Abstract
We know far too little about whether or not animals are conscious. Of course it is usually said that there are a range of consciousness that we should consider and that at a lower level than ourselves, it is granted, an animal might possess consciousness. It seems that many an animal-lover believes this possibility. So far we have not considered different levels of consciousness, but only human consciousness. It is important to ask if there could be other levels of consciousness besides that of human consciousness. To prepare for that we also need to consider what levels of intelligence these animals can reach. I will start with a personal story indicating that it is not only animal consciousness but also animal intelligence that we do not understand very much.
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Taylor, J.G. (2013). Animal Consciousness. In: Solving the Mind-Body Problem by the CODAM Neural Model of Consciousness?. Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7645-6_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7645-6_13
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