From the Anticipations of Perception to the Dynamic Conception of Matter

Giovanelli, Marco

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-0065-9_1

Marco Giovanelli²

Part of the book series: Studies in German Idealism ((SIGI,volume 11))

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Abstract

In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the “Proof” (Beweis)The title “Proof” (Beweis) was added in the second edition, as is the case with the proof of the “Analogies of Experience” (see A176 and B218) and of the of the third analogy (see A210 and B256).

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Notes

1.
^{The title “Proof” (Beweis) was added in the second edition, as is the case with the proof of the “Analogies of Experience” (see A176 and B218) and of the of the third analogy (see A210 and B256).}
2.
^{See Cicero, De natura deorum, 1:16, 43 (255 Us).}
3.
^{See Diog Laertius 9:33 (255 Us).}
4.
^{Unless specified otherwise, all brackets inserted into quotations are the author’s.}
5.
^{The problem of the distinction between concept (Begriff) and intuition (Anschauung) has been especially discussed in English language literature on Kant} ^{. See above all Hintikka, Jakko. “On Kant’s notion of intuition (Anschauung).” In The First Critique: Reflections on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. eds. Terence Penelhum and John James Macintosh. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1969); Parsons, Charles. “Kant’s Philosophy of Arithmetic.” In Mathematics in Philosophy: Selected Essays, 110–49. (London: Cornell University Press, 1983), 112; Howell, Robert. “Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the Critique of Pure Reason,” Noûs 7, no. 3 (1973): 207–32. Houston Smit} ^{effectively summarized the major positions in this debate: “Jaakko Hintikka} ^{ascribes to Kant} ^{the view that an intuition is simply a singular representation, the counterpart of a singular term in the latter’s system of representation … and that the immediacy criterion on intuition is merely a logical corollary of the singularity criterion. … Charles Parsons} ^{agrees with Hintikka} ^{that, in being singular, an intuition is the analogue of a singular term … Parsons} ^{maintains, then, that the immediacy criterion is not merely a logical corollary of the singularity criterion, but an independent constraint … Robert Howell takes a middle course between Hintikka} ^{and Parsons} ^{… Moreover, he suggests, Kant} ^{complements his strict definition of intuition’s immediacy with a positive conception of this immediacy, analogous to the contemporary notion of the direct reference had by demonstrative terms” (Smit, Huston. “Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition,” The Philosophical Review 109, no. 2 (2000): 235–66).}
6.
^{English translation from Kant, Immanuel. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, tr. Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher. ed. Paul Guyer, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78.}
7.
^{Kant, Immanuel. “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science.” In Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, tr. Gary Hatfield. eds. Henry E. Allison, Peter Lauchlan Heath, and Gary C. Hatfield. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 78.}
8.
^{English translation from Kant, Immanuel. “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.” In Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, tr. Michael Friedman. eds. Henry E. Allison, Peter Lauchlan Heath, and Gary C. Hatfield. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 214.}
9.
^{English translation from Kant, Immanuel. Logic. eds. Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1974), 71.}
10.
^{English translation Kant. “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science.” 91.}
11.
^{Particularly in regard to Kant} ^{’s “notes” (Reflexionen), the reader should be aware that the German terms placed between brackets are provided as they appear in the reading of the Akademie-Ausgabe even when they differ from current orthography.}
12.
^{English translation from Kant, Immanuel. Correspondence. ed. Arnulf Zweig, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 400.}
13.
^{English translation from Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Metaphysics. eds. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 467.}
14.
^{English translation from Kant, Immanuel. Opus postumum. eds. Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 95.}
15.
^{English translation from Ibid., 141.}
16.
^{English translation from Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment, tr. Eric Matthews. ed. Paul Guyer, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 171.}
17.
^{English translation from Kant, Immanuel. “What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?” In Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. eds. Henry Allison and Peter Lauchlan Heath. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).}
18.
^{English translation from Kant. “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science.” 103.}
19.
^{Interestingly, even Hume} ^{admits the possibility of ‘anticipating’ differences in degrees before having direct experience of them: “Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour; and each shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for 30 years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colour than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim” (Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. eds. Peter Nidditch and Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 23.).}
20.
^{English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 260.}
21.
^{English translation from Kant. “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science.” 102.}
22.
^{English translation from Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1987), 199–.}
23.
^{See: Hempel, Carl Gustav. Grundzüge der Begriffsbildung in der empirischen Wissenschaft (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1974), 69–.}
24.
^{See: Mach, Ernst. Die Principien der Wärmelehre historisch-kritisch entwickelt (Leipzig: Barth, 1900), 57.}
25.
^{“If the element of fire is in a state of equilibrium among the bodies in a certain space, they are, relative to each other, neither hot nor cold” (AA 2:185). English translation from Kant, Immanuel. “Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy.” In Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. ed. David Walford. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 223–.}
26.
^{One cannot affirm that a body is hot or cold “in itself,” but only that, if the “equilibrium is removed, then the material into which the elemental fire passes is, relatively to the body which is thus deprived of the elemental fire, cold, whereas the latter body, in so far as it yields this heat to that material, is called, relatively to the material receiving the elemental fire, warm” (AA 2:185; English translation from Ibid., 224.).}
27.
^{“The state which prevails during this change is called, in the former case, ‘growing warm’ and in the latter case ‘growing cold’; this process of change continues until everything reaches the state of equilibrium again” (AA 2:185;Ibid.).}
28.
^{See Scaravelli, Luigi. Saggio sulla categoria della realtà (Florence: Le Monnier, 1947). Reprint, “Kant e la fisica moderna.” In Scritti kantiani, ed., Mario Corsi (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1973), 1–189, 167.}
29.
^{Though many English translations of Kant} ^{designate “phenomena” and “phenomenal reality” by the terms “appearances” and “reality of appearances,” I consistently use “phenomenon” to maintain the opposition with “noumenon”.}
30.
^{Daniel Warren} ^{, in his valuable explanation of intensive magnitude, discusses this connection between “degree” and the “causal power” that can be evaluated through the consequences it produces Warren, Daniel. Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature (New York: Routledge, 2001), 22–30. See also Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 200.}
31.
^{English translation from Kant. Lectures on Metaphysics, 192.}
32.
^{Several of Kant} ^{’s „Reflections“ affirm that intensive magnitude is the magnitude of a cause or of a ground: “the magnitude of a whole [eines Gantzen] is extensive,” whereas “the magnitude of a ground [eines Grundes] is intensive or degree” (AA 17:536; Refl. 4411). A ground or a cause’s “capacity to produce effects” cannot be considered more or less extended nor can it contain more or less parts, but rather should be thought as more or less effective: “the magnitude of an (gintensive) ground does not demonstrate any composition [keine Zusammensetzung] from smaller [elements]” (AA 17:448; Refl. 4183); “in this, we do not distinguish any multiplicity; only the consequences of the multiplicity can be represented and is thus the magnitude of a ground” (AA 28:507).}
33.
^{See Höffe, Otfried. Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie (Munich: Beck, 2003), 178.}
34.
^{For a more detailed reconstruction see: Stegmüller, Wolfgang “Theorie und Erfahrung (1. Halbband).” In Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und der analytischen Philosophie. (Berlin: Springer, 1973), 2:19–68. Some scholars point out that an extensive magnitude is a magnitude that can be subjected to cardinal measurability, i.e., an additive operation. In contrast, intensive magnitudes allow the ordinal measurement of qualities. See for example: Walker, Ralph Charles Sutherland. Kant: The Arguments of the Philosophers (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978), 96n11. Such an interpretation is also supported by Hegel} ^{: “The degree is thus a specific magnitude, a quantum; but at the same time it is not an aggregate or plural within itself … The determinateness of degree must, it is true, be expressed by a number, the completely determined form of quantum, but the number is not an amount but unitary, only a degree. When we speak of 10° or 20°, the quantum that has that number of degrees is the tenth or twentieth degree, not the amount and sum of them – as such, it would be an extensive quantum – but it is only one degree, the tenth or twentieth.” (HW V, 251). English translation from Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel’s Science of Logic, tr. Arnold V. Miller (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 1998), 218. Later, Wilhelm Ostwald} ^{developed a similar conception. For example, in the Vorlesungen über die Naruphilosophie, he distinguishes between “magnitudes” (Größen) and “intensities” (Intensitäten): magnitudes are expressed by mean cardinal numbers and intensities by mean ordinal numbers. See: Ostwald, Wilhelm. Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie: gehalten im Sommer 1901 an der Univ. Leipzig (Leipzig: Veit, 1902), 129–.}
35.
^{In numerous instances, Kant} ^{seems to use the photometry study of his friend and correspondent Johan Heinrich Lambert} ^{. On this subject, see Vuillemin, Jules. Physique et métaphysique kantiennes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), 129–32. See also Brittan, Gordon. “Kant’s Two Grand Hypotheses.” In Kant’s Philosophy of Physical Science: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, 1786–1986. ed. Robert E. Butts. (Dordrecht, Netherlands Kluwer, 1986), 70–72n13. Photometry starts from the hypothesis of the conservation of “quantity of light”; that diffusing light in a larger space produces a gradually decreasing “density” as it moves away from the light source and therefore a weaker degree of illumination. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft), Kant} ^{claims that “[t]hus light, for example, diffuses from an illuminating point in all directions on spherical surfaces, which constantly increase with the squares of the distance, and the quantum of illumination on all of these spherical surfaces, which become greater to infinity, is always the same in total. But it follows from this that a given equal part of one of these spherical surfaces must become ever less illuminated with respect to its degree, as the surface of diffusion of precisely the same light quantum becomes greater.” (AA 4:519). From this point of view, it is possible to derive the law by which the degree of illumination should decrease according to the square of the distance from the luminous source. In other words, as Lambert} ^{argues, one can double an illumination by doubling the intensity of the luminous source (I) at the same distance (r), or by diminishing the distance by ¼ without varying the quantity of light: one candle placed at a certain distance from a sheet of paper illuminates it in a determined way; if the distance is doubled, four candles are necessary to create the same degree of sensation, while doubling the distance without augmenting the intensity of the luminous reduces the effect of the illumination by four times. In an example that is reported in the Metaphysik von Schön, Kant} ^{, in accordance with this point of view, states: “The illuminative power of a wax: candle is greater than that of a tallow candle, for with the first we can read at a distance of 2 feet and with the second only at 1 foot; the former is therefore the ground of a greater effect, and the latter the ground of a lesser” (AA 28:424–; Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 199–200). Kant} ^{also appeals to photometry in the Critique of Pure Reason itself in order to clarify the meaning of the Anticipations of Perception: “I would be able to compose and determine a priori, i.e., construct the degree of the sensation of sunlight out of about 200,000 illuminations from the moon. Thus we can call the former principles constitutive” (B221). Here, Kant} ^{has not all of a sudden forgotten about the “non-additivity” of intensive magnitude that he demonstrated a few pages before. In this case, measurement does not require the summing of magnitudes, but rather the equalizing of relations. This point of view also sheds light on this puzzling passage of the Critique of Pure Reason: “the very same extensive magnitude of intuition (e.g., an illuminated surface) can excite as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other (less illuminated) surfaces taken together. One can therefore abstract entirely from the extensive magnitude of appearance and yet represent in the mere sensation in one moment a synthesis of uniform increase from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness” (B217–8). One can produce the effect of two candles through four candles with half the intensity, but at the same distance. For a different interpretation see Nayak, Abhaya C. and Eric Sotnak. “Kant on the Impossibility of Soft Sciences,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75, no. 1 (1995): 133–51, 140.}
36.
^{On the reduction of extensive quantity to intensive quantity, see Franz Brentano’s manuscript “Kants} ^{Intensitätslehre” (Kant} ^{’s Doctrine on Intensity) in Brentano, Franz. Kategorienlehre. ed. Alfred Kastil (Hamburg: Meiner, 1993), 95. This point of view offers a possible response to Nayak and Sotnak} ^{’s thesis “that Kant} ^{really does allow for the cardinal measurability of qualities” (Nayak and Sotnak. “Kant on the Impossibility of Soft Sciences,” 140). For Nayak and Sotnak} ^{,’ “Kant} ^{takes weight to be an intensive” (Nayak and Sotnak. “Kant on the Impossibility of Soft Sciences,” 139.), but it seems clear that Kant} ^{rather takes “density” for an intensive magnitude, namely the quotient mass/volume. The “moment of weight” (} \( \frac{dv}{dt}\) ^{at the beginning of the fall of a body) is for Kant} ^{an intensive magnitude, not the weight. Similarly, when they write that “Kant} ^{says that velocities (which are intensive magnitudes) can be added (by means of vector addition),”, one must not forget the meaning of this addiction. In Kant} ^{’s own words “If, for example, a speed AC is called doubled, nothing else can be understood by this except that it consists of two simple and equal speeds AB and BC […]. If, however, one explicates a doubled speed by saying that it is a motion through which a doubled space is traversed in the same time, then something is assumed here that is not obvious in itself – namely, that two equal speeds can be combined in precisely the same way as two equal spaces – and it is not clear in itself that a given speed consists of smaller speeds, and a rapidity of slownesses, in precisely the same way that a space consists of smaller spaces.” (AA 4:494 -). The addiction of velocities is the geometrical composition of velocities and not the mechanical variation of velocities through a cause.}
37.
^{Fourteenth century scholasticism enters profoundly into the so-called problem of the intensio e remissio formarum. The Aristotelian conception of the immutability and eternality of substantial forms apparently excludes this ability to undergo an increase and a decrease while conserving the species. Conceiving of the transition from one species to another (e.g. from sensible soul to intellectual soul) within the same genus is not the issue here. Instead, it is a matter of admitting a transformation from white to less white, from hot to less hot, in which the species “whiteness” or “hotness” is conserved. According to Aristotelian logic, since substance does not present a more or a less, the perfectio specifica, which distinguishes each species in respect to another, does not admit variations. Intellectual soul cannot become more or less perfect. Even if differences can be admitted in respect to perfectio individualis (in as much as each individual “participates” in the same species), the perfectio specifica is immutable and does not admit a multiplicity of degrees: it either possesses the essential property that makes it what it is, a determinate species, or else it must belong to another species. On this point, see Maier, Anneliese. Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie: Das Problem der intensiven Grösse. Die Impetustheorie (Rome: Storia e Letteratura, 1951), 3–5. Instead, one should think of a hierarchy in which different entities are articulated according to the gradus perfectionis, culminating in God, ens perfectissimus to whom nulla deest perfectio, vel gradus perfectionis. However, a difficulty arises in the case of sensible qualities (white, hot, etc.) that can present a uniformitas or difformitas in spatial or temporal distribution. When the quality is diffused in a non-uniform manner, it necessarily admits a particular quantitative variation. The medieval calculators attempted to mathematically measure what they termed intension and remission of forms. Depicting extension on a horizontal axis and intension on a vertical axis, they graphically represented variations in these magnitudes. Thus one can capture in an intuitive manner how a quality that is diffused in a uniform manner (qualitas simpliciter uniformis), represented by a horizontal line parallel to the axis that represents extension, can be thought as if all of it were placed on the same “level.” In contrast, a quality that is diffused in a “uniform” manner (qualitas uniformiter difformis) can be represented as a straight inclined line in which the quality is distributed on different increasing and decreasing levels in successive instants or in diverse points in space. Finally, a curved line represents a quality that is distributed in a non-uniform manner (qualitas difformiter difformis). See: Clagett, Marshall. The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), 364–406. The use of the concepts gradus motus and gradus velocitatis to indicate intensity of movement is particularly significant: as an alteration process (e.g. transition from hot to cold) is measurable through variations in the gradus intensitatis of a quality acquired in successive instants, in the same manner, something in movement can possess a greater gradus intensitatis velocitatis in one instant than in a preceding instant.}
38.
^{Modern philosophy directly appropriates the medieval tradition’s concept of velocity as a “quality” that a body can possess to a greater or lesser degree. Galileo makes widespread use of the concept of gradus velocitatis, and Leibniz} ^{explicitly discusses velocity as intensio motus (see below 245; 250-). Concerning the persistence of this terminology in modern science, see: Ranea, Alberto Guillermo. “The a priori Method and the actio Concept Revised: Dynamics and Metaphysics in an Unpublished Controversy between Leibniz and Denis Papin,” Studia Leibnitiana 21 (1989): 42–68. Even modern thought however has not renounced the medieval idea of the gradus perfectionis. Leibniz} ^{again, explicitly recognizing his indebtedness to scholastic debates, provides the most significant examples of this idea: “it should be noted that there are many different perfections in nature, that God possesses all of them, and that each one belongs to him in the highest degree” (GP 4:427; see also his 1676 essay: Quod Ens Perfectissimum existit; GP 7:261–). In his correspondence with Eckhart, Leibniz} ^{establishes an explicit parallel between the perfectio, understood as quantitas realitatis seu essentiae, and the intensio, conceived as gradus qualitatis (GP 1:266), showing how easily these two concepts can be confused. If Leibniz} ^{here still seems to think that a greater degree of velocity is more perfect than a lesser (see below 39), he nevertheless delineates later a difference, which becomes central in Kant} ^{, between gradus perfectionis that admits a maximum and gradus velocitatis that has neither a maximum nor a minimum (see GP 4:445). About Leibniz} ^{’s conception of intensive magnitudes see also De Risi, Vincenzo. Geometry and Monadology: Leibniz’s analysis situs and Philosophy of Space (Basel ; Boston: Birkhäuser, 2007), 266–.}
39.
^{Unable to cover all the possible sources of Kant} ^{’s thought, I will only note the diffusiveness of scholastic language in the debate of his time. Christian Wolff’s Ontologia, directly referring to the scholastic doctrine of remissio e intensio formarum, defines degree as “quantitas qualitatum.” See: Wolff, Christian von. “Philosophia prima sive Ontologia.” In Gesammelte Werke. ed. Jean École, 3 Abt. (Hildesheim: Olms, 1962), §747. In Baumgarten} ^{’s Metaphysica, the text Kant} ^{used in his lectures, the definition “quantitas qualitatis est GRADUS” [the magnitude of quality is degree] appears, which Kant} ^{’s passage from the Prolegomena cites (see below 18), as well as a reference to the doctrine of intensio e remmissio formarum: “haec si augetur, QUALITAS, cuisus gradus est INTENDITUR, si minuitur, qualitas, cuius gradus est, REMITTITUR [intension is the increasing of quality’s degree; remission is its decreasing]” (Baumgarten, Alexander. Metaphysica. ed. Herman Carol (Halle, Germany Hemmerde, 1757), §247). See also Moretto, Antonio. Dottrina delle grandezze e filosofia trascendentale in Kant (Padua, Italy: Il Poligrafo, 1999), 259. This terminology is used by Kant} ^{himself in “Widerlegung des Mendelssohnschen Beweises der Beharrlichkeit der Seele” (Refutation of Mendelssohn’s Proof of the Immortality of the Soul). Here Kant considers the possibility of attributing the soul “no manifold [of parts] outside one another, and hence no extensive magnitude” but “intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of reality.” Such a degree might diminish through all the infinitely many smaller degrees and … could be transformed into nothing … by a gradual remission (remissio) of all its powers (hence, if I may be allowed to use this expression, through elanguescence)” (B414, see also AA 8:165 and 286). For discussion of Kant} ^{’s refutation, see Powell, Charles Thomas. “Kant, Elanguescence, and Degrees of Reality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46, 2, no. 2 (1985): 199–217 and Martinelli, Riccardo. “Kant, Mendelssohn e l’immortalità dell’anima,” Studi kantiani 15 (2002): 93–126. Moses Mendelssohn and Lambert} ^{may be two other equally important sources for Kant} ^{’s work. See Mendelssohn, Moses. “Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes.” In Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe. ed. Eva J. Engel. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fromman, 1974), 82; Lambert, Johann Heinrich. “Anlage zur Architektonik, oder Theorie des Einfachen und Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntnis.” In Philosophische Schriften. ed. Hans Werner Arndt. (Hildesheim, Germany: Olms, 1965), 2:359:§21.}
40.
^{A good exposition of this concept that was later repudiated is found in Kant} ^{’s Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (Reflections on Optimism) from 1759 (AA 2:31–).}
41.
^{See Schoenfield, Martin. The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 109.}
42.
^{English translation is from Kant} ^{, Kant, Immanuel. “On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World.” In Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. eds. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 388.}
43.
^{See Baumanns, Peter. Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis. Durchgehender Kommentar zu den Hauptkapiteln der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Würzburg, Germany: Königshausen und Neumann, 1997), 575–.}
44.
^{Heidegger, Martin. “Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen.” In Gesamtausgabe. ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1984–), 214–. English translation from Heidegger, Martin. What is a Thing, tr. W. B. Barton Jr, and Vera Deutsch (South Bend, IN: Gateway Editions, Ltd., 1967), 215–.}
45.
^{Paul Guyer} ^{seems to choose this interpretation: “Because the sensation which is a component of our representation of an empirical object has a degree of intensity, the object itself, or the real thing in the object … must be assigned a degree” (Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 199).}
46.
^{English translation from Kant. “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science.”}
47.
^Bowman ^{’s brackets.}
48.
^{English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 378.}
49.
^{Scaravelli. Saggio sulla categoria della realtà, 170.}
50.
^{Ibid. An intresting discussion of this point can be found in Longuenesse, Béatrice. Kant and the Capacity to Judge Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Longuenesse} ^{correctly observes that Hermann Cohen is the first thinker (see below, 204–) who “charges Kant with psychologistic confusion for attributing to sensation an intensive magnitude that can belong only to the object of sensation, reality … Kant himself acknowledged his mistake and modified his formulation of the principle of the Anticipations of Perception in the second edition of the Critique.” However, Martin Heiddeger, whose interpretation of Kant could be considered the opposite of that of Cohen, also does not hesitate to affirm that the formulation of the A edtion of the Critique of Pure Reason expresses “almost the opposite of the true meaning of the principle” (Heidegger. “Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen.” 214. English translation from Heidegger. What is a Thing, 215.) Although I sympathize with such an antipsychologistic perspective, I think that one should nevertheless take into account Longuenesse} ^{’s suggestion not to consider “sensation, in the Anticipations of Perception, as a mere empirical and psychological given” (Longuenesse. Kant and the Capacity to Judge Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, 319). However, in contrast to Longuenesse} ^{I shall argue that this implies taking into account Kant’s distinction between realitas noumenon and realitas phaenomenon (see below §1.7).}
51.
^Kant ^{does not regard psychology as a science, or as ever likely to become a science. Kant} ^{identifies science with the quantitative treatment of phenomena. Every science must therefore be mathematical. However, he did not think that mental reality could ever be measured, implying that psychology could never become mathematical, and therefore a science: “empirical doctrine of the soul must remain even further from the rank of a properly so-called natural science than chemistry. In the first place, because mathematics is not applicable to the phenomena of inner sense and their law” (AA 4:471; see also B876-7). See Nayak and Sotnak. “Kant on the Impossibility of Soft Sciences,” 144–.}
52.
^{Heidegger. What is a Thing, 216.}
53.
^{On the possibility of different nuances in the meanings of real and wirklich even in daily use, see Holzhey, Helmut. “Das philosophische Realitätsproblem: Zu Kants Unterscheidung von Realität und Wirklichkeit.” In 200 Jahre Kritik der reinen Vernunft. eds. Joachim Kopper and Wilhelm Marx. (Hildesheim, Germany: Olms, 1984), 95.}
54.
^{See Heidegger. What is a Thing, 216.}
55.
^{Natorp, Paul. “Quantität und Qualität in Begriff, Urteil und gegenständlicher Erkenntnis,” Philosophische Monatshefte 27 (1891): 1–32; 129–60, 151.}
56.
^{Heidegger, Martin. “Die Frage nach der Technik.” In Gesamtausgabe. ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. (Franfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1984–), 28.}
57.
^{“Quality is used by Kant} ^{almost as a synonym of reality.” (Delekat, Friedrich. Immanuel Kant. Historisch-kritische Interpretation der Hauptschriften. 2nd ed (Heidelberg,: Quelle & Meyer, 1963), 125).}
58.
^{English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 379.}
59.
^{Heidegger. What is a Thing, 214.}
60.
^{English translation from Kant. Lectures on Metaphysics, 318.}
61.
^{Even if some obscurity remains, this point of view should help clarify the correspondence between the three categories of quality (reality, negation, and limitation) and quality’s three forms of judgment (affirmative, negative, and infinite): Realität is “that which can be thought only through an affirmative judgment” (A246; e.g., A is B, body is extended). An affirmative judgment indicates that the sphere of concept A is found within the wider sphere of the predicate B: “in logical subdivisions one limits the sphaeram; in real determinations, reality” (AA 17:330; Refl. 3890). In contrast, the category of negation corresponds to the negative form of judgment (e.g., A is not B, soul is not extended) that denies that the concept A is found in B’s sphere. B is thus excluded from the determinations that constitute A’s “thinghood in general” or “reality” (AA 16:638; Refl. 3063). English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 62. More complex but with richer consequences, however, is the correspondence between the category of limitation and the infinite form of judgment that does not deny the copula, as in the negative judgment, but rather the predicate (e.g., A is not-B; soul is not-extended). In logic in general, which “abstracts from all content of the predicate” (B97), infinite judgments are considered simply as affirmative judgments. According to Kant} ^{, in contrast, “in a transcendental logic, infinite judgments must also be distinguished from affirmative ones” (B97). Infinite judgment does not merely exclude A negatively from B’s “sphere” but also positively affirms that A is included among the infinite number of things that are excluded from the latter’s sphere: “In iudicio affirmativo, the subject is thought under the sphaera of a predicate; in the iudicio negativo, the subject is posited outside of the sphaera of the latter. In the iudicio infinito, the subject is thought in the sphaeram of a concept that lies outside the sphere of another” (AA 16:640; Refl. 3068). English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 62. For example, affirming that the “soul is not extended” does not imply that it possesses certain finite extension or that it has an extension = 0} ^{(as if it were concentrated in one point), but rather that it is absolutely incomparable with extension: “a ‘spirit is not extended’ does not mean the same as ‘its extension is disappearing,’ but rather that ‘it can absolutely have none.’ A point, on the contrary, is not extended, but it is like a disappearing space. Spirits cannot be considered as points. If I affirm the non-being of a predicate, its mere disappearing is not immediately thought, and I cannot consider the subject as belonging to the same species, but that it should be often included among things of different species” (AA 18:363-; Refl. 5826). Logically, between two opposite predicates (e.g., extended and non-extended), there is no third (exclusi tertii). The infinite judgment, however, transcending formal logic, seems to lead to the idea of a tertium comparationis (e.g., extension) in reference to which the opposition of two “disparate” predicates (per disparate), such as “extended” and “red,” can be distinguished from two “comparable” predicates, such as extended and non-extended. Infinite judgment does not indicate a mere “exclusion” like negative judgment, but should rather be considered a “positive action” (AA 9:104n1). An infinite judgment “delimits” the sphere of the predicate “extension” within which the opposition of extended and non-extended assumes a particular meaning in respect to the opposition between extension and all predicates that are not “extended” (e.g., red, perfumed, etc.): “Infinite judgment does not only show that a subject is not contained in the sphere of a predicate but that it also lies somewhere outside of its [the predicate’s] sphere. Thus, the judgment presents the sphere of the predicate as limited [beschränkt] (AA 9:104, Fn. 1). The soul, the negation of all spatial determination, has nothing to do with extension. The point, in contrast, is only a disappearing extension. It is the limitation of extension and thus remains a spatial determination. For an analysis of post-Kantian philosophy’s interpretation of infinite judgment, which emphasizes the different readings of Georg Wilhem Friederich Hegel} ^{and Herman Cohen} ^{in particular, see Gordin, Jakob. Untersuchungen zur Theorie des unendlichen Urteils (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1929).}
62.
^{For an analysis of the difficulty of expressing the distinction between Realität and Wirklichkeit, see Schwarz, Wolfgang. “Kant’s Categories of Reality and Existence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1987): 343–46.}
63.
^{It should be noted that Kant} ^{also uses the expression “empirical reality” (emprische Realität) as a synonym of “objective validity” (objective Gültigkeit), thus opposing it to mere dreams or illusions. Here, a single category is not at stake, but rather the general problem concerning the possibility of applying the categories to objects. For a discussion of the relations between the three aspects of the “reality problem” in Kant} ^{’s thought, see Zöller, Günter. Theoretische Gegenstandsbeziehung bei Kant. Zur systematischen Bedeutung der Termini “objektive Realität” und “objektive Gültigkeit” in der “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”, Kant Studien, Ergänzungsheft, 117 (Berlin: Gruyter, 1984). in particular 213–29. On the ambiguous relation of Realität and Wirklichkeit, see Delfour, Jean-Jacques. “Une équivocité énigmatique dans le quatrième paralogisme de la Critique de la raison pure. La labilité de la frontière entre réalité et effectivité,” Kant Studien 88, no. 3 (1997): 280–310.}
64.
^{English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 280.}
65.
^{This use of the term realitas dates back to Francisco Saurez’s Disputationes Metaphysicae, which interprets “reality” as thinkable essence, in as much as this is logically possible, in opposition to pure nothingness, which is logically impossible. The use of the term probably derives from the Scotus tradition that came to identify realitas, aliquitas, quidditas, and essentia. In 1692, Stephanus (Étienne) Chauvin} ^{effectively expressed this sense of the term: “realitas is a diminutivum of res”; the followers of Scotus, “who first found this word,” attributed to each res (e.g., human) different realitates (living being, sensible being, etc.), ending in ultimate realitas (rationality), which distinguishes human from all other res. Chauvin, Stephanus. Lexicon Philosophicum … ita tum recognitum & castigatum; tum varie variis in locis illustratum, tum passim quammultis accessionibus auctum & locupletatum, ut denuo quasi novum opus in lucem prodeat. 2nd ed (Leeuwarden: F. Halma, 1713), 557–.}
66.
^{In his Ontologia, Christian Wolff} ^{considers realitas synonymous to quidditas: “quicquid est vel esse posse concipitur, dicitur res, quatenus est aliquid; ut adeo res definiri possit per id, quod est aliquid. Unde realitas et quidditas apud scholasticos synonyma sunt [everything that is or could be thought is called res, thing, which is something, aliquid; therefore a res could be defined as that which is aliquid. For this reason, realitas and quidditas are synonymous for the scholastics]” (Wolff. “Philosophia prima sive Ontologia.” §243). This “synonymy between ‘being real’ (realitas) and ‘being something,’” as Pietro Kobau} ^{notes in respect to Wolff, is also maintained by Baumgarten} ^{, who uses the expression in an even more restricted sense, calling “realities” the single properties of the essence of a thing: “quae determinando ponuntur in aliquo (notae et praedicata), sunt DETERMINATIONES, altera positiva, et afferativa, quae si vere sit, est REALITAS, altera negativa, quae si vere sit, est NEGATIO [what is posited in something in order to determine it (marks and predicates) are determinations, some of them are positive, or affirmative, and if they are true, are called reality, Others are negative and if they are true, are called negations].” (Baumgarten. Metaphysica, §36). See also Kobau, Pietro. Essere qualcosa. Ontologia e psicologia in Wolff (Turin: Trauben, 2004). Reality is thus the affirmative predicate of a thing, that which can truly be attributed to it, whereas negations are something negative: “Hinc negationes et realitates sunt sibi invicem oppositae. Tam realitates ipsae, quam entia, quibus insunt, ENTIA REALIA seu positiva dicuntur. Negationes autem ENTIA NEGATIVA [Therefore negations and realities are opposite to one another. The realities themselves and the entities which they refer to are called real entities; negation, in contrast, negative entities].” (Baumgarten. Metaphysica, §135.).}
67.
^{English translation from Kant. Lectures on Metaphysics, 466 Amerik translates Sachheit with “materiality.” In the footnote on the same page, however, he observes that “this might also be rendered as thingliness”. Especially in this context, in order to avoid misunderstanding, this second translation is preferable.}
68.
^{“The expression in parentheses, realitas phaenomenon, from [edition] A is without doubt an addition to clarify that it does not refer to the thing in itself.” (Broad, Charlie Dunbar. Kant: An Introduction. ed. Casimir Lewy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 242).}
69.
^{English translation from Kant. Lectures on Metaphysics, 324.}
70.
^{Consider Leibniz} ^{’s words: “Nihil aliud enim realitas quam cogitabilitas[reality is nothing other than thinkability]” (GP 1:272).}
71.
^{See for instance this passage: “Differentiating logically means recognizing that a thing A is not B; it is always a negative judgment. In contrast, physically differentiating [physisch unterscheiden]” means “different things cause different sensations” (AA 2:60; English translation is from Kant, Immanuel. “The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures.” In Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. eds. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 104).}
72.
^{Lambert. “Anlage zur Architektonik, oder Theorie des Einfachen und Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntnis.” 359, §21. Also See Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 198.}
73.
^{From this point of view, Ralph Charles S. Walker} ^{’s objection to Kant} ^{does not seem convincing. Walker} ^{argues that it is possible to “imagine an experience rather unlike ours … in which sensible qualities are not naturally thought of as coming in degrees ; things might feel either hot or cold, without gradations between them” (Walker. Kant: The Arguments of the Philosophers, 95). For Kant} ^{, such a world is certainly imaginable (hence not contradictory), but could not be subjected to scientific knowledge, that is, to measurement. As noted above, the principles, which include the Anticipations of Perception, are conditions of possibility of objective knowledge and thus refer to the object of such knowledge as well.}
74.
^{On the schematization of the category of reality in particular, see Haas, Bruno. “Kants Qualitätsschematismus.” In Analysen – Probleme – Kritik 1. ed. Hariolf Oberer. (Würzburg, Germany: Königshausen und Neumann, 1988), 133–74.}
75.
^{It is also no accident that, in the Schematismuskapitel, Kant} ^{abandons the opposition between reality and negation understood as an opposition between two contradictory concepts: “[t]he opposition of the two thus takes place in the distinction of one and the same time as either a filled or an empty time” (B182). This is the very chapter where the mediation between “category” and “principle” (Grundsatz) happens, and thus between “reality” understood as a pure category, that, even “without any conditions of sensibility, should hold for things in general, as they are.” (B186) and phenomenal reality reduced to being “that to which a sensation in general corresponds” (B182) (“sensatio realitas pheanomenon” [B186]). In contrast to what occurs in pure understanding between a concept and its opposite, the full and the empty in intuition are only distinguished by their quantity and can be more or less full or more or less empty the same time: “every sensation has a degree or magnitude which it can more or less fill the same time … until it ceases into nothingness (= 0 = negatio)” (B183, emphasis mine). What permits the same “reality” to be thought as a quantum is thus the possibility of admitting “a relation and connection between, or rather a transition from reality to negation”; and “the schema of a reality, as the quantity of something” is therefore a “continuous and uniform generation of that quantity in time, as one descends in time from the sensation that has a certain degree to its disappearance or gradually ascends from negation to its magnitude” (B183, emphasis mine).}
76.
^{English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 249.}
77.
^{Concerning this proposition, Wolffian scholasticism again merely recuperates a long and consolidated tradition of medieval origin that has many resonances in modern thought. Descartes approaches realitas and perfectio in the Secundae Responsiones of the Meditationes. See Descartes, René. Oeuvres de Descartes. eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1964–1974), Vol. 7, 165. Spinoza also explicitly affirms that: “per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligo.” Spinoza} ^{, Etica, Pars II, def 6 in Spinoza, Benedictus de. Opera. ed. Carl Immanuel Gerhardt (Heidelberg,: C. Winter, 1925). See also Totaro, Giuseppina. “Perfectio e realitas nell’opera di Spinoza.” In Lexicon Philosophicum. Quaderni di terminologia filosofica e storia delle idée. eds. Antonio Lamarra and Lidia Procesi, 71–113. (Rome: Edizioni dell’ateneo, 1988). The same identification occurs in Leibniz} ^{’s Monadology (§41): “perfection is nothing but an amount of positive reality, in the strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things which are limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is absolutely infinite” (GP 6:613). Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. The Monadology, tr. Robert Latta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925), 9. On the relation between Kant} ^{and this tradition of thought, see Sala, Giovanni B. Kant und die Frage nach Gott. Gottesbeweise und Gottesbeweiskritik in den Schriften Kants (Berlin: Gruyter, 1997), 137–.}
78.
^{English translations from Kant. Lectures on Metaphysics, 33.}
79.
^{English translation from Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Philosophical Theology. eds. Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 44.}
80.
^{I prefer the translation “boundary” for “Schranke” instead of “limit.” I will use “limit” for “Grenze.”}
81.
^{English translation from Kant. Lectures on Philosophical Theology, 445.}
82.
^{English translation from Kant. Lectures on Metaphysics, 334.}
83.
^{See Delekat. Immanuel Kant. Historisch-kritische Interpretation der Hauptschriften, 126. Understanding “intension” and “remission” as “perfection” and “imperfection” was common in medieval debates. Intension was often understood as degree of perfection: the perfection or intension of things is measured by their nearness (propinquitas) to the most perfect being, the highest intensity (gradus summus) and their imperfection or remission is measured by their distance (distantia) from that being. This conception, however, was already criticized by the so-called Calculatores, who regarded qualitative variation as a purely relative distinction between great and small: ‘Whiteness A is more intense than whiteness B,’ or ‘whiteness B is more remiss than whiteness A.’. The theory of the Calculatores was later attacked in turn by those who, like Pietro Pomponazzi} ^{, still made constant use of the scheme of God as the measure of all things in the metaphysical hierarchy of being as they approach toward him or recede from him as a pole measuring the various degrees of perfection. See: Wilson, Curtis. “Pomponazzi’s Criticism of Calculator,” Isis 44, no. 4 (1953): 355–62, 361. See also Thorndike, Lynn. “Calculator,” Speculum 7, no. 2 (1932): 221–30. The modern era never really abandoned this last conception. In his correspondence with De Volder} ^{, even Leibniz} ^{seems to confuse these two concepts of degree when he writes: “in ipso motu promtiore plus est realitatis et perfectionis” (GP 2:185; emphasis mine; see also De Volder’s response in GP 2:188): a faster motor is more perfect than a slower one. However, Leibniz} ^{himself later proceeds to clearly distinguish the two concepts of degree, using the same language that Kant} ^{resorts to. The concept of maximum velocity is illegitimate and meaningless, while a maximum degree of perfection is admissible: “We must also know what a perfection is. A fairly sure test for being a perfection is that forms or natures that are not capable of a highest degree are not perfections, as for example, the nature of number or figure. For the greatest of all numbers (or even the number of all numbers), as well as the greatest of all figures, imply a contradiction, but the greatest knowledge and omnipotence do not involve any impossibility. Consequently, power and knowledge are perfections, and, insofar as they belong to God, they do not have limits” (GP 4:427). English translation from Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Philosophical Essays. eds. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 1989), 35–.}
84.
^{English translation from Kant. Lectures on Metaphysics, 193.}
85.
^{Ibid., 176.}
86.
^{Ibid., 128.}
87.
^{English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 260.}
88.
^{English translation from Kant. “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science.” 100.}
89.
^{See Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 200.}
90.
^{English translation from Kant. Lectures on Metaphysics, 326.}
91.
^{English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 247.}
92.
^{Gernot Böhme, Böhme, Gernot. “Über Kants Unterscheidung von extensiven und intensiven Größen,” Kant Studien 65 (1974): 239–58, 239.}
93.
^{English translation from Kant. Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics, 247.}
94.
^{English translation from Ibid., 175.}
95.
^{The relation between force and sensation is also affirmed by Lambert} ^{: subjectively, “we begin to be aware with sensation of different degrees of something” (Lambert. “Anlage zur Architektonik, oder Theorie des Einfachen und Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntnis.” 4:398); but objectively “we feel different levels or degree of force” (Lambert. “Anlage zur Architektonik, oder Theorie des Einfachen und Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntnis.” 4:3). See also Abicht, Johann Heinrich. “Kurze Darstellung der kantischen System.” In Neues philosophisches Magazin: Erläuterungen und Anwendungen des Kantischen Systems bestimmt (Leipzig: Haug, 1790), 1:3:98: “if external forces are the cause of our consciousness, then one says that they act on us; in the face of this action, we undergo … such a consciousness stimulated by the action of external force is called a sensation.” On the relation between force and sensation, Schelling} ^{’s position is also important (see below 105); and in a completely different context, Stadler, August. Kants Theorie der Materie (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1883), 207.}
96.
^{English translation from Kant. Opus postumum, 87.}
97.
^{On the relation between force and sensation, see Falkenstein, Lorne. Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic, Toronto Studies in Philosophy (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1995). See in particular, the discussion of this subject in the appendix, “Sensations as Effects of the Intensity of Force,” 133–.}
98.
^{Arnoldt, Emil, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Otto Schöndörffer (Berlin: Cassirer, 1906–11), 2:80–.}
99.
^{English translation from Kant. “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.” 253.}
100.
^Ibid.
101.
^{Ibid., 244.}
102.
^{Ibid., 209–44. For a detailed commentary, see Pollok, Konstantin. Kants “Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft”. Ein kritischer Kommentar (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001), 222–341; with specific references to Anticipations of Perception on 225–, 233, 247, 281–2, and 345–6.}
103.
^{For whom Kant} ^{means by “other authors,” see Pollok. Kants “Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft”. Ein kritischer Kommentar, 229–.}
104.
^{English translation from Kant. “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.” 210.}
105.
^{Ibid., 210} ^.
106.
^{Ibid., 233.}
107.
^{Ibid., 220. English translation slightly modified by the author.}
108.
^{On Gefühl [feeling] as the sense of “touch,” see Satura, Vladimir. Kants Erkenntnispsychologie in den Nachschriften seiner Vorlesungen über empirische Psychologie (Bouvier: Bonn, 1971), 90.}
109.
^{English translation from Kant. “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.” 221} ^.
110.
^{Beck, Jakob Sigismund. Erläuternder Auszug aus den critischen Schriften des Herrn Prof. Kant auf Anrathen derselben (Riga, Germany: Hartknoch, 1796), 3:145.}
111.
^{This interpretation is put forth by both Schelling} ^{(see below 105) and Hegel} ^{: “Kant} ^{from the start one-sidedly attributes to the concept of matter only the determination of impenetrability, which we are supposed to perceive by the sense of touch [Gefühl]” (HW 5:201; English translation from Hegel. Hegel’s Science of Logic, 180). According to Hegel Kant} ^{presents matter as impenetrable” “since it presents itself under this category to the sense of touch [Gefühl] by which it manifests itself to us“ (HW 5:201; Hegel. Hegel’s Science of Logic, 180).}
112.
^{English translation from Kant. “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.” 220.}
113.
^Ibid.
114.
^{English translation from Kant. “Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy.” 236.}
115.
^{English translation from Kant. “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.” 76.}
116.
^{Ibid., 211.}
117.
^{Ibid., 214.}
118.
^{Ibid., 214.}
119.
^Ibid.
120.
^{Ibid., 235.}
121.
^{Eschenmayer, Carl August. Säze aus der Natur-Metaphysik auf chemische und medicinische Gegenstände angewandt, Propositions from the Metaphysics of Nature Applied to Chemical and Medical Objects (Tübingen: Heerbrandt, 1797), 5.}
122.
^{English translation from Kant. “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science.” 191.}
123.
^{Ibid., 234.}
124.
^{Ibid., 210.}
125.
^{Ibid., 214.}
126.
^{Ibid., 211.}
127.
^{See Vuillemin. Physique et métaphysique kantiennes, 168 On the confusion between force and pressure, see Ibid., 90–94.}

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Giovanelli, M. (2011). From the Anticipations of Perception to the Dynamic Conception of Matter. In: Reality and Negation - Kant's Principle of Anticipations of Perception. Studies in German Idealism, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0065-9_1

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