Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Moral Scepticisms

Kail, Peter J. E.

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4810-1_7

Peter J. E. Kail³

Part of the book series: International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées ((ARCH,volume 210))

782 Accesses

Abstract

In this paper I discuss Shaftesbury’s moral sense theory in the context of his response to Locke’s philosophy and, in turn, Hutcheson’s adoption of Shaftesbury. After offering with some general background, I first look at the different senses of ‘scepticism’ at play in Shaftesbury’s work. I then narrow the focus to consider how Shaftesbury considered Locke’s attacks on moral nativism as tantamount to pyrhhonism. I then argued that at the bottom of Shaftesbury’s response to Locke lies a form of platonism. I then turn to Hutcheson, who sees Hobbes and Mandeville as a greater threat than Locke, in as much as that they seek to understand all moral practice as nothing but disguised self-interest. I then try to show that, in light of this difference, Hutcheson’s moral sense has a different character and grounds from the sense of Shaftesbury.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 84.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 109.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 109.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
E.g. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 9–13.
2.
Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, Lawrence E. Klein (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 369.
3.
Ibid., p. 369.
4.
Ibid., pp. 384–385. This is obviously connected to the important role of satire that Shaftesbury sees in social critique.
5.
Ibid., p. 301.
6.
Ibid., p. 335.
7.
Ibid., pp. 241–242.
8.
Ibid., p. 45.
9.
Ibid.
10.
Ibid.
11.
E.g. Henry Lee, Anti-Scepticism: or, Notes Upon each Chapter of Mr. Locks’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London, 1702. For discussion see John W. Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1956.
12.
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975, 2.28.10–11. References are to book, chapter, and section numbers.
13.
Ibid., 2.28.10.
14.
Ibid., 4.4.7–10.
15.
Ibid., 2.28.8.
16.
Quoted in Daniel Carey, Locke Shaftesbury and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 130.
17.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, J. Annas and J. Barnes (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 40.
18.
Shaftesbury, op. cit., p. 328.
19.
John Leslie Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, New York, Viking Press, 1977, p. 15.
20.
Part of his response is to reinstitute a sophisticated form of nativism based on the stoic notion of prolepsis, but I am not going to pursue this topic here This aspect, however, is the focus of Carey’s work.
21.
Shaftesbury, op. cit., p. 169.
22.
Ibid., p. 172.
23.
Shaftesbury, op. cit., p. 165.
24.
Anthony W. Price, “Doubts About Projectivism”, Philosophy, 61, 1986, p. 215.
25.
Shaftesbury, op. cit., pp. 266–267.
26.
Shaftesbury, op. cit., p. 165.
27.
Ibid., p. 428.
28.
Michael Gill, The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 121ff.
29.
Shaftesbury, op. cit., p. 229.
30.
David F. Norton, David Hume: Common-sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 244.
31.
Norton’s discussion of the alleged crise morale focuses far too much on Hobbes, and leads him to overlook both Locke’s uses of diversity and his voluntarism as sources of concern for Shaftesbury, and to see Locke’s account as sceptical simply because of its externalist character.
32.
Francis Hutcheson, Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Wolfgang Leidhold (ed.), Indianapolis, Liberty Press, 2004, p. 99.
33.
E.g. Hutcheson, op. cit., p.100.
34.
For a full discussion of this, see Carey, op. cit.
35.
For more detail on the aesthetic and moral senses in Hutcheson, see Peter J. E. Kail, “Normativity and Function in Hutcheson’s Aesthetic Epistemology”, British Journal for Aesthetics, 40, 2000, pp. 441–451; and “Hutcheson’s Moral Sense: Realism, Skepticism, and Secondary Qualities”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 18, 2001, pp. 57–77.
36.
Thanks to the participants of the excellent conference on scepticism in São Paulo, December 2009 where an early version of this paper was given, and in particular, Plinio J. Smith, Sébastien Charles and Tom Stoneham.

Bibliography

Carey, Daniel. 2006. Locke Shaftesbury and Hutcheson: Contesting diversity in the Enlightenment and beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book Google Scholar
Empiricus, Sextus. 1994. Outlines of scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Google Scholar
Gill, Michael. 2006. The British moralists on human nature and the birth of secular ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book Google Scholar
Hutcheson, Francis. 2004. Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Google Scholar
Kail, Peter J.E. 2000. Normativity and function in Hutcheson’s aesthetic epistemology. British Journal for Aesthetics 40: 441–451.
Article Google Scholar
Kail, Peter J.E. 2001. Hutcheson’s moral sense: Realism, skepticism, and secondary qualities. History of Philosophy Quarterly 18: 57–77.
Google Scholar
Lee, Henry. 1702. Anti-scepticism: Or, notes upon each chapter of Mr. Locks’s essay. London, Clavel and Harper.
Google Scholar
Locke, John. 1979. An essay concerning human understanding. Oxford: Clarendon.
Google Scholar
Mackie, John L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. Basingstoke: Penguin.
Google Scholar
Norton, David F. 1982. David Hume: Common-sense moralist, sceptical metaphysician. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Google Scholar
Price, A.W. 1986. Doubts about projectivism. Philosophy 61: 215–228.
Article Google Scholar
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper. 1999. Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Google Scholar
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2006. Moral skepticisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Book Google Scholar
Yolton, John W. 1956. John Locke and the way of ideas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Google Scholar

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Peter J. E. Kail

Authors

Peter J. E. Kail
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Peter J. E. Kail .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Université de Sherbrooke, boulevard de l'Université 2500, Sherbrooke, J1K 2R1, Québec, Canada
Sébastien Charles
, Departamento de Filosofia, Universidade Federal de são Paulo, Estrada do Caminho Velho 333, Guarulhos, 07252-312, Brazil
Plínio J. Smith

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kail, P.J.E. (2013). Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Moral Scepticisms. In: Charles, S., J. Smith, P. (eds) Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 210. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4810-1_7

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4810-1_7
Published: 23 February 2013
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-4809-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-4810-1
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics