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Extended Game-Theoretical Semantics

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Between Logic and Reality

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 25))

Abstract

A new version of Game-Theoretical Semantics (GTS) is put forward where game rules are extended to the non-logical constants of sentences. The resulting theory, together with a refinement of our criteria of identity for functions, provide the technical basis for a game-based conception of linguistic meaning and interpretation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Like Fodor’s [5] narrow content. See [17] for an elaboration of the connection between narrow content and the conception developed in the present paper.

  2. 2.

    See [11] for an overview.

  3. 3.

    Starting with a given FO formula there is no unicity in the upshot in the general case since several prenex normal forms can sometimes be available. This is the case with \(\exists x Ax \to \exists y By\) which leads us to two prenex forms, \(\forall x \exists y (Ax\to By)\) and \(\exists y \forall x (Ax\to By)\), thus to two distinct skolemizations: respectively \(\forall x (\neg Ax\vee B\mathbf{f}(x))\) and \(\forall x (\neg Ax \vee B\mathbf{a})\), where \(\ mathbf{a}\) is a constant (function) symbol.

  4. 4.

    Such an extension is actually suggested by Hintikka himself, see [3, p. 51]. However, this suggestion is essentially connected with applications in first-order epistemic logic, and no extended version of GTS is provided. Already in 1985 Hintikka and Kulas [10] argued that game rules must be associated with NL individual constants.

  5. 5.

    Atomic game rules could be formulated independently from the atom truth-value: atomic games would thus be played according to the other rules, and the winner would be the player winning both molecular and atomic game. The outcome regarding ∃loise’s winning strategies would be exactly the same.

  6. 6.

    When an atomic game is reached there is no residual individual variable in the formula: as eGTS games are played for sentences only, every variable is bound and next replaced by a new constant during the molecular game. GTS could of course be defined for open formulas with a slight complication—games relative to a formula, a model and an assignment. However it is not necessary for the objectives of this paper.

  7. 7.

    Here again, one has to assume that the domain contains at least two elements, one of which is denoted by 1. As was suggested by a referee, using relations symbols and predicate variables rather than indicator functions and function symbols would provide much more readable Skolem forms. However, the uniform use of (Skolem-like) functions at a metalinguistic level appears to be consistent with the fact that games are played with no higher-order entities. Incidentally, this uniform treatment would allow us to translate the resulting \(\Sigma^1_1\) formulas into IF logic in the usual way.

  8. 8.

    Both kinds of functions are linked to choice functions in the strict sense: the individual constant functions \(\mathbf{g}_{a_i}\) could be defined relative to a domain D s.t. \(\mathbf{g}_{a_i}(D)\in D\); the indicator functions for relations \(\mathbf{h}_{R_j}\) completely determine functions \(\mathbf{h}'_{R_j}\) s.t. \(\mathbf{h}'_{R_j}(D^n)\in D^n\).

  9. 9.

    In what follows I do not give any strict definition. However strategies are recursively definable: the syntax of a given formula completely determines the set of possible plays or histories, which in turn determines the set of strategies for ∃loise. Hence the arrays of functions here mentioned are expected to be structured. See [15] for an exact definition.

  10. 10.

    Imperfect information semantic games provide a new logic which has been developed by Hintikka and Sandu since the 1980s, independence-friendly logic (IF logic for short). It is a slight extension of first-order logic equivalent to the \(\Sigma^1_1\) fragment of second-order logic.

  11. 11.

    Jackson [12] provides another extension of GTS to atomic formulas in the context of knowledge-base management: new game rules are introduced to check whether the atom in question is a proof-theoretic consequence of the knowledge base under consideration. The theory departs from the model-theoretic ground and admits of indeterminate formulas. Such an account can be seen as an implementation of non-omniscient players, where the initial verifier’s knowledge is restricted to the content of the knowledge base.

  12. 12.

    And this is not an easy task, see [2].

  13. 13.

    Strictly speaking, ∀belard could also choose the individual constant b and lose immediately.

  14. 14.

    If the reader doesn’t share my intuition, successful reference is more obvious in cases such as the speaker’s assertion: “I do not know who Nicolas is”.

  15. 15.

    To be more precise in the writing down of the constraints, we should relativize the stereotypes to usual contexts, in order to avoid situations where, e.g., an elm and a tiger were both boiled, ground, then mixed with flour and black ink, so that the agent can no longer distinguish them. This relativization is here left implicit.

  16. 16.

    This subformula is equivalent to \(\forall y (\neg Py \vee y=a)\), so that ∃loise has a winning strategy if, for any value chosen for y by ∀belard, she can select one of the disjuncts, i.e. either deny P of this value or identify it to a; it is of course assumed that the function h P does not change during the game. Finally, a winning strategy for the initial verifier in the whole game associated with φ is a tuple where h P occurs twice—one time for each occurrence of P in φ: \(\overline{\mathbf{f}_\varphi} = \langle \mathbf{f}_x, \langle\{\mathbf{h}_P\}, \langle\mathbf{f}_\vee, \{\mathbf{h}_P\}\rangle, \{\mathbf{h}_B\}\rangle\rangle\).

  17. 17.

    This means that in a standard Kripkean structure, the accessibility relation between possible worlds is doubled over by world-lines between entities. However, Hintikka does not agree with such a combination of his own ideas with that of rigid designation. See [18].

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Acknowledgements

Acknowledgments Previous and partial versions of this work were presented on several occasions during the past years—notably at APLI 2006 (Rijeka, Croatia), at JSM 2007 (Paris, France), and at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa (2008). I wish to thank Denis Bonnay, Paul Egré, Bertram Kienzle, Paul Gochet, Helge Rückert, Anna Sierszulska, and Tero Tulenheimo for their comments on earlier versions of this paper and for many fruitful discussions. All errors remain mine.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: eGTS Rules

In eGTS, every FO sentence φ evaluated relative to a structure \(\mathbf{M}=\langle D,I \rangle\) is associated to a game \(eG(\varphi,\mathbf{M})\). This new game is identical to the game \(G(\varphi,\mathbf{M})\) played according to the standard GTS rules when it is a molecular game, i.e. when φ is a complex formula. If φ is an atomic formula or an identity, one reaches an atomic game. The original game rule for atomic sentences in GTS, (R.At), is replaced by the following specific four rules:

  • (R.At *) In the atomic game \(eG(\alpha,\mathbf{M})\), if either ∃loise is the current verifier and α is false in M, or she is the current falsifier and α is true, then ∀belard wins and ∃loise loses; else there are two cases:

    1. (i)

      α is of the form \(Rt_1\ldots t_n\), R being a n-ary relation symbol and the t i s being terms: ∀belard picks out an index \(i \in \{0, 1, \ldots,n\}\); if i = 0 then the rest of the game is as in \(eG(R,\mathbf{M})\), else it is as in \(eG(t_i,\mathbf{M})\).

    2. (ii)

      α is of the form \((t_1 = t_2)\), the t i s being terms: ∀belard picks out an index \(i \in \{1,2\}\); the rest of the game is as in \(eG(t_i,\mathbf{M})\).

  • (R.Rel) In the relation game \(eG(R,\mathbf{M})\), where R is a n-ary relation symbol, ∀belard chooses a n-tuple \(\langle d_1, \ldots, d_n\rangle \in D^n\), and ∃loise answers \(\mathtt{yes} \) or \(\ mathtt{no}\). If she answers \(\ mathtt{yes}\) and \(\langle d_1, \ldots, d_n \rangle \in I(R)\), or she answers \(\mathtt{no} \) and \(\langle d_1, \ldots, d_n \rangle \notin I(R)\) then ∃loise wins and ∀belard loses; else ∀belard wins and ∃loise loses.

  • (R.Term) In the term game \(eG(t,\mathbf{M})\), where t is a term, one of the following three cases occurs:

    1. (i)

      t is a new constant previously introduced through the play i.e. not occurring in the original formula; then ∃loise wins and ∀belard loses;

    2. (ii)

      t is an individual constant; then ∃loise chooses an object \(d\in D\); if \(d=I(t)\) then ∃loise wins and ∀belard loses; if \(d\neq I(t)\) vice versa;

    3. (iii)

      t is a complex term involving a n-ary function symbol: \(t=f(t_1, \ldots, t_n)\); then ∀belard picks out an index \(i\in\{0,1,\ldots,n\}\). If \(i > 0\) then rest of the game is as in \(eG(t_i,\mathbf{M})\), and if i = 0 it is as in \(eG(f,\mathbf{M})\).

  • (R.Fun) In the function game \(eG(f,\mathbf{M})\), f being a n-ary function symbol, ∀belard chooses a n-tuple \(\langle d_1, \ldots, d_n\rangle \in D^n\), then ∃loise chooses an object \(d\in D\). If \(d=I(f)(d_1, \ldots, d_n)\) then ∃loise wins and ∀belard loses; else vice versa.

Appendix 2: Second-Order Skolem Forms

There is a simple device to yield a result equivalent to extended GTS with no resort to (sub)atomic games, but only to skolemization. In what follows we will assume that the models under consideration contain at least two distinct elements, and that second-order formulas get a standard (full) semantic interpretation. Let:

$$\Phi(a_1, \ldots, a_k, R_1, \ldots, R_l, x_1, \ldots, x_m)$$
((9.11))

be a first-order sentence, where \(a_1, \ldots, a_k\) are the k individual constant symbols, \(R_1, \ldots, R_l\) the l relation symbols, and \(x_1, \ldots, x_m\) the m variables occurring inside Φ. Being first-order Φ can be put into prenex normal form:

$$Q_1 x_1\ldots Q_m x_m\Phi^\otimes(a_1, \ldots, a_k, R_1, \ldots, R_l, x_1, \ldots, x_m)$$
((9.12))

with \(Q_i \in \{\exists, \forall\}\). Φ can also be skolemized, and is equivalent to:

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{2Sk}[\Phi]=\exists f_1\ldots\exists f_n \forall t_1\ldots\forall t_p\\ \,\hspace{1.5cm} \Phi^\circ(a_1, \ldots, a_k, R_1, \ldots, R_l,f_1(\vec{t_1}), \ldots, f_n(\vec{t_n}), t_1,\ldots, t_p) \end{array}$$
((9.13))

where \(\{t_1,\ldots, t_p\}\subseteq\{x_1, \ldots, x_m\}\) is the subset of the universally quantified variables of \(\Phi^\otimes\), \(\vec{t_i}\subseteq\{t_1,\ldots, t_p\}\) is the set of the universally quantified variables of Φ on which the existentially quantified variable replaced by f i depends, and Φ° results from Φ by a mere permutation of its arguments so that the Skolem functions appear first.

Now we can replace the relation and individual constant symbols in Φ by second-order quantified variables. So Φ is equivalent to the following formula:

$$\begin{array}{l} \exists g_1\ldots\exists g_k \exists X_1\ldots\exists X_l [\Phi(g_1, \ldots, g_k, X_1, \ldots, X_l, x_1, \ldots, x_m)\\ \wedge [g_1=a_1]\wedge\ldots\wedge[g_k=a_k] \wedge [X_1=R_1]\wedge\ldots\wedge[X_l=R_l]] \end{array}$$
((9.14))

The same existential generalization can be done within 2SkΦ, reaching the following formula:

$$\begin{array}{l} \exists g_1\ldots\exists g_k \exists X_1\ldots\exists X_l\exists f_1\ldots\exists f_n \forall t_1\ldots\forall t_p\\ \,\hspace{1.5cm} [\Phi^\circ(g_1, \ldots, g_k, X_1, \ldots, X_l,f_1(\vec{t_1}), \ldots, f_n(\vec{t_n}), t_1,\ldots, t_p)\\ \,\hspace{1.5cm} \wedge [g_1=a_1]\wedge\ldots\wedge[g_k=a_k] \wedge [X_1=R_1]\wedge\ldots\wedge[X_l=R_l]] \end{array}$$
((9.15))

Furthermore, let us change each relation variable X i into a corresponding (indicator) function variable h i and correlatively modify Φ° into Φ—so that each token of \(X_i t_1 \ldots t_{n_i}\) be replaced by one of \(h_i (t_1\ldots t_{n_i})=1\). Hence Φ is equivalent to its extended second-order Skolem form:

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{2eSk}[\Phi]_1\;=\; \exists g_1\ldots\exists g_k\exists h_1\ldots\exists h_l \exists f_1\ldots\exists f_n \forall t_1\ldots\forall t_p\,\hspace{2cm} \\ \,\hspace{2cm} [\Phi^\star(g_1, \ldots, g_k, h_1, \ldots, h_l,f_1(\vec{t_1}), \ldots, f_n(\vec{t_n}), t_1,\ldots, t_p)\\ \,\hspace{2cm} \wedge [g_1=a_1]\wedge\ldots\wedge[g_k=a_k] \wedge [h_1=\mathbf 1_{R_1}]\wedge\ldots\wedge[h_l=\mathbf 1_{R_l}]] \end{array}$$
((9.16))

A similar first-order skolemization is then given by:

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{eSk}[\Phi]\;=\;\forall t_1\ldots\forall t_p\,\\ \hspace{0,2cm} [\Phi^\star(\mathbf{g}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{g}_k, \mathbf{h}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{h}_l,\mathbf{f}_1(\vec{t_1}), \ldots, \mathbf{f}_n(\vec{t_n}), t_1,\ldots, t_p)\\ \,\hspace{2cm} \wedge [\mathbf{g}_1=a_1]\wedge\ldots\wedge[\mathbf{g}_k=a_k] \wedge [\mathbf{h}_1=\mathbf 1_{R_1}]\wedge\ldots\wedge[\mathbf{h}_l=\mathbf 1_{R_l}]] \end{array}$$
((9.17))

Another second-order Skolem form, equivalent to (9.16), obtains if we restore the original constants in Φ:

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{2eSk}[\Phi]_2\;=\;\exists g_1\ldots\exists g_k\exists h_1\ldots\exists h_l \exists f_1\ldots\exists f_n \forall t_1\ldots\forall t_p\,\hspace{2cm} \\ \,\hspace{1.5cm} [\Phi^\circ(a_1, \ldots, a_k, R_1, \ldots, R_l,f_1(\vec{t_1}), \ldots, f_n(\vec{t_n}), t_1,\ldots, t_p)\\ \,\hspace{1.5cm} \wedge [g_1=a_1]\wedge\ldots\wedge[g_k=a_k]\\ \,\hspace{1.5cm} \wedge [h_1=\mathbf 1_{R_1}]\wedge\ldots\wedge[h_l=\mathbf 1_{R_l}]] \end{array}$$
((9.18))

which can be written in a condensed form as:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathbf{2eSk}[\Phi]_2=&\exists g_1\ldots\exists g_k\exists h_1\ldots\exists h_l\\ &\,[\mathbf{2Sk}[\Phi] \wedge [g_1=a_1]\wedge\ldots\wedge[g_k=a_k] \wedge\\ &\,[h_1=\mathbf 1_{R_1}]\wedge\ldots\wedge[h_l=\mathbf 1_{R_l}]] \end{array}$$
((9.19))

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Rebuschi, M. (2012). Extended Game-Theoretical Semantics. In: Trobok, M., Miščević, N., Žarnić, B. (eds) Between Logic and Reality. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2390-0_9

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