Abstract
This chapter suggests taking a new look at akrasia in group actions. The results of such an investigation contribute to a better understanding of what it means to act as a free agent in a group context and to an evaluation of non-intended consequences and outcomes of group actions.
The initial discussion of the single agent’s akratic action alone and in group contexts suggests to focus on the intentional stance of the agent, not on her self-evaluation or rationality constraints. The distinction between strong and weak cases of akrasia highlights how weak akrasia is a symptom of free agency.
This yields an interesting argument against the account of groups as single agents (vs. Pettit, and Hess in the proposed volume). In considering the possibility of akrasia for groups as quasi-single-agents, the result is negative: groups cannot act akratically. Their “actions” are bound by external force since they rely on intentionality derived from agents that initiate or maintain them, no matter what the present mental states of these agents might be. Yet, if groups are not free to act akratically, they cannot act at all, and hence are not proper agents.
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Notes
- 1.
My article is prompted by a debate in the context of contemporary philosophy of society, social ontology, and collective intentionality, in particular, by the discussions with participants of the ENSO conference in Konstanz, in the fall of 2009. I thank all participants for the stimulating discussion.
- 2.
In a discussion at the conference.
- 3.
Bratman discusses cases in which I seem to be able to have two intentions at the same time. He gives the example of a game in which I intend to either hit goal a or I intend to hit goal b (Bratman 1999). Yet, one could also describe my intention in this example as being of the form: I intend to hit a goal, either a or b. So, there is always exactly one (overall) intention that causes an action. Sometimes I intend to do x by doing y and z. Then, the overall (or prior-) intention can consist of further intentions, but they are hierarchically dependent on the intention to x by doing y and z.
- 4.
All things considered judgments are thought of as judgments according to an idealized rationality, but I suggest that “all things considered” judgments should only be tied to the intentions of that agent. This corresponds more to von Wright than to Raz (1975) and Davidson who both suggest to measure the reasons for an action with a third-person-generalized scale.
- 5.
This is so because reason is not a determining, mechanical cause for action, but the determining fact is that I will the act; and this is what we consider reason, that it be a force that moves the agent to change her intentional stance toward acting out of her own accord (see Rovane for an account of special cases in which reason can be used coercively, Rovane 1998). In distinguishing animal from human agency, there are some other notions involved, for example, the more complex notion of personhood, but I think it is very important to stick to a description of intentional agency as a certain form of intentional causation that both animal and human agents can display (against Rovane). Action isn’t identical to “motor control” or “bodily movement”, but it accounts for instances of motor control and bodily movement that have been caused by an intention.
- 6.
See also Kobow (2011).
- 7.
Searle calls these overall intentions “prior intentions.”
- 8.
If we imagine that self (a) writes a note to future self (b) because in the future she might have forgotten about p and will thus remind self (b) of p (“Aha, I am not to forget that p). But reminding someone is just bringing something to the foreground that they already knew. Even the fact that I was not to forget is something I might have forgotten and am reminded of, now.
- 9.
Of course, this doesn’t answer to the question whether there is ever free action. Strict determinists would maintain that all apparent decisions to act (or to cease acting akratically) are bound by force of prior determination. Yet, if this were true, it would only show – against the holist – that there are no agents at all.
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Kobow, B. (2013). The Boys Carried the Piano Upstairs. In: Schmitz, M., Kobow, B., Schmid, H. (eds) The Background of Social Reality. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5600-7_5
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