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Preventing Genocide Through Military Intervention: Peacekeeping Troops in the “Responsibility to Protect” Era

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Confronting Genocide

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 7))

Abstract

This article discusses the similarities between the failure of UN troops to prevent genocide in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda and then proceeds to analyze the possibility of relying on the “responsibility to protect” concept to prevent future atrocities. The author explores the potential hurdles that must be overcome in deploying resources, gathering information, dealing with unreliable parties, training personnel and engaging the power of media to prevent genocide.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cambodian Genocide Program, “The CGP, 1994–2008,” Genocide Studies Program, Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/ (Accessed June 4, 2009).

  2. 2.

    United Nations , “Discussion Topics,” Lessons from Rwanda : The United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide, http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/infokit.shtml (Accessed June 4, 2009).

  3. 3.

    Genocide Intervention Network , “History of Genocide,” Genocide Intervention Network, http://www.genocideintervention.net/educate/genocide#bosnia1 (Accessed June 4, 2009).

  4. 4.

    International Commission on I ntervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect , Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre (2001).

  5. 5.

    The concept of “responsibility to protect” is discussed in Francis M. Deng, Chapter 4 (above).

  6. 6.

    Ibid, X.

  7. 7.

    United Nations Security Council , Res. 872, 3288th meeting, October 5 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993).

  8. 8.

    United Nations Security Council , Res. 743, 47 UN SCOR at 42, 3055th meeting, February 2, 1992, U.N. Doc. S/RES/742 (1992).

  9. 9.

    United Nations Security Council , Res. 819, 3199th meeting, April 16, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (1993), 2.

  10. 10.

    United Nations Security Council , Res. 836, 3228th meeting, June 4, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993), 2–3.

  11. 11.

    Roméo Dallaire , Shake Hands with the Devil (Toronto: Vintage Canada Edition, 2003), 514.

  12. 12.

    Lieutenant General Mladić and General Halilović , “Agreement for the Demilitarization of Srebrenica ,” article 7, signed agreement, Sarajevo, April 18, 1993, cited in Thom Karremans, Srebrenica Who Cares (Nieuwegein: Arko, 1998) 267.

  13. 13.

    Dallaire , Shake Hands with the Devil , 90.

  14. 14.

    Cees Wiebes, Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992–1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992–1995. The Role of the Intelligence and Security Services) (Amsterdam: LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-Münster, 2002), 454.

  15. 15.

    Netherlands Institute f or War Documentation, Srebrenica , een “veilig” gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een Safe Area III (Srebrenica, a “safe” area. Reconstruction, background information , consequences and analyses of the fall of a Safe Area III) (Amsterdam: Boom, 2002), 2839.

  16. 16.

    Dallaire , Shake Hands with the Devil , 333.

  17. 17.

    ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect , XIII.

  18. 18.

    The importance of setting in place early warning mechanisms is highlighted in Francis M. Deng, Chapter 4, Section 4.5 (above).

  19. 19.

    The role of the media in Bosnia during the war is examined in Mark Thompson, Chapter 6 (above).

  20. 20.

    Dallaire , Shake Hands with the Devil , 332.

  21. 21.

    Bas den Hond, “Pers kan blauwhelmen helpen bij hun taak (The media can help blue berets in their work)”, Trouw, October 20, 2007, 12.

  22. 22.

    An argument for having recourse to mercenaries in genocidal conflicts is presented in Krzystof Kotarski and Samuel Walker, Chapter 14, Sections 14.3 and 14.4 (below).

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Arts, W. (2011). Preventing Genocide Through Military Intervention: Peacekeeping Troops in the “Responsibility to Protect” Era. In: Provost, R., Akhavan, P. (eds) Confronting Genocide. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9840-5_8

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