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Introduction

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Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking

Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 65))

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Abstract

When Martin Heidegger passed away on May 26, 1976, both interest in and appreciation of his thought had spread to all corners of the globe. Implicit in this development was the simple fact that many of those who were devoted to studying his thought and writings were not native German speakers, and indeed, may have been fluent only in the language of their own nationality and upbringing. Within the English-speaking world, this “language gap” was probably most glaring in the United States, where the “melting pot” of diverse cultures had often occurred at the expense of cultivating fluency in other languages. Given this unique twist on the “Zeitgeist,” a growing audience of students and scholars alike not only depended upon existing translations, but, also discovered in each “new” translation of Heidegger’s writings the opportunity to gain greater access to his thinking and thereby achieve deeper insight into his philosophy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, GA 54 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), p. 18. Parmenides, trans André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 12.

  2. 2.

    Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977c). Originally published in 1927, Sein und Zeit was first translated into English by John Macquirrie and Edward Robinson. See Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962). Published in the same year was the English translation of Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (which Heidegger composed in 1929). See Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962). Among other early translations of Heidegger’s key works is An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).

  3. 3.

    Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975b).

  4. 4.

    William J. Richardson, S. J., “Dasein and the Ground of Negativity: A Note on the Fourth Movement in the Beiträge-Symphony,” Heidegger Studies, 9 (1993): 35, 37. Also, see George Kovacs, “Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy and the Failure of ‘A Grassroots Archival Perspective,’” Studia Phaenomenologica, 6 (2006): 319–345. See Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989). Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

  5. 5.

    For Heidegger’s discussion of this “violence,” see Kant und das Problem der Metaphysics, GA 3 (Frankfurt am Main: 1992), pp. 201–202. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 141.

  6. 6.

    See Parvis Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007). For a discussion of Emad’s book, see Frank Schalow, “Accessing Heidegger’s Thought through a New Approach to Translation,” Existentia, 18 (2008a): 301–314; and “Review of On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy by Parvis Emad,” Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 39/1 (2008b): 121–125.

  7. 7.

    Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage in Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976c), p. 423. On the Question of Being, trans. William McNeill in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 320 [translation modified].

  8. 8.

    In the past decade, proposals for a new translation of Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), have surface, beginning with the brief excerpt, “Ereignis,” published in The Heidegger Reader, ed. Günter Figal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 177–188. The translation of this excerpt is by Jerome Veith (based on a draft by D. Schmidt, D. F. Krell, and R. Rojcewicz, see footnote, p. 177).

  9. 9.

    One such precedent (i.e., “event of appropriation”) occurs in Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), pp. 36–40.

  10. 10.

    For an example of this way of translation, the “Essential Heading” of Contributions to Philosophy, see Dennis J. Schmidt’s “Foreword” to Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), p. xvii.

  11. 11.

    See Kovacs, op cit, pp. 320, 325.

  12. 12.

    For examples of this claim of “untranslability,” and in regard to its implications for the task of translation in general, see Quentin Lauer, Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 169. Also see John Sallis, On Translation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 1, 100–102. For a critical counter focus to this theme, see Frank Schalow, “Freedom, Truth, and Responsibility: A Critical Look at Recent Translations of the Gesamtausgabe,” Heidegger Studies, 23 (2007): 96–111.

  13. 13.

    See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 37, 39.

  14. 14.

    For a discussion of this important distinction, see Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 21–42.

  15. 15.

    For a discussion of the term “Da-sein,” see Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 15–16, 26–27.

  16. 16.

    Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymne “Der Ister”, GA 53 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984b), p. 76. Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”, trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 63.

  17. 17.

    For a different view of translation, which is not based on Heidegger’s hermeneutical principles, see Paul Ricoeur, On Translation, trans. Eileen Brennan, “Introduction” by Richard Kearney (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. x–xv, 8–15.

  18. 18.

    See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 10–11. Emad points to the error of a “monological reductionism” at the basis of such renderings of Ereignis (enowning) as “event.” Also see p. 33. For a recent example of rendering “Ereignis” as “event,” see The Heidegger Reader, p. 177. The title of the excerpt from Beiträge, that is, “Ereignis,” is left untranslated.

  19. 19.

    For a discussion of the “responsibility” as it bears on the task of translation, see Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 21–42 (Chapter I).

  20. 20.

    As an example of this false equation, or view of Ereignis as another “name” for being, see Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 258–259.

  21. 21.

    See Bret W. Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 272–273.

  22. 22.

    For a critique of this error reifying of Ereignis by equating it with an “impersonal” it, see Thomas Kalary, “Towards Sketching the Genesis of Being and Time,” Heidegger Studies, 16 (2000): 200–205.

  23. 23.

    For a discussion of this “transformed language as ‘saying,’” see Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 30–31, 39–40, 57–59, 70, and for the question of the future of philosophy see, p. 122.

  24. 24.

    DanielaVallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension in Thinking (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2005), pp. 90–92. See also Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 66–80. Also see Vallega-Neu, “Poietic Saying,” in Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, ed. Charles E. Scott, et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 70.

  25. 25.

    See Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit, pp. 212–213.

  26. 26.

    See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 39. See GA 2, p. 262.

  27. 27.

    Heidegger, Besinnung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997b), p. 361. Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: Continuum, 2006), p. 251. See Emad’s and Kalary’s “Translators’ Foreword,” pp. xix–xx. Also, see Emad’s and Maly’s “Translators’ Foreword to Contributions to Philosophy,” pp. xxii–xxiii. As Kenneth Maly explains the preference for abground over abyss: “Abgrund says the staying-away of ground that is part and parcel of Grund. Thus, not an ‘abyss,’ which ‘opens up’ and into which one might ‘fall,’—thus not something that thinking might even consider to avoid—but rather the staying-away of ground that inheres in the ground itself. Thus: not abyss, but ‘abground.’” Kenneth Maly, “Translating Heidegger’s Works into English: The History and the Possibility,” Heidegger Studies, 16 (2000): 136–137.

  28. 28.

    For a discussion of the keys to translating these terms, see Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 31–35, 38–40.

  29. 29.

    Regarding this ‘ringing,” see Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 38–39. For a further discussion of the intimacy of the relation between language, being-historical thinking, and translation, see Ivo De Gennaro, “Heidegger on Translation–Translating Heidegger,” Phänomenologische Forschungen, 5 (2000): 3–22.

  30. 30.

    See Heidegger, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, GA 32 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980). For a brief discussion of the importance of the English translation of this work, see Frank Schalow, “Review of Hegel’s Phenomenology Spirit by Martin Heidegger, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly,” The Review of Metaphysics, 62/4 (June 1989): 837–838.

  31. 31.

    See GA 9, p. 141.

  32. 32.

    Without the guidance of this hermeneutic precondition or strategic insight into the nature of translation, Emad encountered an initial obstacle in the form of a centuries old, metaphysical presumption that there is a simple identity holding between the key terms of Heidegger’s philosophy and their English cognates, most noteworthy, the patently obvious and yet for that reason questionable precedent of using “essence” as a dictionary equivalent for “Wesen.” Almost a decade later when Emad co-translated volume 25 of the Gesamtausgabe, the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, (1997) he began to establish a more solid “foothold” in the hermeneutic situation of translating Heidegger’s texts. See Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, GA 25 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977b). Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). Standing on the threshold of uncovering the hermeneutical basis of translation, Emad discovered clues, which had hitherto lay dormant in other of Heidegger’s works, specifically, in Vom Wesen des Grundes, in which, as hindsight shows, Heidegger was already enacting an “intralingual” translation of the word “Wesen” and thereby suggesting how to translate it into English. In a key passage in this work, Heidegger observes that “To attribute being-in-the-world to Dasein as its basic constitution means to state something about its Wesen, i.e., its ownmost inner possibility (seine eigenste innere Möglichkeit).” See Heidegger, “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” in Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976a, b, c), p. 141.

  33. 33.

    Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 31.

  34. 34.

    GA 66, p. 259; tr. 229.

  35. 35.

    GA 65, pp. 415–417; tr. 286–293 For a discussion of the forgottenness of the difference between being and beings, see Heidegger, “Der Spruch des Anaximander,” Holzwege, GA 5 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977a ), p. 322.

  36. 36.

    GA 65, pp. 411–412; tr. 289.

  37. 37.

    See Heidegger, Idenität und Differenz, GA 11 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), p. 59 (die Vergessenheit der Differenz). Compare the German text with the English version (which is not based on the Gesamtausgabe edition), Identity and Difference, trans. J. Stambaugh, p. 50 (“the oblivion of the difference”).

  38. 38.

    See Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, GA 61 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985b), p. 26. Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, trans. R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 21. Also, see Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, GA 29/30 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983b), pp. 111–112. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 75.

  39. 39.

    GA 66, p. 217; tr. 191.

  40. 40.

    See “Translators’ Foreword” to Mindfulness, p. xxxix.

  41. 41.

    GA 66, p. 259; tr. 229.

  42. 42.

    See Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze, GA 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), pp. 7–36.

  43. 43.

    See GA 66, p. 369; tr. 327.

  44. 44.

    For the importance of this link, see Heidegger, “Seinsvergessenheit,” Heidegger Studies, 20 (2004): 9–14. Also, see GA 65, pp. 113–114; tr. 79.

  45. 45.

    In translating Vergessenheit as “forgottenness,” rather than as “forgetting,” or “oblivion,” we discover an important example of how we can avert many crucial misunderstandings of Heidegger’s thought by practicing hermeneutically responsible translation. Yet there are even more subtle instances of errant translations that have prompted significant misunderstandings of Heidegger’s thought. Foremost among these is the errant decision to translate “das Seiende im Ganzen” sometimes as “beings as a whole,” and sometimes as “being as a whole,” while this technical phrase should have been translated as “beings in a whole.” The history of this error begins as early as the Krell/Capuzzi translation of Early Greek Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975a), reappearing in Krell’s translation of What Is Metaphysics? in Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), only to be preserved in the slightly modified version in the English edition of Pathmarks. See Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Here is an example of the initial error, which occurs in the Krell/Capuzzi translation of the essay “Moira,” in Early Greek Thinking: “One could certainly be justified in wondering further why Parmenides proceeds to give a special proof for this inclusion, particularly through the commonplace notion that aside from beings, and being in totality, there can be no other beings” (p. 80). We see this same error reemerge in the 1977 translation of “What Is Metaphysics?”: “In the inquiry concerning nothing such an inquiry beyond or over beings, as being as a whole, takes place.” See, Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?”, in Basic Writings, p. 109. As the designation of the boldface in both instances suggests, of special note is the way in which Krell renders “das Seiende im Ganzen” as “being” not “beings” as a whole.” First, we discover that by using the singular rather than the plural form “beings,” both translations fail to contrast das Seiende with das Sein, thereby obscuring the ontological difference. In the process, these translations ignore the uniqueness of being’s unconcealment, as a “singularity” to which no beings, even the “all-highest” or God, can compare. Secondly, we find that the two translations vacillate between using “totality” and “whole,” thereby disregarding the phenomenological fact that they are not the same. Thirdly, we see that the mistaken substitution of “as” for “in,” despite the fact that Heidegger’s word is “im” and not “als,” ignores that what is at stake in the phrase “das Seiende im Ganzen” is his concern for the situatedness of a being—any being—in a whole.

    Yet, when two decades later, the slightly modified version of the translation of “What Is Metaphysics?” is incorporated into the edition of Pathmarks, the identical error reappears in the same line. Let me quote the relevant passage from the 1998 English translation of “Was ist Metaphysik?”: “In the question concerning the nothing such an inquiry beyond or over beings, being as a whole, takes place.” For examples, see Heidegger, “Was ist Metaphysik?”, Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976b), pp. 118–119. As different examples of how this line is translated, see “What Is Metaphysics?”, trans. D. F. Krell in Pathmarks, p. 93. In the “Notes” to Pathmarks, the editor points out that the “present edition is edited and revised by David Farrell Krell and William McNeill” (p. 366). This translation was based on the version that appeared in Basic Writings, p. 109. Although here “das Seiende” is properly translated as “beings” (rather than as “being”), the mistake of translating “im” as “as,” rather than as “in,” has not been corrected. The history of this error, however, does not end with the 1998 edition of Pathmarks. On the contrary, translating in 2003 one of Heidegger’s most crucial essays, “The Origin of the Work of Art, ”Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes perpetuate the same error made decades ago by Krell and Capuzzi when Young and Haynes use “beings as a whole,” instead of “beings in a whole.” To take a simple example, allow me to quote the following passage from “The Origin of the Work of Art”: “Now it is indeed possible that the idea of creation which is grounded in faith can lose its power to guide our knowledge of beings as a whole.” See Heidegger, “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” in GA 5, p. 15. “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Off the Beaten Track, trans.Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 11. By rendering “im” from the phrase, “das Seiende im Ganzen” as “as,” thus confusing “im” with “als” rather than translating “im” as “in,” Young and Haynes lose sight of Heidegger’s attempt to bring Dasein’s situatedness into the forefront of questioning. The loss of the idea of creation does not lead to the loss of our knowledge of “beings as a whole,” but to the loss of our knowledge of “beings in a whole.”

  46. 46.

    As Emad points out, whether it be a “pair of shoes or Nietzsche’s new god,” a tool or a person, at stake in Heidegger’s emphasis on the situatedness of beings is the fact that any being, and the possibility of our knowledge thereof, always occurs “in” a whole. See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 168. For his criticism of the translation of “das Seiende im Ganzen” as “being as a whole” see Emad, op cit, p. 188, and note number 93 on pp. 218–219. In their “Translators’ Foreword” to Mindfulness, Emad and Kalary address the importance of avoiding this mistranslation, by raising an important question: “Is it perhaps the epistemology of analytic philosophy that hinders other translators of Heidegger from “seeing” the situatednesss of beings within a whole and blinds them to the insight that there are no beings in isolation from a whole? How else is one to understand and assess the mistranslation of the “im”—how else is one to grasp the fact that “beings as a whole” translates “das Seiende als Ganzes” and not Heidegger’s “Das Seiende im Ganzen”—other than look in the direction of that epistemology?” See Emad’s and Kalary’s “Translators’ Foreword” to Mindfulness, p. xxxiv.

  47. 47.

    See Heidegger, “Ein Vorwort: Brief an Pater William J. Richardson,” in Identität und Differenz, GA 11 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), pp. 141–152 and “Foreword” to William J. Richardson, S. J., Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 4th ed. (Bronx: Fordham University Press, 2003), pp. viii–xiii.

  48. 48.

    In the “Preface to the U.S. Edition” of his book, which contains both William J. Richardson’s letter to Heidegger and his reply to Fr. Richardson, Richardson concedes that the publication of Beiträge zur Philosophie requires “nuan[cing] the understanding of the Kehre” as the division between “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II.” See William J. Richardson, S. J., “Preface to the U.S. Edition” in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 4th ed., p. xxxvi.

  49. 49.

    This misinterpretation of die Kehre as a “reversal” and not as the “turning,” occurs most overtly in Kockelmans’s characterization of Heidegger’s thought as having two phases, one “Dasein-oriented,” and the other “being-oriented.” See Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Art Work (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 76. For a critical account of the secondary literature about the “turning,” see Emad, op cit, note #41, p. 214.

  50. 50.

    See Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. xviii–xix and Heidegger, “Brief über den ‘Humanismus,’” in GA 9, p. 328.

  51. 51.

    Heidegger, Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte “Probleme” der “Logik”, GA 45 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984a), pp. 214–215. Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic,” trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 181 (translation modified). Also, see Heidegger, “Ein Vorwort: Brief an Pater William J. Richardson,” GA 11, p. 151. “Foreword” to Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 4th ed, p. xx.

  52. 52.

    See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 3–4, 9–10, and 16.

  53. 53.

    By demonstrating that in being-historical thinking the two structures called “projecting open” and “thrownness” are retained and simultaneously transformed, Emad opens the path toward approaching Heidegger’s thought with no need for the premeditated thesis of a “Heidegger I” “Heidegger II” distinction. Ibid., pp. 200–201.

  54. 54.

    On this point, see GA 65, pp. 238–239; tr. 169. See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 188–189.

  55. 55.

    For a good example of Heidegger’s discussion of this “occurrence,” see GA 3, p. 229; tr. 160.

  56. 56.

    Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 190.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., p. 200.

  58. 58.

    For a discussion of this key transformation, see Heidegger, “Die Kehre,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze GA 7, pp. 113–124.

  59. 59.

    GA 66, pp. 321–322; tr. 286.

  60. 60.

    For a critique of this chronological view, see Thomas Kalary, “Towards Sketching the Genesis of Being and Time,” Heidegger Studies, 16 (2000): 200–207.

  61. 61.

    GA 65, p. 315; tr. 221.

  62. 62.

    See GA 66, pp. 40–42; tr. 31–33.

  63. 63.

    It should be pointed out that using neologisms is one of many ways in which Heidegger faces the task of thinking in relation to language. Perhaps, it suffices to mention a few cases. From the transcendental-horizonal thinking: Alltäglichkeit, Bewandtnisganzheit, Erschlossenheit, Jemeinigkeit, Befindlichkeit; from being-historical thinking: Anfängnis, Bewëgen, Eignung, Ereignung, Gegnet, Jeweiligkeit, Übereignung, das Seiendste, Ge-Stellnis, and Wesung. For a discussion of the importance of neologisms in translating Heidegger’s writings, see Frank Schalow, “Freedom, Truth, and Responsibility in the Recent Translations of the Gesamtausgabe,” Heidegger Studies, 23 (2007): 104–105.

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    Frank Schalow

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Schalow, F. (2011). Introduction. In: Schalow, F. (eds) Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 65. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_2

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