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Vague Objects in Quantum Mechanics?

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Vague Objects and Vague Identity

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 33))

Abstract

This paper considers some ways in which quantum particles may be thought of as “vague objects” in the context of a naturalistic approach to metaphysics. It is optimistic about making some connections with the mainstream vague objects literature, for example, E. J. Lowe’s “referential indeterminacy with an ontic source”. Going further, in particular, connecting that literature with the “nonindividuals” approach of Steven French and Décio Krause is more problematic, and indeed there are grounds for skepticism about the metaphysical basis of nonindividuality even from a naturalistic perspective. Nevertheless, the general idea is defended against a charge of a priori incoherence, and some lines are sketched along which it might be elaborated.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The account in question has to be a very particular one, after all: quantum mechanics apparently involves worldly indeterminacy; that is an interpretative problem for quantum mechanics to be solved either by giving a philosophical account of worldly indeterminacy or by coming up with another interpretation of quantum mechanics. Amongst interpretations of quantum mechanics that do require an understanding of worldly indeterminacy, some involve the particular kind of indeterminacy that Skow argues refutes the Barnes-Williams model, and some do not. At this point, why reject the Barnes-Williams model instead of concluding that those particular interpretations of quantum mechanics are indeed impossible?

  2. 2.

    Thanks for an anonymous referee for pointing this out, and for suggesting defences of quasi-set theory on which this section is based.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Ken Akiba and Ali Abasnezhad for putting together the volume and to Ken, Ali and an anonymous referee for comments on the paper. For discussion of the ideas involved, thanks to David Corfield, Steven French, Décio Krause, Jonathan Lowe and Robbie Williams.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK

    George Darby

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  1. George Darby
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Correspondence to George Darby .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia, USA

    Ken Akiba

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Lille III, Villeneuve D'Ascq, France

    Ali Abasnezhad

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Darby, G. (2014). Vague Objects in Quantum Mechanics?. In: Akiba, K., Abasnezhad, A. (eds) Vague Objects and Vague Identity. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7978-5_4

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