Abstract
This chapter discusses what institutional model is best able to address identified deficiencies in enforcement of the EU’s Electronic Communications Framework, i.e. lack of consistency and independence of national regulatory authorities. An examination of the three paradigm models otherwise available in EU law reveals that the current ‘network-based’ model is basically sound. While it should be strengthened and supplemented, it should not be replaced. The author argues that it is time to move beyond these ‘basic’ questions of institutionalisation to the more fundamental question of the constitutionalisation of this model, through a debate on the legitimacy and accountability of its central construct: the European Regulators Group.
Maartje de Visser is Assistant Professor, Department of International and European Law, Maastricht University. At the time of her contribution to the project, she was Assistant Professor, Department of International and European Public Law, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg University and a member of the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC). An abbreviated version of this chapter was published as ‘Surveying Regulatory Regimes for EC Communications Law’ in Preissl B, Haucap J and Curwen P (eds), Telecommunications Markets: Drivers and Impediments (Physica-Verlag, 2009). This contribution was closed in 2007 and accordingly it does not discuss the subsequent steps in the legislative process leading to the adoption of the legislative package reforming EU electronic communications law, in 2009. For the ease of reference, references to the Treaties have been updated to reflect the new numbering after the Treaty of Lisbon.
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Notes
- 1.
‘Why we need more consistency in the application of EU telecom rules’ SPEECH/06/795, 11 December 2006, 3.
- 2.
The first legislative measures in the sector challenged existing legal monopolies to bring about liberalisation. The 1998 ONP framework was directed at the ‘original sin’ of the former incumbent to allow the development of a genuinely competitive market. The current 2003 framework is premised upon a fully liberalised and competitive sector. A recent example of the perceived need to adapt substantive rules to technological evolution is the discussion on next generation networks.
- 3.
Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment [1988] OJ L131/73 and Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunication services [1990] OJ L192/10. Further Larouche 2000.
- 4.
Commission (EC) Fifth Annual Implementation Report (1999) 9. In particular, they were in charge of applying the SMP regime.
- 5.
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ L108/33.
- 6.
The Reports are available at DG INFSO’s website.
- 7.
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/index_en.htm> Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 8.
Commission (EC) ‘Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications’ (Communication) COM(2006)28 final, 6 February 2006; Commission (EC) ‘2nd Report on Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications’ (Communication) COM(2007)401 final, 11 July 2007; Commission (EC) Twelfth Annual Implementation Report COM(2007) 155, 29 March 2007, 15; Reding (note 1); V Reding ‘The Review of the EU Telecom rules: Strengthening Competition and Completing the Internal Market’ SPEECH/06/442, 27 June 2006; V Reding ‘Towards a True Internal Market for Europe’s Telecom Industry and Consumers—the Regulatory Challenges Ahead’ SPEECH/07/86, 15 February 2007; Hogan & Hartson and Analysis Preparing the Next Steps in Regulation of Electronic Communications (July 2006) accessible at the website of DG INFSO and numerous responses to the Commission consultation process, accessible at the same website.
- 9.
Eg Commission (EC) Eleventh Annual Implementation Report COM(2006)68 final, 20 February 2002, 10.
- 10.
Larouche 2005.
- 11.
Majone 1996, 277.
- 12.
Of course, these are complemented by the generalist consistency tools laid down in Articles 267 and 258 TFEU, cf Case C-478/93 Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-3081 [38].
- 13.
Article 7(3) Framework Directive.
- 14.
Article 7(4) Framework Directive. The Commission must consider that the measure would create a barrier to the single market or have serious doubts as to the measure’s compatibility with EU law. Thus far, five veto decisions have been adopted: Commission Decision of 20 February 2004 C(2004)527final in Cases FI/2003/0024 and FI/2003/0027, Commission Decision of 5 October 2004 C(2004)3682final in Case FI/2004/0082, Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 C(2004)4070final in Case AT/2004/0090, Commission Decision of 17 May 2005 C(2005)1442final in Case DE/2005/0144 and Commission Decision of 10 January 2007 C(2006)7300final in Cases PL/2006/0518 and PL/2006/0514.
- 15.
Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2003] OJ L114/45.
- 16.
Commission Guidelines of 9 July 2002 on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ C165/6.
- 17.
Commission Decision 2002/627/EC of 29 July 2002 establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications Networks and Services [2002] L200/38 amended by Commission Decision 2004/3445/EC of 14 September 2004 [2004] OJ L293/30. The ERG’s website can be found at <http://erg.eu.int/> Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 18.
Article 7(2) Framework Directive. National courts are left out of this network for obvious constitutional reasons.
- 19.
Further: Article 10(7) Framework Directive and Article 2 of Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services (Consolidated Services Directive) [2002] OJ L249/21.
- 20.
Article 6 and Recital 15 Framework Directive and paras 144, 145 of the Commission Guidelines on market analysis.
- 21.
Eg Commission (EC) Twelfth Annual Implementation Report COM(2007) 155, 29 March 2007, 14; Reding (note 1).
- 22.
IP/06/1798, MEMO/06/487, IP/07/888, MEMO/07/255.
- 23.
IP/05/430, IP/05/875, IP/05/1296, MEMO/05/372, MEMO/05/242, MEMO/05/478, IP/06/464, IP/06/948, IP/06/1798, MEMO/06/158, MEMO/06/271, MEMO/06/487.
- 24.
- 25.
Maher 2004, 228.
- 26.
Article 3(2) first sentence Framework Directive.
- 27.
Also Case C-91/94 Criminal Proceedings against Thierry Tranchant and Téléphone Store SARL[1995] ECR I-3911, Joined Cases C-46/90 and C-93/91 Procureur du Roi v Jean-Marie Lagauche and others [1993] ECR I-5267, Case C-69/91 Criminal Proceedings against Francine Gillon, née Decoster [1993] ECR I-5335 and Case C-92/91 Criminal Proceedings against Annick Neny, née Taillandier [1993] ECR I-5383.
- 28.
Eg § 4 Gesetz über die Bundesnetzagentur (Germany), Article L.131 Code des postes et des communications électronique (France), Article 4(1)(c) Wet OPTA (the Netherlands), Members’ Code of Conduct (Ofcom), available at <http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/csg/ofcom_board/code/> Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 29.
Articles 3(2) second sentence and 11(2) Framework Directive.
- 30.
Stevens and Valcke 2003, 169, submit that the trigger should be interpreted to encompass not only a majority, but also a minority interest in, or control over, an undertaking active in the eCommunications field.
- 31.
Council Regulation (EEC) No 17 (First Regulation implementing Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty) [1959–1962] OJ Spec Ed 87, now replaced by Council Regulation No 1/2003/EC on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. For a detailed examination of the origins of the competition rules, Goyder 2003. For an explanation of the substance and procedure of the competition rules inter alia Whish 2003; Motta 2004; Kerse and Khan 2004.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
Article 245 TFEU.
- 37.
Although one could argue that it is certainly more cost-efficient for an undertaking to lobby a single authority as opposed to 27 different ones. Even so, it is not certain to what extent lobbying at the EU level would exert the desired effect. Indeed, capture requires a relationship of information asymmetry which makes the authority dependant on the information coming from one source. At European level, there is no single entity on the other side of the Commission: industry groups are not united or powerful enough given the divergence in the interests of their members and individual firms are too small.
- 38.
Mainly due to the doctrine of national procedural autonomy and the need for implementation of directives. If the Commission was to become the sole enforcer of the eCommunications rules, it would in all likelihood remain dependent on the Member States for the supply of local information.
- 39.
Goyder 2003, 31.
- 40.
Forrester 2003, 80.
- 41.
- 42.
- 43.
The EU lacks the competence to directly legislate on, let alone harmonise, national procedure. Indeed, Member States have strong national traditions in the field and will be loathe to accept too many intrusions, Schwarze 1996.
- 44.
Member States must adopt rules that are effective and equivalent to domestic laws, Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989. For an example, in telecommunications Case C-462/99 Connect Austria Gesellschaft für Telekommunikation GmbH v Telekom-Control-Kommission and Mobilkom Austria AG [2003] ECR I-5197. Also, they must behave loyally towards the European institutions pursuant to Article 4(3) TEU.
- 45.
Yataganas 2001. This is referred to by Nicolaides et al. 2003 as ‘the implementation deficit’ and by Majone 2000, 279 as ‘the institutional deficit’. In a way, we can, of course, also qualify the main problem of centralised governance as an implementation/institutional deficit. After all, the insufficiency of resources also resulted in defective implementation of the relevant legal rules. Keeping in with normal European parlance; however, we will reserve references to the implementation deficit to discussions on decentralised governance.
- 46.
Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649.
- 47.
Commission (EC) ‘First Report On the Application of the Principle of Mutual Recognition In Product and Services Markets’ SEC(1999)1106, 13 July 1999, 6. Note that this report followed 20 years after the judgment was delivered.
- 48.
Ibid.
- 49.
Cases C-6 & 9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357, Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029, Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239, Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v Repubblica Italiana [2006] ECR I-5577.
- 50.
Also Scott and Trubek 2002.
- 51.
For a full list of existing agencies. <http://europa.eu/agencies/community_agencies/index_en.htm> Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 52.
- 53.
Eg CEDEFOP, EUROFOND, ETF.
- 54.
Eg EEA, EU-OSHA, EMCDDA.
- 55.
Eg OHIM, CPVO, EMEA, EFSA.
- 56.
They may also include members appointed by the European Parliament or representatives of the social partners or other relevant stakeholder groups. These members commonly do not have the right to vote.
- 57.
Here, we must not think solely of the threat of infringement proceedings or perhaps even Member State liability, but also—and arguably primarily—of a loss of face towards other Member States or the Commission.
- 58.
Cf note 24.
- 59.
Further the text between notes 99 and 100.
- 60.
Case 9/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority [1957] ECR 133.
- 61.
Eg Lenaerts 1993.
- 62.
- 63.
Commission (EC) ‘European Governance’ (White Paper) COM(01) 428 final 8, 25 July 2001, Commission (EC) ‘The operating framework for ERAs’ (noteote 52). There are, however, tensions within the Commission regarding the topic, with some members wishing to move beyond Meroni and create true regulatory agencies, cf Majone 2002.
- 64.
Commission (EC) ‘The operating framework for ERAs’, ibid., 1.
- 65.
Ibid., 163.
- 66.
Majone 1997, 3.
- 67.
Eurostrategies/Cullen International Report ‘Draft Final Report on the Possible Added Value of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications’ ECSC-EC-EAEC Brussels-Luxembourg 1999, Forrester Norall & Sutton ‘The Institutional Framework for the Regulation of Telecommunications and the Application of the EC Competition Rules’ ESSC-EC-EAEC Brussels-Luxembourg [1996], Commission (EC) Annual Implementation Reports (website DG INFSO).
- 68.
Articles 101(1) and 107–109 TFEU.
- 69.
In large part because competition rules and institutions in the then Member States were in a primitive state, Gerber 1994, 103; Goyder 2003, 28.
- 70.
The importance of telecommunications for the economic development of national sovereign states required, or so it was believed, political control. The need to ensure complete national coverage at equal and affordable prices was used as an additional argument.
- 71.
In 1992, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) introduced a Chapter on Trans-European networks (TENs). Article 170 TFEU (as it now is) states that the Community has the task of contributing to ‘[T]he establishment and development of trans-European networks in the areas of (..) telecommunications (..) infrastructures’. This has never taken off in the field of telecommunications.
- 72.
Case C-202/88 France v Commission (Terminal Equipment) [1991] ECR I-1223 and Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90 Spain v Commission [1992] ECR I-5833, directed at Dir 88/301/EEC and Dir 90/388/EEC.
- 73.
Article 8 Dir 97/51 and Article 22 of Directive 97/33 of the European Parliament and of the Council on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP) [1997] OJ L199/32.
- 74.
Eurostrategies/Cullen International Report (noteote 67). This study followed two earlier reports dealing at least partially with the issue of the establishment of an ERA: Forrester Norall & Sutton (noteote 67) especially 51–82 and NERA/Denton Hall ‘Issues Associated with the Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications’ ECSC-EC-EAEC Brussels-Luxembourg [1997].
- 75.
Commission (EC) ‘Towards a new framework for Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated services’ (Communication) COM(1999)539, 9.
- 76.
Reding see notes 1 and 8 above.
- 77.
As the debates on the Constitutional Treaty, its successor and voting arrangements so vividly demonstrate.
- 78.
Dir 88/301/EEC.
- 79.
<http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/escb/html/index.en.html> Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 80.
<http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=home&mac=0&id=> Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 81.
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/index_en.html> Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 82.
Annex 1 to the ERG advice to the Commission in the context of the Review. See the entire process of correspondence between the Commission and the ERG (accessible through the DG INFSO and ERG website) for other institutional proposals notably an enhanced role for the ERG in existing regulatory and legislative processes or its transformation into an agency-like body.
- 83.
These are aimed, in particular in fleshing out the ‘proper’ application of the ERG Common Position on remedies, ERG(06)33.
- 84.
The ERG gives the example of the Bundesnetzagentur who requested such a group for its leased line market notification. The group’s recommendation was for the Bundesnetzagentur to withdraw its notification. NRAs can also seek informal peer review of their analysis prior to finalisation and notification.
- 85.
Commission ‘Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for electronic communications networks and services’ (Communication) COM(2006)334 final, 29 June 2006, 9 and accompanying Staff Working Document SEC(2006)816. For a more elaborate version of this argument, Larouche and de Visser 2006.
- 86.
The recent process of correspondence between the Commission and the ERG (note 82) indicates that the Commission is willing to also give consideration to enhancing or transforming the ERG—without, however, abandoning its proposal to extend veto rights.
- 87.
Article 4 fourth al. ERG Decision ERG (03)07 Articles 1.4 and 5.6.
- 88.
ERG (05)16 1. This much is also evident from the language used in the Conclusions of ERG Plenary Meetings, referring eg to ‘complementarity of activities’ or ‘that there will be close coordination with Commission services’. In addition, the Commission reports its efforts on the same matters as NRAs are dealing with and gives information on its activities, COCOM meetings and policy proposals.
- 89.
Akin to what the ECN is for the Commission and the national competition authorities (noteCAs) for the notification of draft decision and possible ousting of jurisdiction under Article 11 Reg 1/2003 (note 31). Consider the ERG’s comments in Annex 1 of its advice to the Commission (note 82 above) 2.
- 90.
<http://irgis.anacom.pt/site/en/irg.asp> Accessed 14 May 2012. ERG(06)03. The IRG is an unofficial forum of NRA heads, established in 1997 and used for informal strategic discussions which do not involve the Commission.
- 91.
For instance, the IRG could issue separate documents where the views of the NRAs and the Commission do not align or take over the advisory tasks of the ERG.
- 92.
E.g. under dispute settlement, Articles 20 and 21 Framework Directive or where competitors institute damage actions for an undertaking’s failure to comply with an NRA decision.
- 93.
Article 15 Reg 1/2003, Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] [2004] OJ C101/54.
- 94.
C-2/88 Criminal Proceedings against JJ Zwartveld and Others [1990] ECR I-3365 [17]-[22]. Examples of assistance mentioned by the Court include the production of documents and having Commission officials give evidence in national proceedings.
- 95.
The non-confidential versions of those judgments that have been voluntarily submitted can be found at <http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/article_7/national_judiciaries/index_en.htm> Accessed 14 May 2012. In terms of scope and accessibility, contrast with those sent under the competition regime: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/antitrust/nationalcourts/> Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 96.
The fact that the eCommunications regime is laid down in directives arguably exacerbates matters, as it obscures its European origins and Internal Market imperatives.
- 97.
In particular, their broad and discretionary competences.
- 98.
Commission Review Documents (note 85 above). A proposal to this effect was already made during the negotiations on the current regulatory framework: European Parliament, Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy A5-0053/2001FINAL amendment 22, Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy A5-0435/2001/FINAL amendment 27.
- 99.
E.g. Case 71/74 Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit en Groenten-importhandel, Nederlandse Bond van Grossiers in Zuidvruchten en ander Geimporteerd Fruit v Commission [1974] ECR 1034; Case 97/85 Union Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke GmbH and others v Commission [1985] ECR 1031. These conditions have also been extended to the award of interim relief by national courts against European measures, e.g. Case C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1991] ECR I-415; Case C-465/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and others v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-3761.
- 100.
Majone 1996, Chap. 12 arrives at a similar conclusion, albeit from a different premise. His starting point is the ‘commitment problem’ of national governments towards regulatory policies, and the credibility of national agencies to address this problem. Majone argues that the credibility of these agencies, and their commitment to regulatory policies can be strengthened through teamwork.
- 101.
As with the conditions for suspension, suggestions to this effect were already made by Parliament in the negotiations on the current version of the Framework Directive, (note 98 above) amendment 10.
- 102.
Reding (note 8 above) 7.
- 103.
Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities [1997] OJ L202/60. The proposal can be found at Article 23b(2) of the Commission proposal of 24 May 2007.
- 104.
Admittedly, the Commission mentions some of these in its letter of request to the ERG (note 82), but seems to perceive their relevance only in relation to the far-reaching institutional scenario of transforming the ERG into some sort of regulatory agency. It is argued here that these questions are also relevant if the current state of institutional play remains in place.
- 105.
Baldwin and McCrudden 1987, 33.
- 106.
Article 8 ERG Decision. The Annual Report is also sent to the Council.
- 107.
ERG Work Programmes are currently available through the body’s website and subject to public consultation, ERG(06)03 7.
- 108.
Joined Cases 8-11/66 Cimenteries and others v Commission [1967] ECR 75 [91].
- 109.
Although the Commission argues in the revision documents that the soft law nature of ERG documents hinders the body’s ability to achieve an acceptable degree of consistency, see Commission-ERG consultation process (note 82). ERG documents are followed by NRAs for any of the following reasons: they state that ‘ERG members shall be recommended to take the utmost account of them. They commit to provide reasoned regulatory decisions by reference to the relevant ERG Common Position(s)’; peer pressure and reputational enforcement; the fact that, leaving aside Commission guidelines, they have no other source of informational assistance and co-authorship. National courts may be expected to show a certain amount of deference towards ERG documents, probably because of a lack of expertise or respect towards a document agreed upon by representatives of all 27 NRAs.
- 110.
- 111.
If ERG documents are made reviewable, they will have to become hard law, i.e. binding, as no court would accept jurisdiction to assess the legality of a document that does not produce binding effects.
- 112.
It would also radically alter the premise of network-based enforcement.
- 113.
They could also end up reflecting the lowest common denominator and hence jeopardise the ERG’s tasks of achieving consistency in law enforcement.
- 114.
Case 314/85 [1987] ECR 4199.
- 115.
The latter costs are incurred by market parties, NRAs (as they would arguably have to defend the ERG document and use resources otherwise dedicated to enforcement activities) and national courts. On the other hand, the costs would be decentralised, i.e. spread over the 27 legal systems, which might increase acceptability (although we cannot completely rule out a certain degree of forum-shopping).
- 116.
Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co. v Commission [1963] ECR 95, confirmed in Case C-50/00P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA) v Council [2002] ECR I-6677. For an eloquent critique of this approach, Jacobs AG in UPA.
- 117.
Joined Cases 41–44/70 NV International Fruit Company and others v Commission [1971] ECR 411 [24]–[27], Case 11/82 SA Piraiki-Patraiki and others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, Case T-172/98, T-175 to 177/98 Salamander AG and others v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR II-2487.
- 118.
Even if the body would in fact render independent decisions, the appearance of influence or bias could amount to an infringement of the right to effective judicial protection, consider e.g. the case law of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 6 ECHR: Piersack v Belgium (Appl no 8692/79) (1982) Series A no 85; Procola v Luxembourg (Appl no 14570/89 (1995) Series A no 326.
- 119.
Baldwin and McCrudden 1987, 63 et seq. This could be justified with reference to the principle of separation of powers or institutional balance.
- 120.
ERG(06)03 7, ERG website (note 17 above).
- 121.
Eg ERG (07)20 for ERG(06)67 and ERG(06)68.
- 122.
Article 5 second al. ERG Decision and Articles 5.4, 5.5, 6 and 7 ERG (03) 07.
- 123.
In terms of cost, we can think of preparation and participation in meetings and opportunity costs, i.e. the resources that are spent on ERG work as opposed to SMP analysis, dispute resolution etc. In terms of benefits, we can think of a higher quality of decisions and consequently perhaps a decrease in the number of judicial challenges on that ground or the fact that NRAs need not reinvent the wheel for every new issue that crops up.
- 124.
Eg Craig 2006, Chaps. 10, 11.
- 125.
For instance, if it is decided that more emphasis should be placed on participation, it would do to tighten the conditions for consultation for the ERG. Currently, Article 6 ERG Decision only requires that consultation must be extensive and at an early stage. Support could be derived e.g. from Article 6 Framework Directive—the national consultation procedure for NRAs, inter alia stipulating time limits and that account must be taken of comments received or the United States’ Administrative Procedure Act 1946 with its notice and comment procedure.
- 126.
On the Continent, a number of legal systems do not readily admit that independent authorities be given wide, discretionary powers, usually for reasons of a constitutional nature. Under the 1998 framework, it could, thus, be noted that the status of NRAs was often dubious, that Ministries tended to keep important competences to themselves and that the court was overly strict in reviewing NRA decisions, focusing too much on competence, e.g. Eurostrategies/Cullen International Report (note 67 above), Commission (EC) Annual Implementation Reports.
- 127.
Consider the text between notes 41 and 43 above.
- 128.
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de Visser, M. (2013). The Reform of EU Electronic Communications Law: Revolution or Evolution?. In: Larouche, P., Cserne, P. (eds) National Legal Systems and Globalization. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-885-9_7
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