psychology. I defended these claims, citing psychological literature outside the Freudian framework, in (1971) Determinism Princeton University Press, pp. 113–114; see also Daniel Dennett, ‘Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness’. op. cit. (note 4), pp. 164–173.

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  45. See op. cit. (note 13), p. 232.

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  46. Ibid. p. 233.

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  47. See op. cit. (note 32).

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  48. S.M. Kosslyn (1980) Images and Mind, Harvard University Press.

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  49. J.R. Anderson (1985) Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications. Freeman. p. 133.

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  50. Marvin Minsky (1981) ‘A Framework for Representing Knowledge’. Mind DesignJohn Haugeland (ed.), Bradford, p. 124. Minsky’s concern that propositions are not the units of meaning does not ipso facto make him an enemy of propositions. Philosophers, e.g., Quine, have challenged the view that sentences are the unit of meaning without being taken as denying that there are sentences or that we think in sentences.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York, USA

    Bernard Berofsky

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  1. Bernard Berofsky
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Cognitive Science, University of New South Wales, Australia

    Peter Slezak

  2. School of Science and Technology Studies, University of New South Wales, Australia

    W. R. Albury

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Berofsky, B. (1989). Belief and Responsibility. In: Slezak, P., Albury, W.R. (eds) Computers, Brains and Minds. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1181-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1181-9_5

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