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The Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and Security Policy

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The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law - La Cour de Justice et la Construction de l'Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans de Jurisprudence

Abstract

The Court of Justice’s powers always and until today have been markedly restricted when it comes to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This inevitably results in a fragmented and sparse mosaic of yet important findings of the Court. Among these are several judgements on delimiting CFSP competences from other competences, clearly establishing priority for the latter, formerly EC competences. The Treaty of Lisbon seems to modify this relationship, without the ECJ so far having had the opportunity to express itself on that. Another development of paramount importance and established by the ECJ is the indirect fundamental rights scrutiny of restrictive CFSP measures. More generally, also the findings on the relationship between EC and EU law as well as between EC law and international law (today: between EU law and international law) on that occasion are relevant to the CFSP.

Professor Dr. S. Griller, University of Salzburg.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a short yet informative survey compare e.g. McGoldrick 1997, p. 138 et seq. See also Gosalbo Bono 2006, p. 337 et seq.

  2. 2.

    Article L (after Amsterdam: Article 46; and also Article 28 para 1) TEU.

  3. 3.

    Article M (after Amsterdam: Article 47) TEU. This clause was to be read together with and reinforced by the following provisions (numbering post-Amsterdam, emphasis added): Article 1 TEU: ‘… The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty.’; Article 2 TEU fifth indent: ‘The Union shall set itself the following objectives: …—to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it…’; Article 3 TEU: ‘The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.’

  4. 4.

    Almost identical wording is to be found in Article 24 para 1 TEU.

  5. 5.

    See Wouters et al. 2008, p. 160 et seq, p. 186 et seq; Streinz et al. 2010, p. 136 et seq, esp 141 et seq; Eeckhout 2011, p. 478 et seq. For a more differentiated view, see Herrmann 2008, p. 46 et seq; van Elsuwege 2010, p. 989 et seq; Regelsberger and Kugelmann 2012, para 3 et seq. This is not the place for an in-depth discussion. Suffice it to say that this author is not fully convinced by the ‘nothing has changed’-arguments. They bring the constitutional aspects of the CFSP reforms by the Lisbon Treaty close to mockery. Moreover, taken seriously and applied to EU law in general, at least the arguments drawing on the democracy principle and the rule of law put into question the legal status of further and similarly ‘constitutionally deficient areas’ such as Economic Union.

  6. 6.

    Case C-70/94 Werner, [1995] ECR, I-3189, para 10. See also Case C-83/94 Leifer, [1995] ECR, I-3231, para 10 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Compare Eeckhout 2011, p. 39.

  8. 8.

    Council Regulation 3381/94 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use goods, OJ 1994/L 367/1.

  9. 9.

    Council Decision 94/942/CFSP on the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods, OJ 1994/L 367/8.

  10. 10.

    Council Regulation 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology, OJ 2000/L 159/1; in the meantime replaced by Council Regulation 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, OJ 2009/L 134/1.

    Exception was only made for certain services considered not to come under the CCP competence. For these services (again) a CFSP measure was adopted: Council Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP concerning the control of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses, OJ 2000/L 159/216.

  11. 11.

    At the time: Article 133 TEC; today, mutatis mutandis, Article 207 TFEU. For a detailed assessment of the change in the dual-use regime compare Weidel 2002.

  12. 12.

    Council Regulation 1432/92 prohibiting trade between the European Economic Community and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, OJ 1992/L 151/4.

  13. 13.

    Case C-124/95 Centro-Com, [1997] ECR, I—114, para 27.

  14. 14.

    Case C-124/95 Centro-Com, [1997] ECR, I—114, para 32.

    The contrast to the classical instances on CCP is obvious: The Court did not—as e.g. in Opinion 1/75, Understanding on Local Cost Standard, [1975] ECR, p. 1355 (on 1363 and 1364) where it found it unacceptable that "the Member States should exercise a power concurrent to that of the Community, …”—rule out Member State measures. It only stressed that such measures had to respect Community measures. This might be seen as a cautious approach to the CCP-CFSP overlap resembling (but not entirely accepting) the older, more general contention in the literature that even CCP competences were not exclusive but concurring; compare only Vollbrecht 1987 p. 204 et seq; Timmermans 1987, p. 680 et seq.

  15. 15.

    Compare infra in the text near fn 24.

  16. 16.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS—Economic Community of West African States), [2008] ECR, I-3651.

  17. 17.

    Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, OJ 2002/L 191/1.

  18. 18.

    Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to a European Union contribution to ECOWAS in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OJ 2004/L 359/65.

  19. 19.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 33.

  20. 20.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 60.

  21. 21.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 61.

  22. 22.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 62.

  23. 23.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 71.

  24. 24.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 72.

  25. 25.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 73.

  26. 26.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 75.

  27. 27.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 76 et seq.

  28. 28.

    Case C-91/05 Commission vs Council (ECOWAS), [2008] ECR, I-3651, para 108 et seq.

  29. 29.

    Compare e.g. Hillion and Wessel 2009, regarding the following remarks esp. on p. 571 et seq.

  30. 30.

    The action was brought under Article 230 TEC. On this broad interpretation of the Court’s power see Hillion and Wessel 2009, p. 564 et seq, and—on the earlier emergence of this jurisprudence—Griller 1999, p. 61 et seq. Compare also Eeckhout 2011, p. 172 et seq.

  31. 31.

    Compare for the argument Griller 1999, p. 57 et seq. A similar result, yet on the grounds of very different arguments, appears to be reached by Dashwood 2008, esp on p. 93 et seq.

  32. 32.

    E.g. Cremona 2008, p. 44 et seq; Dashwood 2008, p. 103 et seq; Hillion and Wessel 2009, p. 582 et seq; Klamert 2010, p. 499 et seq; van Elsuwege 2010, p. 1002 et seq. More optimistic Eeckhout 2011, p. 180 et seq.

  33. 33.

    Articles 60 and 301 TEC.

  34. 34.

    Article 215 TFEU. This provision allows for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, as well as for four restrictive measures against individuals. Arguably, it thereby encompasses the former Article 60 TEC. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the ‘necessary measures’. The European Parliament shall only be informed.

    By contrast, Article 75 TFEU, which replaced Article 60 EC with regard to restrictions on capital movements and payments, is different in several respects. First, its application is independent from a previous CFSP measure. Second, its scope is refined to preventing and combating terrorism and related activities. Third, the two-tier mechanism in this case consists of the regulation passed in the ordinary legislative procedure establishing the framework, and of implementing measures by the Council. It is not entirely clear whether Article 74 TFEU could also be used to implement CFSP measures, eventually without taking a previous CFSP decision under the TEU.

  35. 35.

    See for a more comprehensive picture including the development over the decades, Eeckhout 2011, p. 501 et seq.

  36. 36.

    This shall be explained only for the post-Lisbon situation. However, the point could also be made—mutatis mutandis—under pre-Lisbon law. Within the TFEU, restrictive measures are regulated in a Title different from that on CCP (Articles 206 et seq and Article 215 TFEU respectively), even if the historical development would suggest the contrary. Article 40 TEU also in this respect is not very helpful, given that ‘restrictive measures’ are not mentioned in Articles 3–6 TFEU. At any event, the ‘non-affection-concept' of Article 40 TEU could only work with respect to restrictive measures if they were—also if adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU—to be qualified as CFSP measures.

    Compare also Eeckhout 2011, p. 502: ‘border area between trade policy and foreign policy where it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw clear boundaries … no man’s land between the front line of the supranational and the intergovernmental’. Even if restrictive measures should be qualified as CCP measures, the competence of the Union could—under Article 215 TFEU—not be exclusive; see Eeckhout 2011, p. 541.

  37. 37.

    Article 275 TFEU. The premise of the provision is that such decisions could produce legal effects even before their implementation through Article 215 TFEU. This in turn (but not only this) renders the position untenable that CFSP law after Lisbon would not be legally binding.

  38. 38.

    Case C-355/04 P Segi, [2007] ECR, I-1662.

  39. 39.

    Similarly, Eeckhout 2011, p. 481.

  40. 40.

    Case C-355/04 P Segi, [2007] ECR, I-1662, para 51.

  41. 41.

    Case C-355/04 P Segi, [2007] ECR, I-1662, para 52.

  42. 42.

    Case C-355/04 P Segi, [2007] ECR, I-1662, paras 53 and 55.

  43. 43.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation (hereinafter, Kadi and Al Barakaat), [2008] ECR, I-6351.

    For a full appraisal including the facts of the case and further references, see Eeckhout 2011, p. 506 et seq; De Búrca 2012. For this author’s comments which in the following are partly developed further, compare Griller 2008.

  44. 44.

    For those, however, who would qualify Articles 60 and 301 TEC (today Article 215 TFEU) as (very special) CFSP provisions (compare above fn 36), all jurisprudence on these Articles and implementing measures is case-law ‘directly’ in CFSP matters.

  45. 45.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, para 326.

  46. 46.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, paras 334–353.

  47. 47.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, paras 354–370.

  48. 48.

    However, it ordered that the regulation was to be maintained for a period not exceeding three months, which consequently led to a ‘renewal’ by the Commission and a second round of litigation which is not yet finished; see Case T-85/09 Kadi, 30 Sept 2010, nyr.

  49. 49.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, para 201.

  50. 50.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, para 216.

    Post-Lisbon, the issue is of minor importance because, first, Article 352 TFEU, replacing, with substantive amendments, Article 308 TEC, includes a new para 4 which states that Article 352 cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the CFSP and that Article 40(2) TEU has to be respected. Second, Article 215 TFEU now explicitly includes the option to adopt sanctions against individuals. Consequently, there is no need to rely on Article 352.

  51. 51.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, para 202.

  52. 52.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, para 317. The Court also uses the expression ‘autonomous legal system’: paras 282, 316. However, the significance of the difference remains unclear.

  53. 53.

    Compare supra in the text before and in fn 5.

  54. 54.

    Case C 548/09 P Bank Melli, 16 Nov 2011, nyr, para 100 (emphasis added).

  55. 55.

    In the light of the Segi Case (compare supra in the text after n 38), however, it is conceivable that the ECJ would not hesitate to review CFSP law directly, if need should be, in order to protect the rule of law and fundamental rights.

  56. 56.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, para 285.

  57. 57.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, para 288.

  58. 58.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, paras 281–284; compare also para 316 et seq.

  59. 59.

    For a full discussion compare the references supra fn 43.

  60. 60.

    Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR, I-6351, para 285.

  61. 61.

    See especially Solange I (BVerfG 29 May 1974, Case BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271, esp. at 285); Solange II (BVerfG 22 October 1984, Case 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339, esp. at 383 et seq.); Banana judgment (BVerfG 7 June 2000, Case 2 BvL 1/97, BVerfGE 102, 147); Lisbon judgment (BVerfG, 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, paras 339 et seq).

  62. 62.

    BVerfG 12 October 1993, Case 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 155.

  63. 63.

    The English version of the first part of the citation is taken from ‘Brunner v The European Union Treaty’ 1 Common Market Law Reports (1994) p. 57 at p. 79.

  64. 64.

    Banana Judgment, supra 61 [emphasis added]; the author’s own translation of the second part.

  65. 65.

    See ECtHR 30 June 2005, Application No. 45036/98, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland, at para 155.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

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    Stefan Griller

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    Griller, S. (2013). The Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In: The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law - La Cour de Justice et la Construction de l'Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans de Jurisprudence. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-897-2_36

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