Abstract
This chapter analyses the authentic faith (“true piety”), which is the unity of “light” and “virtue.” Only by this means (“Fatum Christianum”) can divine predetermination be reconciled with human freedom.
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Notes
- 1.
M. Serres (Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques, 2 vols., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1968, p. 14) writes “To understand the systematic nature of Leibniz’s thought, it would thus seem that one should construct a grid, seeking to constitute thereby the plan of the labyrinth; or, rather, two grids: one expressing the ‘philosophical’ notions and the other serving a reference function, constituting the mathematical model – all this before considering their respective relations. Every region of these grids has the figure of a kind of stellar node (or ‘apex’), each thread of which, be it efferent and / or afferent, intersects with the whole or a part of all the other apices and is reunited with them. It appears, in brief, that Leibniz always took the greatest possible care to multiply these connections and intersections, to connect each point with all the others along the greatest possible number of roads or, where possible, with all the roads possible: combination, composition, expression, conspiracy.”Further on (p. 18) Serres continues: “The idea of a system thus does not seem in any way to be reducible to the idea of a unique or irreversible order of reasonings or themes, which would draw its evidential strength from the unity of its starting points and interconnections. It presents itself as an ordered and multilinear system of intersections. Any given point of the whole is situated along a certain number of inferential lines and, as a consequence, at the crossroads between them. Hence, even if one wishes to follow a given inferential order, it is always possible to return to the point in question along one path or another. A system, therefore, is characterised by this facet of having a multiplicity of possible return routes.” Serres’ approach to Leibniz’s thought is excellent and offers a satisfactory account of its systematic and polyhedral nature. It is able, moreover, to definitively pass beyond the earlier diatribes concerning the primacy of the one or the other aspect in Leibnizian philosophy, without, however, losing sight of the precious contributions which each of those unilateral interpretations has made to our understanding of Leibniz’s philosophy (on this point, cf. M. SERRES,op.cit., pp. 24 ff., 78, 532, 640).
- 2.
T 25/49.
- 3.
Cf. ibidem.
- 4.
Cf. GP V 14 f.; VII 299 (Eng. trans. PhPL 225); COUT 230, 363 ff., 368 ff., 387 f. (Eng. trans. LP 53 ff., 57 ff., 76 f.).
- 5.
“This meant that the Christian schools, and above all the Thomists, following their founder, were right to sustain that the truth of future contingents is determined. All of which is equivalent to applying the general rule of contradiction, which is the principle of all our universal knowledge, that every intelligible enunciation, with regard to the present, past or even the future, is true or false, even if we do not know where truth lies” (GRUA 479).
- 6.
COUT 514.
- 7.
COUT 515.
- 8.
Cf. SIMPLICIUS,In Aristoteles de caelo commentaria, ed. J. L. Heiberg [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. VII], G. Reimer, Berlin 1894, p. 488.
- 9.
GP IV 496; Eng. trans. MaOth 325.
- 10.
COUT 230.
- 11.
Cf. GP II 576.
- 12.
With the expressions “critical philosophy” and “critical idealism,” I refer, from here on, to a perspective and philosophical tradition drawn above all from Hermann Cohen. For further details, see my The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, Eng. trans. J. Denton, State University of New York Press, New York 1997.
- 13.
Cf. PLATO,The Sophist, 235d–236d. It is possible that, writing this page, Leibniz also has in mind Heb 8:5.
- 14.
Cf. T 25/101.
- 15.
GP IV 328.
- 16.
GP IV 361; Eng. trans. PhPL 387.
- 17.
GP V 91/AVI/6 100; cf. GP III 403 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 195); IV 362 (Eng. trans. PhPL 388), 452 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 58); V 191 f./AVI/6 206.
- 18.
GRUA 253.
- 19.
GRUA 194 f.
- 20.
GP V 480/AVI/6 497; cf. GP V 492/ AVI/6 510.
- 21.
Cf. GP V 502 f./ AVI/6 520 f.
- 22.
T 25/101.
- 23.
T 25/49 f.
- 24.
The manuscript published in GRUA 46 ff., and in particular pp. 60 f., would seem to suggest the influence, which is anything but improbable, of Toland on Leibniz, regarding this critique of the neo-paganism and anti-Christianity concealed by contemporary Christianity. It is nonetheless noteworthy that, whilst the manuscript in question identifies this heresy in the Church of Rome and in other Christian confessions, Leibniz instead directs his polemics against specific ideological approaches such as libertinism or fideism.
- 25.
(GRUA 20; cf. 22). On the necessity of the rational bases of faith, without which there would be no reasonable criteria for choosing Christianity over any other religious persuasion, cf. T 67/91; GP V 477/AVI/6 494; GRUA 18; TS 15.
- 26.
(T 28/52). “There are few individuals who truly understand God’s love for all things, yet herein lies the principle of true religion. This love is all the greater for being the more enlightened. I believe that idiots sometimes have it without knowing, but those who have it by demonstration have it in a more concrete and perfect form, since, with practice, the practical will conform to the theoretical” (GRUA 161).
- 27.
It is probable that Leibniz’s history of the religions is influenced by Toland (cf. GRUA 46 ff. And Grua’s famous note) However, this does not detract from the fact that Leibniz adopts the position and develops its implications on his own accounts.
- 28.
T 26/51.
- 29.
T 26/50.
- 30.
T 26/51.
- 31.
T 27/51.
- 32.
T 26/51; cf. GP IV 462 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 68); E 445.
- 33.
T 27/51.
- 34.
T 26/50.
- 35.
Ibidem. This may be a reference to 2Cor 3:14.
- 36.
GRUA 22. Whether or not Leibniz really managed to demonstrate this truth is another matter. For now, I will disregard this matter altogether. It will be dealt with in the Chap. 7 of the present study, with regard to the existence of God.
- 37.
Cf. GP I 61.
- 38.
GP V 416/AVI/6 497.
- 39.
Cf. GP III 249 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 288).
- 40.
Cf. GP III 389 (Eng. trans. PhPL 423); V 82, 413/ AVI/6 89 f., 432; VII 511.
- 41.
GP III 416.
- 42.
GP V 89/ AVI/6 97; cf. GP VII 509.
- 43.
GP IV 290; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 235.
- 44.
Cf. GP V 176/ AVI/6 190.
- 45.
Cf. GP V 61/AVI/6 68.
- 46.
Cf. GP IV 105 ff. (Eng. trans. PhPL 109 ff.).
- 47.
With regard to the immortality of the soul, cf. Also Leibniz’s letter to the Elector Johann Friedrich of Hannover, published in A II/l 110 ff.
- 48.
T 75/98.
- 49.
Cf. GP II 99 f. (Eng. trans. L-A 124 f.), V 64 f./AVI/6 72; VI 515 f., 534 f. (Eng. trans. PhPL 557 f.), 542 f. (Eng. trans. PhPL 588), 609 (Eng. trans. PhPL 644), 620 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 214 f., 223); VII 315, 330, 530; COUT 15 f.; FdCL 68.
- 50.
Cf. GP III 249 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 288), 291 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 285); V 24, 48, 51 f., 148/AVI/6 55, 58 f., 162; GRUA 379. On the meaning and importance of Leibniz’s theory of immortality by nature, cf. E. CASSIRER, Leibniz’ System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen, Text und Anmerkungen bearbeitet von M. Simon, in IDEM, Gesammelte Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe, vol. 1, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1998, p. 374, which, however, neglects the moral and religious motivations for this stance. Cassirer goes on to dwell on the “personal” character of the immortality of the human soul (cf. pp. 394 ff.).
- 51.
GP III 291; Phil. Ess. 285.
- 52.
GP V 24.
- 53.
GP V 52/ AVI/6 59; cf. GP VI 535 f. (Eng. trans. PhPL 558 f.); GRUA 67. On the position of the averroists, cf. also T 53 ff./134 ff.
- 54.
Cf. GP IV 526.
- 55.
GP IV 459 f.; Eng. trans Phil. Ess. 65 f.; cf. GP II 57 (Engl. trans. L-A 64); IV 462 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 68); V 218 ff./AVI/6 236 f.; VI 542 f. (Eng. trans. PhPL 588), 600 f. (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 209); VII 316, 332,530 f.; COUT 16; FdCL 69. A comprehensive overview of these aspects of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is, famously, to be found in Leibniz’s Remarques on the Rorarius entry in Bayle’s Dictionnaire in GP IV 524 ff.; partial eng. trans. PhT 198 ff.
- 56.
GP IV 460; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 66; cf. GP IV 462 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 67 f.); VII 316, 332, 530 f.; COUT 16; FdCL 69. A typical outline of Leibniz’s doctrine of the immortality of the soul, with particular attention to its theological and moral implications, can be found in the Systema theologicum (cf. TS 191 ff.).
- 57.
GP IV 300; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 243.
- 58.
GP III 384; cf. 133, 187, 391, 620; GRUA 103.
- 59.
GP III 180.
- 60.
Cf. J. BARUZI,Leibniz et l’organisation religieuse de la terre d’après des documents inédits, Felix Alcan, Paris 1907.
- 61.
J. TOLAND,Christianity not Mysterious: or, a Treatise Showing that there is nothing, in the Gospel contrary to Reason, not above it: and that no Christian Doctrine can be properly call’d a Mystery, London 1696 (cf. T 83/170).
- 62.
Cf. T 25/49.
- 63.
T 25/50.
- 64.
T 28/52.
- 65.
E. CASSIRER,op. cit., p. 389. With regard to this approach of the Marburg school, which highlights, together with the scientific also the practical dimension of Leibnizian rationalism, cf. also, and perhaps even more crucially, the study by A. GÖRLAND,Der Gottesbegriff bei Leibniz. Ein Vorwort zu seinem System [Philosophische Arbeiten, ed. H. Cohen e P. Natorp, vol. I, fasc.3], Töpelmann, Gießen 1907. H.G. Gadamer also focuses on the significance and practical value of Leibniz (Metaphysik im Zeitalter der Wissenschaft, in AA.VV., Akten des Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, Hannover 14–19 November 1966, vol. I: Metaphysik – Monadenlehre, in “Studia Leibnitiana,” Supplementa vol. I, Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden 1968, p.12): “The individual being attains to fulfilment as a will, making the best possible rational choices. This is certainly a Leibnizian formulation. It is the formulation of divine wisdom, according to which it recognises compossibilitas as the measure of what can be. Nonetheless, in my opinion, this remains eternally as a human task, which has never been as urgent and significant as at the present day when, as human beings, we must learn to track down with our reason the greatest possible good to be drawn from an earth which is becoming ever smaller.”
- 66.
Cf. T 29/53.
- 67.
Cf. ibidem.
- 68.
Cf. T 33/57.
- 69.
Ibidem.
- 70.
T 27/52. As I have already indicated, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the practical interest of reason in Leibniz by A. Görland (op. cit.). Görland underlines the practical dimension of Leibniz’s philosophy: “The main aim of philosophy [for Leibniz] consists in being able to stimulate the soul to the exercise of virtue” (p. 34). To this end, he quotes the Eclaircissement to the 1705 Considérations sur les Principes de Vie et sur les Natures Plastiques: “The principal aim of philosophy must be a knowledge of God and of the soul which will stimulate the soul to love God and practise virtue” (GP VI 548). It is certainly true that Görland stretches his reading of Leibniz a little too far in a “kantian” direction in suggesting that “the concept of God” is “a product of moral reflection” (p. 15), and therefore considering the idea of God as a mere “postulate” of practical reason (cf. pp. 66 ff.). This interpretation is no doubt a reductive reading of Leibniz’s real intentions; but Görland’s emphasis and capacity to do justice to the important but often-overlooked practical dimension in Leibniz is nonetheless praiseworthy.
- 71.
GRUA 499; cf. 105, 581.
- 72.
T 28/52; cf. GRUA 14. Baruzi (op. cit., p. 279) also underlines the indissoluble link between faith and charity.
- 73.
GP III 221.
- 74.
GRUA 211.
- 75.
GP V 193/AVI/6 207; cf. TS 35 f.
- 76.
T 28/52; cf. GP VII 56.
- 77.
T 27/51; cf. GRUA 8: “they produce fervour without light.”
- 78.
Cf. TS 33.
- 79.
D. Mahnke (Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik, Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Günther Holzboog], Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1964), instead, sees no contradiction here and refers to Leibniz as an “active mystic” (p.118).
- 80.
GRUA 137; cf. GP II 576 f.; GRUA 105, 114, 125, 128; E 446. Leibniz famously dedicated the 19 chapter of the fourth book of his Nouveaux Essais to the theme of enthusiasm (cf. GP V 485 ff./AVI/6 503 ff.).
- 81.
T 32/56.
- 82.
T 28/52; cf. GRUA 580 f.; FdCL 142 f.
- 83.
GP V 413/AVI/6 432.
- 84.
GP VII 79.
- 85.
Ibidem.
- 86.
GRUA 138 f.
- 87.
T 28/52.
- 88.
In his Confessio Philosophi, Leibniz expresses this maxim with an incisive Latin formula: “Boni consulere praeterita, optima reddere conari futura” (CF 110).
- 89.
T 27/51.
- 90.
Ibidem.
- 91.
Cf. COUT 169.
- 92.
COUT 153.
- 93.
GP VII 391; Eng. trans. L-C 58.
- 94.
GP III 427; Eng. trans. PhPL 632.
- 95.
T 27/51.
- 96.
Cf. É NAERT’s thorough and penetrating study of Leibniz and the debate on pure love: Leibniz et la querelle du pur amour, J. Vrin, Paris 1959. I have here drawn extensively from the findings of this study, and would refer any of my readers seeking a broader and deeper insight into this matter to consult it.
- 97.
D IV/3 295.
- 98.
GRUA 208.
- 99.
GP II 581; cf. I 73 (Eng. trans. PhPL 150); II 577; GRUA 10; FdCNL 393; A II/1 173 f.
- 100.
COUT 516.
- 101.
GRUA 640.
- 102.
L.E. Loemker (Das ethische Anliegen des Leibnizschen Systems, in AA.VV., Akten des Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, Hannover, 14–19 November 1966, vol.IV: Theologie – Ethik – Pädagogik – Ästhetik – Geschichte – Politik – Recht, in “Studia Leibnitiana,” Supplementa vol. IV, Franz Steiner Wiesbaden 1969, p. 74) also underlines the relationship between aesthetics and ethics in the Leibnizian conception of love.
- 103.
T 27/51.
- 104.
Cf. GP II 581; V 149 f./AVI/6 163; VI 605 f. (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 212); VII 86 f. (Eng. trans. PhPL 425 f.), 546, 549; GRUA 142, 515, 580.
- 105.
CF 32.
- 106.
FdCNL 393. Cf., in this regard, C. BROWN,Leibniz und die Ästhetik, in AA.VV., Akten des Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, Hannover, 14–19 November 1966, vol. IV: Theologie – Ethik – Pädagogik – Ästhetik – Geschichte – Politik – Recht, cit., pp. 124 ff.
- 107.
GRUA 91.
- 108.
GRUA 380.
- 109.
COUT 492.
- 110.
GP V 149/AVI/6 162 f.
- 111.
Cf. T 27/51.
- 112.
Cf. TS 5, 193.
- 113.
T 27/51.
- 114.
T 26/51.
- 115.
T 27/51.
- 116.
GP IV 479 f.; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 140.
- 117.
GP VI 622; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 224.
- 118.
Cf. GP VI 498; TS 5.
- 119.
Cf. FdCL 171.
- 120.
Cf. GP VII 74.
- 121.
Cf. CF 36.
- 122.
Cf. GP IV 460 ff. (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 66 ff.).
- 123.
COUT 493.
- 124.
GP V 321/AVI/6 340.
- 125.
GP VII 74.
- 126.
T 27/52; cf. GP I 73 (Eng. trans. PhPL 150); VII 74; GRUA 108, 111, 137, 581, 586, 609; FdCL 277; TS 47. As Leibniz writes to Wolff, on 21 February 1705: “Our good, the common good and the glory of God are not to be distinguished as means and ends, but as parts and the whole. It is the same thing to serve our own good, the common good and the good of God” (Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, Halle 1860; reprinted Georg Olms, Hildesheim 1963 p.20). In a fine passage from L’Action. Essai d’une critique de la vie et d’une science de la pratique (in M. BLONDEL, Oeuvres complètes, Tome I: 1893 Les deux thèses, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1995, p. 480), Maurice Blondel writes: “We hence obtain the positive expression of Leibniz that ‘to love all men and to love God is the same thing,’ since in everything and for everything He is the only thing to love, and because we cannot know other individuals without embracing them all with the same charity. In reality, mankind can only truly be united thanks to a flame which even the whole world would be unable to light. The following circle is thus justified: without the active love which human beings have for each other, there can be no God for mankind. He who does not love his brother has no life in himself. However, we would in this way seek in vain to group together the spirits into a family excluding the Father of the spirits. In vain we would seek to deceive our reason, to hide the great vacuum by exalting other sentiments. Ultimately, in the common practice of life, in the hidden logic of the individual consciousness, without God man does not exist for man. There is, therefore, an intrinsic contextuality between two sentiments and actions which are very different in themselves. The first consists in loving in the spirit and truth within an individual’s one-to-one relationship with God. The second involves developing a cult dedicated to the whole body of humanity in each of its individual members, as if it were the body of the living God in each point of the universal organism.” J. Baruzi (op. cit., pp. 456 ff.) rightly acknowledges that this complementarity between the love of God and the love of one’s neighbour, which is of Johnian inspiration, represents an important facet of authentic Christian faith for Leibniz.
- 127.
GP I 358; cf. III 425 (Eng. trans. PhPL 630); V 82/AVI/6 90; VII 86 (Eng. trans. PhPL 425), 112; GRUA 589.
- 128.
GP V 82/AVI/6 90.
- 129.
GP V 153/AVI/6 172. Leibniz is somewhat undecided with regard to his use of terminology here. In COUT 492 Leibniz provides definitions similar to those already quoted from the Nouveaux Essais: “Gaudium is joy for an event. Laetitia is the predominant pleasure of the soul or, rather, the pleasure of the soul for a state which is general to it.” We should nonetheless note the strange way in which gaudium is defined through laetitia, thus suggesting that there is a genus-species relation between the two which does not correspond with the passage from the Nouveaux Essais. In GRUA 11, gaudium is defined as a synonym of “pleasure:” “Joy (gaudium) or pleasure (delectatio) are the feeling of perfection.” In GRUA 579 ff., Leibniz returns to the definition of “felicity,” “joy” and “pleasure.” Leibniz’s indecision is here made clear by his numerous cancellations (which I will indicate in square brackets). At the beginning, he writes: “Felicity is a lasting state of [contentment] pleasure […]. Pleasure is a knowledge or [a] sentiment of perfection” (GRUA 579). Later he corrects this definition: “Felicity is a lasting state of [pleasure] [contentment] joy […]. Joy is the total pleasure which results from the ensemble of all that which the soul feels […] Pleasure is the sense of some perfection” (GRUA 582).
- 130.
In GRUA 574 Leibniz returns to this distinction, referring to non-rational pleasure as felicitas and to rational pleasure as beatitudo. Had this terminology been applied coherently, it would have contributed to clarifying and avoiding misunderstandings in Leibniz’s writings, but unfortunately this was not the case.
- 131.
GP V 185/AVI/6 199 f.
- 132.
T 27/51.
- 133.
This anticipation of future felicity is a result of true piety, but also of true philosophy (cf. GRUA 162): here, too, the two prove convergent.
- 134.
Cf. GRUA 582.
- 135.
Cf. GP V 179 f./AVI/6 194; GRUA 95, 487.
- 136.
GP VII 197.
- 137.
Cf. E 446.
- 138.
Cf. T 27/51.
- 139.
GP V 199 f./AVI/6 215.
- 140.
Cf. CF 116.
- 141.
Cf. GP VII 546 ff.
- 142.
Cf. GP VII 547.
- 143.
GP VII 548; cf. TS 39.
- 144.
GP V 436/AVI/6 454.
- 145.
GRUA 107.
- 146.
Cf. T 32/56.
- 147.
Cf. GRUA 37.
- 148.
Cf. GP II 27 (Engl. trans. L-A 26).
- 149.
Cf. GP VII 381(Eng. trans. L-C 45).
- 150.
Cf. GP II 37 f. (Engl. trans. L-A 39 f.); VII 389 (Eng. trans. L-C 55).
- 151.
GP II 37 (Engl. trans. L-A 39).
- 152.
GP III 368.
- 153.
Cf. GRUA 376.
- 154.
Cf. GRUA, 457, 458 f., 464.
- 155.
GP VII 391; Eng. trans. L-C 59; cf. GP IV 139 f. (Eng. trans. PhPL 122).
- 156.
T 30/54. The fact that Leibniz attributes the error of fatalism to the Muslims (“Finally the Mohammedans, who flooded the world with violence and ignorance, fuelled their barbarous courage with their opinion that the future was inevitable:” GRUA 457) does not seem to contradict, but surely does not fit well with his earlier appreciation of Islam, as the religion which spread the dogmas of true piety “even among the most remote races of Asia and of Africa, whither Christianity had not been carried; and they abolished in many countries heathen superstitions which were contrary to the true doctrine of the unity of God and the immortality of souls” (T 27/51). This positive evaluation of Islam in fact stands in isolation in Leibniz’s writings, where, beyond his interest in Islamic texts (cf. GP II 545, 557, 563) and appreciation for various Arabic philosophers (cf. GP II 563), there emerges overall a negative judgement of the barbarity of the Turks (cf. GP III 213; VII 142) and the errors of Islam (cf. GP I 71; III 324; V 176 f./AVI/6 190 f.; VII 70; GRUA 156, 370; TS 73). Even the Consilium Aegyptiacum, for all that it is evidently conditioned by contingent political interests, is significantly harsh in its judgements of the Turks and of Islam. F. Olgiati (II significato storico di Leibniz, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1929, p. 49) writes of this project: “We need not believe that religious interests alone spurred Leibniz to promote a holy war against the Turk. The human and profane aims of such a war were not underestimated – indeed, they were precisely illustrated. Nonetheless, he conceived of them as inseparably linked to the religious ideal, which formed their ideal inspiration.” On this point cf. also J. BARUZI,op. cit., pp. 5 ff.
- 157.
This form of sophism, which is probably of Megarian origin, is cited by Plato, who attributes it to the sophists, by Chryssipus, and by Cicero (De fato, XII, 28).
- 158.
Cf. T 32/108.
- 159.
Cf. T 268/282.
- 160.
Leibniz’s attribution of the fatum stoicum to the epicureans is also noted by G. Carlotti (II sistema di Leibniz, Principato, Messina 1923, p.70), who, therefore, attributes “an arid stoicism; or, more coherently, an epicureanism (in the exact sense of the word)” to Descartes (p. 29).
- 161.
Cf. T 30/54.
- 162.
In the already quoted letter to the Elector Johann Friedrich of Hannover, Leibniz explicitly groups epicureans, stoics and Cartesians (cf. A II/1 111).
- 163.
Cf. T 30 f./54 f.
- 164.
Cf. T 217/234, 336/349; GP IV 285; GRUA 38.
- 165.
T 33/57.
- 166.
T 133/153.
- 167.
Cf. B. SPINOZA,Ethica Ordine Geometrico demonstrata, in IDEM, Opera, im Auftrag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften hg. von C. Gebhardt, Carl Winters-Universitaetsbuchhandlung, Heidelberg 1925, vol. II, p. 56, 61 ff., 70.
- 168.
T 30/54.
- 169.
Cf. ibidem.
- 170.
Cf. T 33 f./58.
- 171.
T 71 f./95.
- 172.
Cf. GP IV 258 f.; GRUA 496.
- 173.
Cf. T 34 f./58.
- 174.
Cf. GP VII 334 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 282). Cf., on this point, J. IWANICKI,Leibniz et les démonstrations mathématiques de l’existence de Dieu, Librairie Universitaire d’Alsace, Strasbourg 1933, pp. 48 ff.
- 175.
Cf. T 43/67, 139/160, 336/348, 412/417, 413/418.
- 176.
Cf., for example, GPII 563; IV 283 (Eng. trans. PhPL 273); VI 3; GRUA 38, 478, 486.
- 177.
Cf. T 141/161, 216 f./234.
- 178.
T 389/394.
- 179.
T 393 f./398 f.
- 180.
T 398/403.
- 181.
The issue of Leibniz’s relationship with Descartes has been long discussed, above all by French scholars, amongst whom there initially prevailed a tendency to emphasise Leibniz’s dependence on Descartes. As Foucher de Careil notes: “I am well aware that there existed an energetic and fervent propensity amongst the French school, which sees its culmination in Cousin, to seek to establish the closest possible connection between Leibniz and Descartes and to merge their two philosophies into one, and it is undeniable that there was a certain skill in the way in which they were thus able to bundle up together the strengths of two great systems” (FdCNL CXL). At the same time, he dissociates himself from this tendency: “There is, without a doubt, a point at which all great spirits meet, and we can only applaud this tendency of eclecticism, which seeks to reconcile doctrines and pacify spirits. Yet we must also recognise that if Descartes and Leibniz had the same end, their means were very different” (FdCNL CXLI). E. Boutroux (La Philosophie allemande au XVII’ siècle. Les prédécesseurs de Leibniz: Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke et la philosophie de Leibniz, J. Vrin, Paris 1948, pp. 3 ff.) considers the reasons why some accentuate the continuity between the two philosophies while others emphasise their difference, ultimately opting for this latter approach. J. Baruzi (op. cit., pp. 57 ff.) also rigorously espouses the diversity of Descartes and Leibniz: “There is the habit in France of associating Leibniz with the Cartesians. Without doubt, many aspects of his systems can only be explained in terms of Cartesian influence. Nonetheless, Leibniz was not a direct descendent of Descartes. To make a Cartesian of Leibniz would be to accept a unilinear conception of history; it would mean to continue to uphold the Cousinian theory of modern philosophy as deriving entirely from Descartes” (p. 60). It seems to me that Y. Bélaval’s accurate study, Leibniz critique de Descartes, Gallimard, Paris 1960, has provided the definitive demonstration of the radical difference and, on various points, the absolute opposition, between Leibniz’s philosophy and Descartes’ (which, indeed, is revealed in Leibniz’s reading of his own ideas).
- 182.
GP IV 305; cf. 311, 343, 345.
- 183.
GP IV 285.
- 184.
Cf. GP IV 298 ff.; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 241 ff.
- 185.
Cf., in this regard, Y. BÉLAVAL,op. cit., p. 400.
- 186.
R. DESCARTES,Principia Philosophiae III 47, in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Ch. Adam e P. Tannery, vol. VIII/1, J. Vrin, Paris 1964, p. 103.
- 187.
GP II 562f.; cf. IV 283 (Eng. trans. PhPL 273), 288f., 299 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 242), 340f.; VII 334 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 282).
- 188.
T 30/54.
- 189.
T 31/55.
- 190.
T 31/55. P. Burgelin (Commentaire du Discours de métaphysique de Leibniz, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1959, p. 110): explains thus “To be truly satisfied implies something entirely other than simple resignation. We are completely involved, however difficult that may be. We love God only if we find our joy in the course of events in the world, whatever they may be […]. In this way, we can be certain that all that is at present, all that has been and all that will be conforms to the will of God and therefore to the best in itself and for us. This is the basis for our moral and spiritual life.”
- 191.
T 30 f./55.
- 192.
GP III 218. E. Cione (Leibniz, Libreria Scientifica Editrice, Napoli 1964, p. 217) concludes from his study of Leibniz’s monadology that “Not only does Leibniz neglect to emphasise the deliberative momentum of the will […], but he also ignores the pragmatic, with the result that intention is transformed into action tending to mute the objective conditions of the world in order to realise one’s own ends.” However, the study of the Theodicy leads us to the opposite conclusions. Cione himself in fact acknowledges later on that for Leibniz “the cosmos is not a brutal reality, but rather the result of a divine choice and it thus implies that there should be an Ought to Be which imposes on all of us the necessity to participate freely but consciously in the impetus which marks God’s imprint on the world and which should carry us in the direction of an ever greater realisation of the Good” (p. 298).
- 193.
For this reason I disagree with E. Cione (op. cit.) who criticises Leibniz on this point. His criticisms are grounded in a conception of Christianity, which he considers as the only legitimate vision but which is instead only the expression of one particular sensibility and spirituality which is of a pessimistic nature, which may certainly influence one particular approach to Christianity but can certainly not be identified with the Christian faith as a whole. Cione accuses Leibniz of not participating in the “healthy anthropological pessimism which Christianity has brought to the world” (p. 478); and repeats: “If he can be truly defined as an optimist, it is not because he is fatuous like Pangloss who imagines that everything speeds ahead in full sail, but rather because he ignores the anguish of the fall, the torture of remorse, the self loathing which invades and overwhelms the sinner […]. This is the point at which he comes up against not only Pascal, not only Luther and Calvin, not only Augustine and Paul, but healthy Christian pessimism as a whole, which has always been founded on the concept of sin. Without this, Christianity would lose the essential characteristic which distinguishes it from other religions” (p. 507). Again, Cione insists: “His [Leibniz’s] Christianity does not only walk unscrupulously hand in hand with reason; not only is it immune to the gnawing of sin; it does not reverberate with the trembling of mystery, which represents at once the shuddering terror and anguish of sin and the trembling exaltation of sublime mystery. It emerges entirely unruffled and somewhat overly luminous, clear and optimistic” (p. 523). I repeat that Cione’s identification of Christianity with “healthy[!] pessimism” is unacceptable, as is his pretence that Christianity must necessarily neglect only the “anguish of the fall,” the “torture of remorse” and “self-loathing.” I maintain that if Leibniz “cannot even imagine the anxiety of a Kierkegaard or the passionate faith of a Dostoevskij” (ibidem), but, whilst not denying the reality of sin, places his primary emphasis on Christian joy, on consolation and devotion, this does not mean that he did not understand or authentically uphold the Christian faith. On the contrary, Leibniz’s discourse sheds light on and effectively calls our attention to fundamental dimensions of the Christian faith, which the univocal emphasis on the aspects indicated by Cione sometimes risks eclipsing, even nowadays, doing serious damage to Christian hope and placing an unjust, excessive affliction on the shoulders of mankind, which may lead to despair (which is certainly not Christian!). F. Olgiati’s appraisal therefore seems to me more objective and balanced (op. cit., p. 46): “To that pessimism which dries up the founts of action and sows hate, inspiring blasphemy, Leibniz opposes his religious optimism. The general knowledge of the great truth, that God always acts in the most perfect and desirable way possible, was his basis for the love which we owe to God above everything and of our duty to live following the divine will, thus ascending from the ‘kingdom of nature’ to the ‘kingdom of grace’.”
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Poma, A. (2012). True Piety. In: The Impossibility and Necessity of Theodicy. Studies in German Idealism, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5031-9_2
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