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Pacing Science and Technology with Codes of Conduct: Rethinking What Works

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The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight

Part of the book series: The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology ((ELTE,volume 7))

Abstract

Against concerns about the social, political, and ethical issues associated with science and technology, many organizations and governments have suggested scientists and engineers should adopt what are generally referred to as “codes of conduct”.  While the term “code of conduct” covers a range of options, in general, these measures attempt to establish expectations regarding proper thinking and behavior.  Although codes of various complexions are hardly new, they are often portrayed as highly desirable today because they are said to offer means of professional (self-)regulation adept enough to keep pace with S&T developments. Building on extensive previous work into the question of whether codes of conduct can and have worked as a means of ethical regulation, this chapter seeks to reframe traditional approaches to their utility.  Beyond treating codes as a means of regulating individuals, consideration is given to how the discussion of codes itself acts to foster shared interpretative resources and problem definitions among organizations.  With this reframing of utility, the bases for the assessment of codes changes. This argument is substantiated in large part through making reference to the “real time” experiences of the author over the last five years in attempts to devise a code of conduct to mitigate concerns about the relation between life science research and the deliberate spread of disease.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Examples of code initiatives in nanotechnology include, for instance, the European Commission’s 2008 Recommendation document On a Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research, the European Nanotechnology Trade Alliance’s Developing a Nanotechnology Code of Conduct for European Industry, the collaborative Responsible NanoCode.

  2. 2.

    Royal Society. 2006. Report of the RS-IAP-ICSU international workshop on science and technology developments relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. London: Royal Society.

  3. 3.

    Rappert, Brian. 2008. Defining the emerging concern with biosecurity. Japan Journal for Science, Technology and Society 17: 95–116.

  4. 4.

    Facilitated by a grant from by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) New Security Challenges Program (RES-223-25-0053) running from 2004 to 2007. See Rappert, Brian. 2009. Experimental secrets. Lanham, NY: University Press of America.

  5. 5.

    See http://www.codesofconduct.org for many written examples.

  6. 6.

    Kaptein, Muel. 2004. Business codes of multinational firms. Journal of Business Ethics 50: 13–31.

  7. 7.

    Rappert, B. 2004. Responsibility in the life sciences. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 2(3): 164–175.

  8. 8.

    Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. 2007. A code of conduct for biosecurity. Amsterdam: KNAW.

  9. 9.

    While a matter of speculation based on my personal experience, the uncertainty about what is meant by the term ‘code of conduct’ is probably highly functional in contributing to suggestions of their utility.

  10. 10.

    Rappert, Brian. 2004. Towards a Life Sciences Code: Countering the Threats from Biological Weapons. Bradford Briefing Papers (2nd series); No. 13 See http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/bw-briefing.htm

  11. 11.

    Pels, P. 1999. Professions of Duplexity. Current Anthropology 40(2): 101–114.

  12. 12.

    See as well Atlas, R., and M. Somerville. 2007. Life sciences or death sciences. In Web of prevention, eds. B. Rappert and C. McLeish. London: Earthscan.

  13. 13.

    Ladd, J. 1991. The question for a code of professional ethics. In Ethical issues in engineering, ed. D. Johnson, 130–136. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

  14. 14.

    House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee. 2003. The scientific response to terrorism. HC 415-II, Examination of Witnesses, May 14, 2003. London: HMSO.

  15. 15.

    Ibid.: paragraph 211. See as well Times Higher Education Supplement. 2003. Agree ethics code or face state control. Times Higher Education Supplement, 14 Nov.

  16. 16.

    17InterAcademy Panel. 2005. IAP statement on biosecurity, 7 Nov 2005 http://www.nationalacademies.org/morenews/includes/IAP_Biosecurity.pdf

  17. 17.

    United Nations. 2002. Annex report of the policy working group on the United Nations and terrorism A/57/273-S/2002/875, 6 August 2002. Available at http://www.un.dk/doc/A.57.0273_S.2002.875.pdf

  18. 18.

    18ICGEB. 2005. Building blocks for a code of conduct for scientists, in relation to the safe and ethical use of biological science. Trieste: ICGEB.

  19. 19.

    19Bush, G. 2001. President's statement on biological weapons, 1 Nov 2001, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011101.html

  20. 20.

    20Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Draft Decision of the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction BWC/CONF.V/CRP.3 6 November 2002.

  21. 21.

    21 Report of the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction BWC/MSP/2005/3 14 December.

  22. 22.

    22Rappert, B. 2004. Towards a Life Sciences Code: Countering the Threats from Biological Weapons. Bradford Briefing Papers (2nd series) 2004; No. 13 See http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/bw-briefing.htm

  23. 23.

    Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. 2007. A code of conduct for biosecurity. Amsterdam: KNAW.

  24. 24.

    http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/pdf/NSABB%20Draft%20Guidance%20Documents.pdf

  25. 25.

    In November 2002 the Federation of American Scientists, Stockholm International Pease Research Institute, Verification Research, Training and Information Center, International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Sunshine Project, Pax Christi International, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and 20/20 Vision agreed draft recommendations for a code of conduct for biodefence programs. These were published as an Annex to Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Defending against biodefence: the need for limit. Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 69, February – March 2003. Available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd69/69op03.htm

  26. 26.

    Somerville, M., and R. Atlas. 2005. Ethics: a weapon to counter bioterrorism. Science 307: 1881–1882.

  27. 27.

    http://www.iubmb.unibe.ch/Standing_Orders/Code_ethics.htm

  28. 28.

    http://www.asm.org/ASM/files/ccLibraryFiles/FILENAME/000000001596/ASMCodeofEthics05.pdf

  29. 29.

    See Green, S., S. Taub, K. Morin, and D. Higginson. 2006. Guidelines to prevent malevolent use of biomedical research. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 15: 432–439.

  30. 30.

    For another instance of the reading of responsive measure as an effort in the ‘simulation of control’, in this case the risk-benefit analysis of the security implications of research, see Rappert, B. 2008. The benefits, risks, and threats of biotechnology. Science and Public Policy 35(1): 37–44, Feb.

  31. 31.

    Van der Bruggen, K. 2009. Science of mass destruction. In Biosecurity, eds. B. Rappert and C. Gould. London: Palgrave.

  32. 32.

    As in the debate codes in synthetic biology. See Check, Erika. 2006. Synthetic biologists try to calm fears. Nature 441, 388–389 and Etc. 2006 ‘Global Coalition Sounds the Alarm on Synthetic Biology’ News Release 19th May. Available at http://www.etcgroup.org/en/issues/synthetic_biology.html.

  33. 33.

    Though at the time of writing, an industry association for the five leading German companies in the field of synthetic biology (Industry Association Synthetic Biology) issued a draft ‘Code of Conduct’. See http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/644/46/PDF/G0864446.pdf?OpenElement

  34. 34.

    34Emphasis in original. See FCO. n.d. FCO Discussion Paper on a Possible Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Code of Conduct.

  35. 35.

    35FCO. 2004. Biological and toxin weapons convention: Code of conduct. Lancaster house seminar 15 December 2003 Main Points. London: FCO: 2.

  36. 36.

    36United Kingdom. 2006. Codes of Conduct for Scientists Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction BWC/CONF.VI/WP.23 Geneva, 13–24 June 2005: 22 November: 2.

  37. 37.

    37Ibid., 2.

  38. 38.

    38Ibid., 2.

  39. 39.

    39Ibid., 2.

  40. 40.

    40United Kingdom. 2008. Oversight of ewmerging technologies: Examples of UK approaches to responsible development of science. BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.11 12 Aug, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/626/54/PDF/G0862654.pdf?OpenElement

  41. 41.

    41Ibid., 6.

  42. 42.

    As in the Health Protection Agency. 2005. Principles of good scientific practice. London: HPA, Aug.

  43. 43.

    Gotterbarn, D. 1999. Not all codes are created equal. Journal of Business Ethics 22: 81–89.

  44. 44.

    Rappert, Brian. 2009. Experimental secrets. Lanham, NY: University Press of America.

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    For an example of an analysis that attempts to determine why so much attention has been given to codes given their shortcomings, see Lentzos, Filippa. 2006. Managing biorisks: Considering codes of conduct. Nonproliferation Review 13(2) July: 221.

  47. 47.

    Taussig, M. 2003. Viscerality, Faith, and Skepticism. Another Theory of Magic. In Magic and Modernity, eds. B. Meyer and P. Pels. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press: 272–306.

  48. 48.

    Ibid., 288.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., 294

  50. 50.

    While recognizing that what past and current codes discussion will enable in the future cannot yet be known, I have sought to raise doubts about expectations given past experience.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Exeter, Exeter, Devon, UK

    Brian Rappert

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Correspondence to Brian Rappert .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. College of Law, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA

    Gary E. Marchant

  2. , Department of Civil and Environmental En, Ira A. Fulton School of Engineering, PO Box 875306, Tempe, 85287, USA

    Braden R. Allenby

  3. , School of Letters and Sciences, Arizona State University, Santa Catalina Hall 250 D, Mesa, 85212, USA

    Joseph R. Herkert

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Rappert, B. (2011). Pacing Science and Technology with Codes of Conduct: Rethinking What Works. In: Marchant, G., Allenby, B., Herkert, J. (eds) The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1356-7_8

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