Abstract
In this article, I evaluate the merits of existing empirical and philosophical theories of collective emotions in accounting for certain established functions of these emotions in the emergence, maintenance, and development of social groups. The empirical theories in focus are aggregative theories, ritualistic theories, and intergroup emotions theory, whereas the philosophical theories are Margaret Gilbert’s plural subject view and Hans Bernhard Schmid’s phenomenological account. All of these approaches offer important insights into the functions of collective emotions in social dynamics. However, I argue that none of the existing theories offers a satisfying explanation for all established functions of collective emotions in social groups. Therefore, I offer a new typology that distinguishes between collective emotions of different kinds in terms of their divergent degrees of collectivity. In particular, I argue that collective emotions of different kinds have dissimilar functions in social groups, and that more collective emotions serve the emergence, maintenance, and development of social groups more effectively than less collective emotions.
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Notes
- 1.
In this article, I use the notion of “collective emotions” in a wide sense to refer to shared, group, and collective emotions that are understood as referring to the same phenomena. I prefer the concept of “collective emotions” to “shared emotions”, which I have employed elsewhere (Salmela 2012), because the latter concept is ambiguous. On the one hand, the notion “sharing of emotion” refers to a phenomenon in which one person’s expressed emotion is perceived by another person (see e.g. Michael 2011; Rimé 2007). On the other hand, it may refer to several individuals experiencing an emotion of the same type and content, such as joy about the success of their favorite team, with mutual awareness of their respective emotional state. My analysis of collective emotions invokes the notion of sharing in the latter sense as I suggest that emotions become collective by virtue of being shared—to lesser or greater degree—with other individuals. Accordingly, I occasionally use the notions of “collective” and “shared” emotion interchangeably for stylistic reasons.
- 2.
- 3.
Collins uses the notions of emotion, feeling and mood interchangeably. Here is a striking example: “Members share a common mood. It is unessential what emotion is present at the outset. The feelings may be anger, friendliness, enthusiasm, fear, sorrow, or many others” (Collins 2004, pp. 107–8; my italics). This kind of conceptual vagueness is very unhappy as moods and feelings, unlike emotions, are widely agreed to lack particular intentional objects.
- 4.
There is wide agreement among emotion researchers, both empirical and philosophical, that the function of emotions is to evaluate perceived changes in our environment for their significance to our concerns. Cognitive theories (e.g. Frijda 1986; Lazarus 2001; Scherer 2001; Nussbaum 2001; Solomon 2007) maintain that emotions serve this function by virtue of involving evaluations of their particular objects, whereas non-cognitive theories (e.g. Damasio 2003; Prinz 2004; Robinson 2005) argue—in various ways—that emotions can serve this evaluative function even without involving appraisals in their content.
- 5.
My account of strongly collective emotions resembles Gilbert’s membership account in which there is a joint commitment to the goal or intention or action that underlies the group members’ convergent emotional evaluations. I supplement this account with the dimension of affective synchronization which is absent from Gilbert. Moreover, I distinguish between two dissimilar membership accounts, weaker and stronger, whereas Gilbert only has one.
- 6.
On the difference between descriptive and prescriptive emotions norms, see von Scheve (“What Kind of Norms are Emotion Norms?” Unpublished conference presentation).
- 7.
On the group-eroding effect of negative emotions, see footnote 2 above.
- 8.
I would like to extend my thanks to the anonymous referees of my chapter as well as to the editors of this volume. Their perceptive comments helped me to improve the article in many respects. Any remaining shortcomings are solely my responsibility.
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Salmela, M. (2014). The Functions of Collective Emotions in Social Groups. In: Konzelmann Ziv, A., Schmid, H. (eds) Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6934-2_10
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