Abstract
The topic of empathy has recently received a good deal of attention, both for the questions it raises about its mechanisms and for the role it might play in motivating moral behaviour. The present chapter addresses both of these questions in the light of considerations about how shared experiences emerge from emotional interactions between individuals. It comprises three parts. I begin with the more general issue of the reducibility of collective emotions to individual emotions or other, sub-emotional, individual states. I do this by briefly situating the discussion in the context of two notions that have been somewhat contentious in philosophy during the last few decades: externalism, and emergence. In the second part, I narrow my focus to empathy, and discuss some speculations about its mechanism. In a third and concluding section, I draw on both the preceding discussion as well as some further considerations to buttress sceptical doubts about the importance of empathy for morality.
‘I weep for you’, the Walrus said:
‘I deeply sympathize.’
With sobs and tears he sorted out
Those of the largest size,
Holding his pocket-handkerchief
Before his streaming eyes.
Lewis Carroll
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Notes
- 1.
To draw the starkest contrast with Campbell’s thesis, one can turn to the purest form of existentialism, illustrated by Sartre’s play Les Mains Sales. The central character, Hugo, a Communist Party member, had been ordered to kill a deviationist Party leader. He did indeed kill him, but out of sexual jealousy. The party having now adopted the dead leader’s line, Hugo could save his life by admitting that he killed out of jealousy, not political conviction. But in the climactic scene of the play he chooses to be “non-recuperable” by the Party, by retroactively construing his motive as political. In this existentialist view, the psychological and collective facts don’t matter. The individual can just choose by fiat the nature of his past act (Sartre 1948).
- 2.
I wish to thank conference participants for discussion at the 2010 Basel Conference at which these ideas were first presented, and I am particularly grateful to an anonymous reviewer for extremely helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this chapter.
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de Sousa, R. (2014). Emergence and Empathy. In: Konzelmann Ziv, A., Schmid, H. (eds) Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6934-2_9
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