Skip to main content

Self-Defence and Weapons of Mass Destruction

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Anticipatory Action in Self-Defence
  • 1310 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter examines those conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries that involved the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and in which claims of self-defence were contemplated or used. Three instances of state practice are discussed: the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the Israeli bombing of the Osirak reactor (1981) and the US invasion of Iraq (2003). In all these cases the temporal dimension of the invoked claims of self-defence is analysed. The specific instances are tested against the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as identified in the introductory remarks of Part II. The chapter will also look at the ICJ’s Nuclear Advisory Opinion (1996) in order to discern the Court’s approach to the question of self-defence against such weapons.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 85.

  2. 2.

    Ibid

  3. 3.

    Ibid., p. 86.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., p. 322; Allison 1971, pp. 98−99. Structural realist approach: Waltz 1990, pp. 732–736. For a social constructivist discussion of nuclear deterrence in general, see. Tannenwald 1999, pp. 433−468; Farrell and Lambert 2001, pp. 309−326.

  5. 5.

    Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 86; Waltz 1990, pp. 732−733; Farrell and Lambert 2001, pp. 321−322.

  6. 6.

    Chayes 1974, p. 8.

  7. 7.

    Chayes 1974, p. 8; Garthoff 1988, p. 67.

  8. 8.

    ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Chronology of Events’, in Chang and Kornbluh 1992, p. 352.

  9. 9.

    Chang and Kornbluh 1992, p. 353.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Ibid., p 358; Mueller et al. 2006, pp. 172−173.

  12. 12.

    Chang and Kornbluh 1992, p. 361.

  13. 13.

    Allison 1971, p 104.

  14. 14.

    Mueller et al. 2006, p. 175; SCOR, 17th Sess., 1022nd meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.1022(OR) (23 October 1962) paras 13, 71.

  15. 15.

    Chang and Kornbluh 1992; Chayes 1974.

  16. 16.

    For an overview of these hypotheses, see Allison 1971, pp. 43−56.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., pp. 50–56

  18. 18.

    Ibid., p. 54; Mueller et al. 2006, p. 174.

  19. 19.

    Allison 1971, p. 54.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., pp. 58−61. For a composition of the Executive Committee, see Chayes 1974, pp. 13−14.

  21. 21.

    Allison 1971, pp. 59−60; Mueller et al. 2006, pp. 176−177.

  22. 22.

    Allison 1971, pp. 58−59; Mueller et al. 2006, pp. 176−177.

  23. 23.

    Chayes 1974, p. 65; Mueller et al. 2006, pp. 176−177.

  24. 24.

    Chayes 1974, p. 65.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., pp 65−66.

  26. 26.

    Chang and Kornbluh 1992, pp. 364−365.

  27. 27.

    UN Doc. S/5181 (1962).

  28. 28.

    The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (commonly known as the Rio Treaty) was signed in 1947 between several American countries, including the US. The declared purpose of the Treaty was ‘to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State, and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them’ (preamble). According to Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, in the event of an aggression, extra- or intra-continental conflict or other situation not amounting to an armed attack that affected the inviolability, territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence of any American State, the Organ of Consultation had to meet up and discuss necessary measures. Article 8 of the Rio Treaty offered a list of measures that could be taken by the Organ of Consultation: ‘recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force.’

  29. 29.

    UN Doc. S/5181 1962; Chayes 1974, pp. 16, 20.

  30. 30.

    UN Doc. S/5181 1962.

  31. 31.

    UN Doc. S/5183 1962.

  32. 32.

    UN Doc. S/5186 1962.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    Chayes 1974, p. 88; Wright 1963, p. 558.

  35. 35.

    Mueller et al. 2006, pp. 174, 179.

  36. 36.

    Chang and Kornbluh 1992, pp. 377−80; Mueller et al. 2006, p. 180.

  37. 37.

    Mueller et al. 2006, p. 180; Allison 1971, pp. 106.

  38. 38.

    Campbell 1963, pp. 160−176; McDougal 1963, pp. 597−604; Meeker 1963, pp. 515−524; Wright 1963, pp. 546−565.

  39. 39.

    McDougal 1963, p. 603; Campbell 1963, p.176.

  40. 40.

    Wright 1963, pp. 554−557, 559−563; Dinstein 2005, p.186; Alexandrov 1996, pp. 156−157.

  41. 41.

    McDougal 1963, p. 603; Campbell 1963, p. 160; Wright 1963, pp. 554−556.

  42. 42.

    Meeker 1963, pp. 515−516, 523−524.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., pp. 523−524.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., p. 524. Also see Franck 2002, pp. 99−100.

  45. 45.

    Chayes 1974, p. 65.

  46. 46.

    Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 86.

  47. 47.

    Mueller et al. 2006, p. 212.

  48. 48.

    UN Doc. S/14510 1981.

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    Mueller et al. 2006, pp. 212, 214; Gill 2007, p. 140.

  51. 51.

    Mueller et al. 2006, p. 213.

  52. 52.

    Franck 2002, p. 106; Gill 2007, p. 141.

  53. 53.

    Mueller et al. 2006, p. 212.

  54. 54.

    Gill 2007, p. 141.

  55. 55.

    Mueller et al. 2006, p. 213.

  56. 56.

    SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.2280 (12 June 1981) para 58.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., 2280th–2288th meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.2280–S/PV.2288 (12−19 June 1981).

  58. 58.

    SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282nd meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.2282 (15 June 1981) paras 14−19; 2283rd meeting., S/PV.2283 (15 June 1981) paras 23−27; 2284th meeting., S/PV.2284 (16 June 1981) para 11.

  59. 59.

    SCOR, 36th Sess., 2283rd meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.2283 (15 June 1981) paras 46, 117, 146; 2288th meeting., S/PV.2288 (19 June 1981) para 115. In one instance, the concepts of ‘anticipation’ and ‘preventive aggression’ were equated and deemed unlawful: 2283rd meeting., S/PV.2283 (15 June 1981) para 146 (Sierra Leone).

  60. 60.

    SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282nd meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.2282 (15 June 1981) paras 14−19.

  61. 61.

    SC Res. 487 (1981) para 1.

  62. 62.

    Alexandrov 1996, p. 162; Franck 2002, pp. 105−106; Gill 2007, pp. 141−142; Greenwood 2003, p. 14.

  63. 63.

    Franck 2002, p. 106.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., p. 107; Gill 2007, p. 141.

  65. 65.

    Nuclear Weapons 1996, p. 226.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., para 35.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., para 39.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., para 105 (C).

  69. 69.

    Ibid., para 47.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., para 48.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., para 42.

  73. 73.

    Matheson 1997, p. 424.

  74. 74.

    Nuclear Weapons 1996, para 42.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., para 43.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., paras 53−95 (discussion of the international law applicable in armed conflict), and 105 (E).

  77. 77.

    Ibid., para 96.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., para 105 (E).

  79. 79.

    Falk 1997, pp. 64−75; Grief 1997, pp. 681−688; Weston 1997, pp. 383−392. For a more positive opinion, see Matheson 1997, pp. 417−435.

  80. 80.

    Nuclear Weapons 1996, pp. 589−590 (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins), 321−323 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President Schwebel), 376−377 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen), and 435 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).

  81. 81.

    Ibid., p. 589 (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins).

  82. 82.

    Ibid., p. 590.

  83. 83.

    Ibid.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., p. 435 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).

  85. 85.

    Falk 1997, p. 68.

  86. 86.

    Ibid.

  87. 87.

    Matheson 1997, p. 431.

  88. 88.

    Grief 1997, p. 687.

  89. 89.

    Matheson 1997, p. 430.

  90. 90.

    Nuclear Weapons 1996, para 105 (C).

  91. 91.

    Green 2009, p. 77.

  92. 92.

    Nuclear Weapons 1996, para 42.

  93. 93.

    Ibid., para 48.

  94. 94.

    Ibid.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., para 105 (E).

  96. 96.

    Ibid.

  97. 97.

    Greenwood 2005, pp. 399−404; Ignatieff 2003.

  98. 98.

    Greenwood 2005, pp. 399−403.

  99. 99.

    See infra 10.5.3.

  100. 100.

    Bush (29 January 2002) State of the Union Address.

  101. 101.

    Ibid.,Bush (1 June 2002) Graduation Speech at West Point.

  102. 102.

    US National Security Strategy 2002, Part V.

  103. 103.

    Ibid.

  104. 104.

    Ibid.

  105. 105.

    Schmitt 2003, pp. 518-519.

  106. 106.

    US National Security Strategy 2002, Part V.

  107. 107.

    Gardner 2003, p. 587; Heisbourg 2003, p. 77.

  108. 108.

    US National Security Strategy 2002, Part V.

  109. 109.

    Ibid.

  110. 110.

    Gardner 2003, p. 587; Sapiro 2005, p. 366.

  111. 111.

    Gardner 2003, pp. 585−586; Henderson 2004, p. 6.

  112. 112.

    Bush (12 September 2002) Remarks.

  113. 113.

    Ibid.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    Ibid.

  116. 116.

    Ibid. The US president made two other demands: disclosure of information about missing Gulf War personnel (from the 1990−1991 war) and end to the illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program.

  117. 117.

    Greenwood 2005, pp. 399−404.

  118. 118.

    Falk 2003, p. 592.

  119. 119.

    McGoldrick 2004, pp. 13−15; Yoo 2003, p. 563.

  120. 120.

    Johnstone 2005, p. 397; McGoldrick 2004, p. 62

  121. 121.

    SC Res. 1441, 1443, 1447 and 1454 (2002).

  122. 122.

    SC Res. 1443, 1447, 1454 (2002).

  123. 123.

    SC Res. 1441 (2002) para 1.

  124. 124.

    Ibid., paras 2−5, 8.

  125. 125.

    Ibid., para 13.

  126. 126.

    An earlier draft of what became paragraph 4 of Resolution 1441 had stated that ‘such breach authorizes member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area.’ The text was opposed by France and Russia, thus was erased from the final version of the resolution. McGoldrick 2004., p. 62

  127. 127.

    Defiant Saddam accepts UN team (14 November 2002) Guardian; UN weapons inspectors arrive in Iraq (18 November 2002) Guardian.

  128. 128.

    Saddam risks war over arms dossier (8 December 2002) Guardian; Greenwood 2005, p 394.

  129. 129.

    ElBaradei (27 January 2003); Blix (27 January 2003); ElBaradei (14 February 2003); Blix (14 February 2003); UN Doc. S/2003/232 (2003); ElBaradei (7 March 2003); Blix (7 March 2003). See also Greenwood 2005, pp. 394-395.

  130. 130.

    ElBaradei (27 January 2003); Blix (27 January 2003); ElBaradei (14 February 2003); Blix (14 February 2003); ElBaradei (7 March 2003); Blix (7 March 2003).

  131. 131.

    SCOR, 58th Sess., 4714th meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.4714 (7 March 2003) p. 3.

  132. 132.

    Ibid., pp. 9 (Germany), 11 (Syria), 17 (Russia), 18−19 (France), 21 (China), 32–33 (Pakistan).

  133. 133.

    Falk 2003, p. 595; Greenwood 2005, p. 395.

  134. 134.

    Greenwood 2005, p. 395.

  135. 135.

    UN Doc. S/2003/351 (2003); UN Doc. S/2003/350 (2003); McGoldrick 2004, pp. 53−55, p. 286 (Appendix VII: The Advice of the United Kingdom Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, on ‘The Legal Basis for the Use of Force against Iraq’, 17 March 2003).

  136. 136.

    UN Doc. S/2003/351 (2003); McGoldrick 2004, pp. 53−55, pp. 264−280 (Appendix V: Presentation of Colin Powell, US Secretary of State to the United Nations Security Council on ‘Iraq–Failing to Disarm’, 5 February 2003). Greenwood asserted that the governments that resorted to force against Iraq were right to conclude that they could rely on the authorization of military action in Res. 678, read together with Res. 687 and Res. 1441. Greenwood 2003, p. 36. For similar opinions, see Hill 2004, pp. 329−331; Pierson 2004, pp. 154−155; Taft and Buchwald 2003, pp. 557−563, Wedgwood 2003, pp. 576−585; Yoo 2003, pp. 571−574. For the rejection of the US argument see: Rapport Commissie-Davids, Conclusions (January 2010), paras 18−20.

  137. 137.

    US combat mission in Iraq ends (31 August 2010) CNN.

  138. 138.

    Taft 2002.

  139. 139.

    Ibid.

  140. 140.

    Franck 2002, pp. 105−106; Greenwood 2003, p. 14; Gill 2007, pp. 141−142; Alexandrov 1996, p. 162; SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th–2288th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.2280–S/PV.2288 (12−19 June 1981).

  141. 141.

    UN Doc. S/2003/351 2003.

  142. 142.

    Taft 2003.

  143. 143.

    Gardner 2003, p. 588; Henderson 2004, p. 12; McGoldrick 2004, p. 68; Sapiro 2003, p. 602.

  144. 144.

    Nuclear Weapons 1996, para 48.

  145. 145.

    Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (September 2004). The report concluded that Saddam Hussein did not possess stockpiles of illicit weapons at the time of the US invasion in March 2003 and had not begun any program to produce them.

  146. 146.

    ElBaradei (27 January 2003); Blix (27 January 2003); ElBaradei (14 February 2003); Blix (14 February 2003); ElBaradei (7 March 2003); Blix (7 March 2003).

  147. 147.

    UN Doc. S/14510 (1981); Mueller et al., p. 212.

  148. 148.

    Special Report Iraq, ‘Iraq timeline: July 16, 1979 to January 31, 2004’, Guardian; Iraq weapons inspectors find empty chemical warheads (17 January 2003) Guardian; UN team finds Iraq has illegal missiles (13 February 2003) Guardian.

  149. 149.

    Iraq weapons inspectors find empty chemical warheads (17 January 2003) Guardian.

  150. 150.

    Iraq’s al-Samoud missile (3 March 2003) BBC World News. .

  151. 151.

    A Decade of Deception and Defiance 2002 Bush (12 September 2002) Remarks; McGoldrick 2004, pp. 53−55, pp. 264−280 (Appendix V—Presentation of Colin Powell, US Secretary of State to the UN Security Council on ‘Iraq: Failing to Disarm’, 5 February 2003); Falk 2003, p. 592.

  152. 152.

    A Decade of Deception and Defiance (2002); Bush (12 September 2002) Remarks; McGoldrick, pp. 53−55, pp. 264−280 (Appendix V).

  153. 153.

    Nuclear Weapons 1996, para 48.

  154. 154.

    Franck 2002, p. 106.

  155. 155.

    Henderson 2004, p. 14; Sapiro 2003, p. 603..

  156. 156.

    Beatty 2003.

  157. 157.

    Defiant Saddam accepts UN team (14 November 2002) Guardian.

  158. 158.

    Ibid.; UN weapons inspectors arrive in Iraq (18 November 2002) Guardian; Saddam risks war over arms dossier (8 December 2002) Guardian; SCOR, 58th Sess., 4714th meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.4714 (7 March 2003) pp. 34−36.

  159. 159.

    ElBaradei (27 January 2003); Blix (27 January 2003); ElBaradei (14 February 2003); Blix and February (2003)ElBaradei (7 March 2003); Blix (7 March 2003).

  160. 160.

    SCOR, 58th Sess., 4714th meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.4714 (7 March 2003) pp 9 (Germany), 11 (Syria), 17 (Russia), 18−19 (France), 21 (China), 32−33 (Pakistan).

  161. 161.

    Henderson 2004, p. 14.

  162. 162.

    Gardner 2003, p. 588; Henderson 2004, p. 12; Sapiro 2003, p. 602.

  163. 163.

    US National Security Strategy 2002, Part V; Sapiro 2005, p. 367.

  164. 164.

    Sapiro 2005, p. 367.

  165. 165.

    Bush (17 March 2003) Remarks.

  166. 166.

    Gardner 2003, p. 587; Sapiro 2005, p. 367.

  167. 167.

    See supra 8.2.2.

  168. 168.

    See supra 9.3.

  169. 169.

    Chayes 1974, p. 65.

  170. 170.

    Lowe 2003, p. 865.

  171. 171.

    For an author with similar views, see Gardner 2003, p. 588. For authors defending the new doctrine, see Hill 2004, pp. 329−331; Pierson 2004, pp. 174−176; Taft and Buchwald 2003, pp. 557−563; Wedgwood 2003, p. 584; Yoo 2003, pp. 571−574.

  172. 172.

    Gardner 2003, p. 588.

  173. 173.

    See supra 9.3. Mueller et al. 2006, p. 212.

  174. 174.

    See supra 9.2.

  175. 175.

    See supra 9.3.

  176. 176.

    SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282nd meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.2282 (15 June 1981) paras 14-19; 2283rd meeting., S/PV.2283 (15 June 1981) paras 23−27; 2284th meeting., S/PV.2284 (16 June 1981) para 11.

  177. 177.

    SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282nd meeting., UN Doc. S/PV.2282 (15 June 1981) paras 14−19.

  178. 178.

    Nicaragua 1986, para 186.

  179. 179.

    Hill 2004, pp. 329−331; Pierson 2004, pp. 154−155; Taft and Buchwald 2003, pp. 557−563, Taft 2003; Wedgwood 2003, p. 584; Yoo 2003, pp. 571−574.

  180. 180.

    See supra 9.3 and 9.5.2.

  181. 181.

    See supra 9.4.

  182. 182.

    Gardner 2003, pp. 587−588; Henderson 2004, p. 14; Lowe 2003, p. 865; Sapiro 2005, p. 367; Slaughter 2004, pp. 262−263.

References

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague, The Netherlands, and the authors

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Szabó, K.T. (2011). Self-Defence and Weapons of Mass Destruction. In: Anticipatory Action in Self-Defence. T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-796-8_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships