Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Political Economy in Forest Policy-Making: Economic Efficiency and Beyond

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Post-Faustmann Forest Resource Economics

Part of the book series: Sustainability, Economics, and Natural Resources ((SENR,volume 4))

Abstract

The development of political economy and studies of political economy in forest policy -making are reviewed and a case study of U.S. policy-making in restricting Canadian softwood lumber imports is presented. The analysis presented demonstrates that interest group politics and political contributions have worked in the U.S. political and institutional settings and that the results are an inefficient forest products trade policy. The implications are that policy-making does not exist in isolation of political and social structure , and that the outcomes of theoretical economic models are greatly influenced by these structures. Forest economists and forest managers can better explain, anticipate, and predict the outcomes of various forest policy developments with a better understanding of political economy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    One may argue that political economy economy is the interplay between economics, law and politics, and thus can also analyze how institutions develop in different social and economic systems. I view that how institutions develop is the subject of institutional economics. In any event, I am more interested in analyzing and explaining the ways in which governments affect the allocation of scarce resources in society through their laws and policies and the ways in which the nature of the economic system and the behaviour of people acting on their economic interests affect the form of government and the kinds of laws and policies that get made.

  2. 2.

    The president needed the support of the Senate Finance Committee before the start of the free trade talks. Since Congress has jurisdiction over trade and commerce, the president cannot rely upon his inherent foreign relations power to negotiate an international trade agreement and ensure that it will be faithfully implemented by Congress. So when the free trade negotiation process started, President Reagan made it clear to Congress that he wanted a “fast track” negotiating authority, under which Congress would not be allowed to offer amendments before voting to ratify the resulting agreement. If the request for a fast-track authority was approved by the committees of jurisdiction (the House Ways and Means Committee, which did not act on this request, and the Senate Finance Committee), the president could proceed with negotiations and the resulting agreement would then be put to the Congress for approval, which requires a simple majority.

References

  • Adams DM, Alig R, McCarl B, Callaway JM, Winnett SM (1996) An Analysis of the impacts of public timber harvest policies on private forest management in the United States. For Sci 42(3):343–358

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson RC, Hansen EN (2004) Determining consumer preferences for ecolabelled forest products: an experimental approach. J For 55(6):19–22

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson RC, Laband DN, Hansen EN, Knowles CD (2005) Price premiums in the mist. For Prod J 55(6):19–22

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson FJ, Cairns RD (1988) The softwood lumber agreement and resource politics. Can Public Policy 14:186–196

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker GS (1983) A Theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quart J Econ 98:371–400

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown RM, Zhang D (2005) The sustainable forestry initiative’s impact on U.S. south stumpage markets. Can J For Res 35:2056–2064

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burton DM, Berck P (1996) Statistical causation and national forest policy in Oregon. For Sci 42(1):86–92

    Google Scholar 

  • Cashore B, Auld G, Newsome D (2004) Governing through markets: forest certification and the emergence of non-state authority. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • FEMAT (1993) Forest ecosystem management: an eclogical, economic, and social assessment. Report of the Forest Ecosystem Management Team. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington

    Google Scholar 

  • Fox IK (1991) The politics of Canada–U.S. trade in forest products. In: Uhler (ed) Canada–United States trade in forest products, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, pp 15–56

    Google Scholar 

  • Godwin J, Zhang D (2012) Political pressure: an examination of U.S. senators’ actions in restricting canadian softwood lumber imports. Can J Agric Econ 60:263–274

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Humphreys D (1996) Forest politics: the evolution of international cooperation. Earthscan Publications Ltd., London

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalt J (1988) The political economy of protectionism: tariffs and retaliation in the timber industry. In: Baldwin RE (ed) Trade policy issues and empirical analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 339–368

    Google Scholar 

  • McChesney FS (1987) Rent extraction and rent creation in the economic theory of regulation. J Legal Stud 16:101–118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maini J (2003) International dialogue on forests: impact on national policies and practices. In: Teeter L, Cashore B, Zhang D (eds) Forest policy for private forestry: global and regional challenges. CABI Publishing, Oxon (chapter 2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Mehmood S, Zhang D (2001) A roll analysis of endangered species act amendment. Am J Agric Econ 83(3):501–512

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mehmood S, Zhang D (2002) Causes for continuation of state cost-share program for nonindustrial private forest landowners. For Sci 48(3):471–478

    Google Scholar 

  • Montgomery C, Brown GM Jr, Adams DM (1994) The marginal cost of species preserbation: the northern spotted owl. J Environ Econ Manage 26:111–128

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nordhaus WD (1989) Alternative approaches to the political business cycle. Cowles foundation discussion papers 927, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson M (1965) The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson M (1982) The rise and decline of nations: economic growth stagflation and rigidities. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Pareto V (1927) Manual of political economy. A.M. Kelley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman S (1976) Toward a more general theory of regulation. J Law Econ 19(2):211–240

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman S (1984) Constituent interest and congressional voting. J Law Econ 27(1):181–210

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schattschneider EE (1935) Politics, pressure, and the tariff. Prentice-Hall, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith PM (1999) A review of studies on consumer attitudes towards forest products marketed with environmental, social and/or sustainability attributes. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler G (1971) The theory of economic regulations. Bell J Econ 2:3–21

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sun C (2006a) A roll call analysis of the healthy forests restoration act and constituent interests in fire policy. For Policy Econ 9:126–138

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sun C (2006b) State statutory reforms and retention of prescribed fire liability laws on U.S. forest land. For Policy Econ 9:392–402

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tanger S, Laband D (2010) An empirical analysis of bill co-sponsorship in the US senate: the TREE Act of 2007. For Policy Econ 11:260–265

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wear DN, Lee KJ (1993) U.S. policy and canadian lumber: effects of the 1996 memorandum of understanding. For Sci 39:799–815

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang D (2001) Welfare impacts of the 1996 U.S.–Canada softwood lumber (trade) agreement. Can J For Res 31(11):1958–1967

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhang D (2006) Welfare impacts of the 1996 U.S.–Canada softwood lumber agreement: an update. Can J For Res 36(1):255–261

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhang D (2007) The softwood lumber war: politics, economics and the long U.S.-Canada trade dispute. Resources for the Future Press, Washington

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang D, Laband D (2005) From senators to the president: solving the lumber problem or else. Public Choice 123:393–410

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhang D, Tanger S, Godwin J (2011) Money for signatures or signatures for money: an empirical analysis of the 2007 tree act. Working Paper, School of Forestry and Wildlife Sciences, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, 36849

    Google Scholar 

  • Zusman P (1976) The incorporation and measurement of social power in economic models. Int Econ Rev 17:447–462

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge Joeseph Godwin for his assistance and Brandon R. Kaetzel and Shashi Kant for their Comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Alumni and George W. Peake Jr. Professor, Forest Economics and Policy, School of Forestry and Wildlife Sciences, Auburn University, AL 36849, Aubum, US

    Daowei Zhang

Authors
  1. Daowei Zhang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daowei Zhang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Forestry, University of Toronto, Willcocks Street 33, Toronto, M5S 3B3, Ontario, Canada

    Shashi Kant

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Zhang, D. (2013). The Political Economy in Forest Policy-Making: Economic Efficiency and Beyond. In: Kant, S. (eds) Post-Faustmann Forest Resource Economics. Sustainability, Economics, and Natural Resources, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5778-3_8

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation