Abstract
We have now reached the point of inquiry where it is time to relate the various theoretical lines of reasoning presented in earlier chapters to actual practices of making risky decisions. In particular, we need to reconsider the issue about what PP should amount to in actual political decision making regarding environmental action and the use and introduction of technology. In doing this, I will proceed in a sort of ‘down-top’ order, starting with the issue of what the theory developed in the preceding chapter might say about a number of particular activities in isolation from the issue of policy. After this, the discussion will move on to the primary policy level and discuss what my theory implies regarding PP and its implementation within the political and regulative systems of a nation. As a final, I will then conclude by considering a number of implications on a more overarching global and long-term level of policy making.
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Notes
- 1.
In Western consumerist societies of today, I would suggest, this growth is mainly indirectly effected by actual consumption (through the use of resources created by the consumerist system for other purposes, such as health care and public health, education, social security, public safety, et cetera). This since people in these societies as a rule live on such a high level of material wealth that the marginal value of each new brand or product may be assumed to be microscopically small. However, in other consumerist societies, such as developing countries, the continuous consumption of new goods may still by itself be an important contributor to many people’s quality of life.
- 2.
For example, in the case of less energy consuming products, the end result may be even larger energy consumption than before due to an increased market for the product created by lower prices made possible by the energy saving production process.
- 3.
This notion was introduced by German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992).
- 4.
Unless, of course, there are reasons for believing that the growth itself would change the political situation into one where more people are allowed to enjoy more well-being up to a point that may justify the extra risks.
- 5.
This presupposes the absence of dynamic effects in the form of negative growth , for example, due to those better off in such a society becoming motivated to emigrate (personally and/or financially). Below, such prospects will be noted as one of many factors supporting the idea that precautionary policies should ideally be at work on a global rather than merely multi-lateral, national or regional level.
- 6.
Assuming, of course, that they are to any benefit at all.
- 7.
Of course, the very distribution may bring risks of its own, which then will have to be taken into account in decisions on its size and shape.
- 8.
- 9.
This claim does not assume that any conceivable market gap will be automatically filled, only that gaps resulting from measures that impede a formerly active part of the market are very likely to be filled.
- 10.
They would simply be slaughtered, held in slavery or at least robbed of all their possessions.
- 11.
Hobbes (1651).
- 12.
For facts on this issue, see IPCC (2007). The side-effects include, among other things, massive migration from large areas that become uninhabitable due to climate change , severe strain on traditional industries, and resulting risks of grave social unrest and war. It should be observed that it is highly probable that these effects will saliently affect also developed nations.
- 13.
This claim is consistent with the existence of the so-called climate scepticism , expressed by a minor group of researchers (mostly not in the relevant scientific fields), who doubt the conclusions drawn, e.g. by IPCC . However, none of those doubts disprove the risks created by green-house gas emissions, global warming and climate change and – for the most part – concern minor details in the scientific discourse. Some climate sceptics also criticise the political initiatives taken to handle these risks, and thus seem to assume some (undeclared) theory on the ethics of risk and precautionary policy. My discussion in this subsection may be seen as a response to such debaters, with the difference that I present and defend a transparent and worked out theory on the ethics of risk and precaution on which the analysis of climate change policy is based.
- 14.
United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997).
- 15.
- 16.
This argument must be kept separate from an argument based on desert considerations often wielded by representatives of developing countries. That argument claims that rich countries are overproducers of pollution , while developing countries are not, since it is mainly the past pollution of developed nations that has given rise to the climate change problem now being faced by all nations – simply put: ‘it is their fault not ours!’. This claim assumes desert to be a valid normative consideration, but such an assumption is not a part of my theory. Since desert is a classic suggestion in debates about justice , however, this is another instance of how my theory is able to produce results of relevance from the point of view of justice without making any particular assumption about what is a just distribution of risks.
- 17.
In such a process, it may be claimed that the idea of directing policies towards the fostering of precautionary virtue s among the electorate of the nations involved has an important role to play.
- 18.
This last effect might be thought to be countered by a system for price control working in favour of less affluent countries. However, it seems unlikely that this would be accepted by developed countries, since they could then just as well have accepted to be endowed with less pollution rights from the very beginning, and as a bonus escaped the transition costs of upholding the price control system. Alternatively, these same nations may accept such a system but engineer it to their own benefit, much as has been done in other areas of global trade (cf. Pogge 2008).
- 19.
About a month after the failure of the COP-16 meeting in Cancún , Mexico , in 2010.
- 20.
For a basic outline of the game theoretical features of Chicken , see Resnik (1987).
- 21.
For a basic outline of the game theoretical features of The Prisoners’ Dilemma , see Resnik (1987).
- 22.
The importance of this strategy for establishing mutually benefiting cooperative schemes in situations with radically opposed interests has been brilliantly described and analysed by Robert Axelrod (1984).
- 23.
While making the last corrections to this book, the hazard at the Fukushima nuclear power plants, classified as serious as Chernobyl, was still under way.
- 24.
The development of so-called Generation IV nuclear reactors still being mainly at the drawing board stage, it is also unclear whether these sort of possibilities will bring new risk factors in the actual running of plants.
- 25.
I am here ignoring the doubts about the economic efficiency of nuclear power based on its potential insurance premium costs (which are astronomical and in most cases have been non-transparent due to them being carried primarily not by the industry, but by the nations housing the power plants). As will be seen, this benefit of the doubt will not prevent critical assessment of nuclear power from a precautionary point of view.
- 26.
See, e.g., the overview in Stork (2009). It should be underlined, that temporary enthusiastic bursts of individual scientists or groups (for a recent example, see Palmer (2010)) regarding the prospect of fusion technology has been a repeated pattern in the marketing of this domain of science, just as in the case of gene therapy (to be discussed in the next subsection), for several decades. Awaiting solid evidence, all such forecasts are to be taken with a substantial grain of salt. Something similar holds regarding the recent hype of the possible practical applications of synthetic biology (the feasibility of which very much remains to be demonstrated) – see, e.g., Synthetic Biology & Bioenergy.
- 27.
Unless we acknowledge a line of reasoning central to certain branches of classic revolutionary left-wing political theory; that boosting the flaws of an allegedly bad system may speed up the process of having it abolished. In the present case: making climate change problems much more serious much sooner than necessary may be a good thing in that such a development may motivate populations and political leaders to take effective measures against having the destructive process proceed even further. I trust that pointing out the flaws of this argument would be to overstate the obvious.
- 28.
Gibson et al. (2010) and Pennisi (2010). Another recent development in this trend of ‘precision micro technology’ is so-called nanotechnology – a field where the aim is to precisely control, manipulate and design extremely small entities (such as molecules, atoms or even sub-atomic particles). Although already applied in certain processes for the construction of materials, nanotechnology is still even more in the experimental stage than biotechnology . However, in the future, this line of development will most likely offer an even wider span of possible applications than current biotechnology and with these applications will, of course, follow new risks of various kinds. I believe, however, that much of what is said in this section about biotechnology will be applicable to nanotechnological risks as well. See, for example, Hunt and Mehta (2006), and O’Mathúna (2009) for introductions to nanotechnology, its possible risks and benefits, and the ethical considerations actualised by it.
- 29.
One example of such an idea that has already been put into some practice is the so-called Golden Rice . This genetically modified type of rice is an example of designer food that may have a more far-reaching potential than merely attract the interest of already affluent consumers. However, its potential for solving important problems such as malnutrition is debatable. See, e.g., Mayer (2005).
- 30.
Synthetic Biology & Bioenergy.
- 31.
Alternatively (as regards, e.g., Craig Venter ’s vision of a limitless source of non-polluting fuel through synthetic microorganisms, see Synthetic Biology & Bioenergy), the economic potential of such developments, and thus attractiveness for investors, would require far-reaching patenting and commercial secrecy surrounding the work – factors that in turn tend to slow down, or even impede, the realisation of the applications (since scientific development works best when data and methods can be shared freely) and increase risks (since societal oversight and control becomes more difficult).
- 32.
In fact, if we consider the whole potential market for genetically modified products, the risks and uncertainties will plausibly be many times greater and this for two reasons. First, more risk-factors simply means that risks are accumulated into a higher total risk-level. Second, the more risk-factors that are present, that higher the risk for synergetic interactions between these that elevate the risks even more, or introduce additional risks of their own.
- 33.
For a recent overview accessible to the lay person, see Häyri (2010, chapter 8). One strand of biotechnology that has been so applied for a rather long time, though, is techniques enabling the extraction of elementary biological (primarily genetic) information about humans. Applications of this kind, such as presymptomatic genetic testing and prenatal diagnosis , create quite a lot of ethical issues in their own right . See, for example Juth (2005), as well as Munthe (1996b, 1999c and 2007).
- 34.
- 35.
Mayr (1942).
- 36.
See the brief but excellent overview, description and further references given in Malmqvist (2008, especially pp. 26–27).
- 37.
- 38.
See, e.g., Agar (2004) and Boström and Roache (2007). In addition, these debaters – as well as somewhat more cautious ones (e.g., Buchanan et al. 2002) – tend to project a surprisingly unreflected and/or simplified idea of what may actually constitute an enhancement . There are many examples given of both physical (such as strength and endurance) and cognitive/intellectual abilities (such as memory or computational skill) with no necessary or obvious connection to what makes life better for a person and the boosting of which may in fact make life worse. For elaboration of this type of point, see Shickle (2000).
- 39.
Boström and Roache (2007).
- 40.
Cf. the considerations discussed at the end of Chapter 5.
- 41.
In Chapter 5, I suggested that, perhaps, relative and non-relative determinants of an acceptable or decent mix of risks and chances should be balanced against each other in some way. Obviously, such an idea would further complicate the application of the relative progressiveness idea to the cases at hand.
- 42.
- 43.
This conclusion seems to be in line with Ahteensuu ’s point (2008).
- 44.
- 45.
The choice of this term is inspired by the use of the same notion in debates on the methodology of medical ethics (see, e.g., Davis 1995). However, in that context, principlism is juxtaposed to casuistry and virtue based ethics (with regard to what basic normative outlook to adopt to medical ethical issues), rather than the use of practical policy procedures for solving some of the problems involved in the practical application of moral ideals.
- 46.
- 47.
Seen from this perspective, one might say that the idea of principlism expresses the impossible dream of making political decisions without politics.
- 48.
See, e.g., Tännsjö (1999) for an account of legal security along these lines.
- 49.
This gives room for some legal insecurity until such coherent practices have been established. If the time-frame for this is not too long, it is hard to see this as a powerful objection, however. For example, compare with the case of agencies for the licensing of pharmaceuticals . When these were created around the world (in the 1960s) and given the power to decide which pharmaceuticals are legal and which are not, not much of coherent practice was in place, but with time such practice developed.
- 50.
A reminder to the reader is in order: “proven” may be interpreted in a variety of ways. See further, Chapter 2.
- 51.
I owe Ingmar Persson for bringing my attention to this.
- 52.
The exception is one of the rigidity approaches – rigidity of aggregation – touched upon in Chapter 5.
- 53.
See Andersson (2007) , for a recent exposition and critical discussion of this issue.
- 54.
Cf. Rawls ’ argument that his theory of justice can only be applied to ‘well-ordered’ societies and therefore is inapplicable to global distributive issues (Rawls 1971).
- 55.
There is an immense literature on this subject, which has been debated at least since the seventeenth century. In this context, I refer the reader to a few works which are useful both through their intellectual content and/or their provision of references for further study: Archibugi et al. (1998), Beitz (1979), Dower (2003), Held (1995), Heater (1996), Hinsley (1963), Pogge (2008), Rawls (1999), Singer (2002), and Tännsjö (2008).
- 56.
An influential expression of this sort of criticism can be found in Rawls (1999).
- 57.
Recently, this has led Ingmar Persson (2008) to argue that liberal democracy itself constitutes a major hurdle for effective global as well as national environmental policy.
- 58.
The basic connection between democracy as a political ideal and the extent to which people have an opportunity to influence political decisions affecting themselves is explored and defended in Arrhenius (2005).
- 59.
There are, however, considerable differences between democratic countries as to the nature of such a constitution (in some cases it is not even written down) and the possibilities of changing or amending it through democratic means. For details, see, e.g., the International Constitutional Law (ICL) web resource.
- 60.
Mill (1982).
- 61.
This perceived threat to liberal values is stressed by Sunstein (2005, Chapter 9).
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Munthe, C. (2011). Practical Applications. In: The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1330-7_6
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