Abstract
We are members of many groups to which we ascribe the performance of intentional actions, and belonging to these groups seems to give rise, in many cases, to special normative relations. For instance, as a member of the university I have certain duties, as a member of the football team I have others, and yet I have other duties qua member of my law firm. But what is special about some groups that claims of the form “I am under a duty qua member of the group” seem adequate? This paper claims that the standard answer to this question faces two main difficulties. Firstly, most accounts appeal to one special normative notion (e.g. the idea of a joint commitment, or an agreement) to explain such relations, a notion such that, if instantiated, it gives rise to duties that are independent of the value of the joint action. But there are cases where participants think that they are under a duty qua members because the joint activity is valuable, and only because it is valuable. Secondly, most accounts seem unable to explain disagreements among participants about the content of their duties. The paper proposes a model of group action and of normative relations among participants that attempts to overcome both difficulties.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
I think Kutz’s proposal is promising for several reasons. See Rodrigo Sánchez Brigido (2010).
- 2.
Clause (d) implies, as an anonymous referee has rightly pointed out, that the group would be unsuccessful if the relevant intentions are not executed. This does not mean, however, that one could not attribute to the group an intentional action in another sense. The same happens with individual action. I may intend to do A knowing that, in my attempt to do A, B (an unwanted consequence) will occur. Even if I end up being unsuccessful in doing A, I may have done B intentionally. The same applies, I think, to group action.
- 3.
The idea of overlap, and the example, are taken from Kutz (2000, p. 94).
- 4.
Kutz (2000, pp. 74–75, 89–90) introduces the idea of a minimalistic model, although I am not sure of whether he would interpret it in the way I do in the text.
- 5.
I am assuming that values are normally seen as being grounds of duties. If you think that the assumption is too controversial, think of any case where participants would consider themselves under a duty based on other moral grounds which make reference to the intrinsic or instrumental desirability of the relevant action. It is still the case, as I argue in the next paragraph, that Gilbert’s account would not capture it. Unless you think, of course, that the only ground of duties is a joint commitment.
- 6.
I am assuming that this normative consideration is normally thought of as grounding duties. It may be argued that the normative consideration need not make reference to individuals other than participants in order to be thought of as imposing duties. If that is so the model should be modified.
- 7.
Notice that adding more conditions to the initial model does not imply that GNUs are a special case of groups with no normative unity. For both models contain necessary and sufficient conditions, and the conditions are not identical. It does imply, however, that if there is a GNU, there is also a group with no normative unity with some additional conditions.
- 8.
The remarks that follow provide an additional reason for thinking that Gilbert’s account is inadequate as an account of GNUs of type (I).
- 9.
Notice that it is not the case that agreements are considered binding without any type of restrictions, e.g. when serious coercion takes place.
- 10.
I have taken a stab at the normativity of agreements in Sánchez Brigido (2010).
- 11.
- 12.
Tuomela’s notion of “proper social norms” may help to deflect the criticism but, for reasons of space, I cannot consider that issue here.
- 13.
For a brief examination, see Rodrigo Sánchez Brigido (2010, ch. 8).
- 14.
- 15.
References
Atiyah, P. 1979. The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bratman, M. 1999. Faces of intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Endicott, T. 2000. Objectivity, subjectivity and incomplete agreements. In Oxford essays in jurisprudence (152), ed. J. Horder, 151–171. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gilbert, M. 1996. Living together: Rationality, sociality and obligation. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Gilbert, M. 2002a. Considerations on joint commitment: Responses to various comments. In Social facts and collective intentionality, vol. 73, ed. G. Meggle, 73–101. Frankfurt: Dr. Hansel-Hohenhausen AG.
Gilbert, M. 2002b. Acting together. In Social facts and collective intentionality, vol. 73, ed. G. Meggle, 53–71. Frankfurt: Dr. Hansel-Hohenhausen AG.
Goddard, D. 1987. The myth of subjectivity. Legal Studies 7(3): 263–278.
Kutz, C. 2000. Complicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Langille, B., and A. Ripstein. 1997. Strictly speaking—It went without saying. Legal Theory 2(1): 63–81.
Raz, J. 1972. Voluntary obligations and normative powers. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46: 59–102.
Raz, J. 1986. The morality of freedom. Oxford: Clarendon.
Sánchez Brigido, R. 2010. Groups, rules and legal practice. Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer.
Treitel, G. 2003. The Law of Contract (11th ed.). Londo: Sweet & Maxwell.
Tuomela, R. 1995. The importance of us. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Brigido, R.E.S. (2014). Groups, Normativity and Disagreement. In: Konzelmann Ziv, A., Schmid, H. (eds) Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6934-2_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6934-2_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-6933-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-6934-2
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)