Abstract
In this paper, Yitzhak Melamed argues that Spinoza was the most radical anti-humanist among modern philosophers. Spinoza rejects any notion of human dignity. He conceives of God’s—and not man’s—point of view as the only objective perspective through which one can know things adequately, and it is at least highly questionable whether he allows for any genuine notions of human autonomy or morality.
A triangle, if it could speak, would likewise say that God is eminently triangle, and a circle that God’s nature is eminently circular.
- Spinoza, Letter 56
But if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or were able to draw their hands, and do the works that man can do, horses would draw the forms of the gods like horses, and with cattle like cattle, and they would make their bodies such as they each had themselves.
- Xenophanes, Fr. 1691
This paper is a first attempt to explore the scope of Spinoza’s critique of humanism. Several issues mentioned in this paper are not adequately discussed due to limitations of space. I hope to develop the paper into a larger project in the future. I am indebted to Robert Adams, Hillel Braudie, Michael Della Rocca, Carlos Fraenkel, Zachary Gartenberg, Zeev Harvey, Eve Krakowski, Jean-Luc Marion, Alan Nelson, David Nirenberg, Oded Schechter, Neta Stahl, Lina Steiner, and Peter Thielke for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Unless otherwise marked, all references to the Ethics, the early works of Spinoza, and Letters 1–29 are to Curley’s translation (1985; henceforth C). In references to the other letters of Spinoza I use Shirley’s translation (1995; henceforth S). I also rely on Shirley’s translation of Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise (2001). Passages in the Ethics will be referred to by the following abbreviations: a(-xiom), c(-orollary), p(-roposition), s(-cholium), and app(-endix); “d” stands for either “definition” (when it appears immediately to the right of the part of the book) or “demonstration” (in all other cases). Hence, E1d3 is the third definition of part 1 and E1p16d is the demonstration of proposition 16 of part 1. Occasionally, I will supplement a reference to Gebhardt’s Latin edition, by volume, page, and line (hence, II/23/5 is volume II, page 23, line 5). I will use this notation when the reference by proposition number (in the Ethics), chapter, or letter is not specific enough.
1Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983, 169)
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Notes
- 1.
For the view of Spinoza’s philosophy as anticipating “secularism…,the Enlightenment, and the liberal- democratic state,” see Yovel (1989, ix). For the view of Spinoza as a humanist, see Fromm (1964). Any quick search on the web will yield dozens of ideological characterizations of Spinoza as one of the heroes of modern humanism. See, for example, the following declaration: “We, the Sixth International Congress of the IHEU (International Humanist and Ethical Union), representing humanists from all over the world, meeting in Amsterdam on August 5–9, 1974, wish to pay special tribute to Benedict de Spinoza…Spinoza is one of the greatest forerunners of humanist philosophy in modern time. A defender of intellectual and religious liberty and the free mind, he attempted to establish ethics on rational foundations independent of religious dogma. Standing as a bridge between the Middle Ages and Modern science, Spinoza was committed to the use of reason as a source of human freedom” (International Humanist and Ethical Union). Similarly, in a declaration signed by an impressive group of philosophers and intellectuals (among them, W.V. Quine, Arthur Danto, Ernst Nagel, George Hourani, Sidney Hook, Walter Kaufman, and A.J. Ayer) Spinoza is included in a list of “distinguished secularists and humanists who have demonstrated moral principles in their personal lives and works” (Council for Secular Humanism).
- 2.
On Spinoza as a champion of human dignity, see also Smith (1997, xvi): “Spinoza did not use the term ‘liberal’ to describe his system of politics …. But if to be a liberal means to have a lively sense of the autonomy and dignity of the individual, … then Spinoza can be described as a liberal.”
- 3.
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Althusser, and Foucault are probably the most prominent philosophers associated with anti-humanism, though at least in the case of Heidegger, the appropriateness of this association is, to my mind, questionable. In his “Letter on Humanism” (1947, 204), Heidegger criticizes the traditional understanding of the essence of man as ‘animal rationale.’ According to Heidegger, this definition fails to recognize man’s unique relationship with language and Being. “Only man is admitted to the destiny of ek-sistence. Therefore ek-sistence can also never be thought of as a specific kind of creature among others” In this sense, Heidegger is an arch-humanist. Furthermore, Spinoza seems to be much more radical than Nietzsche in his critique of humanism. The two share a significantly similar conception of good and evil and are both strict naturalists. Yet, Nietzsche never goes beyond the relativity of human perspectives. For Spinoza, there is an objective perspective, but it is God’s. Max Black is one of the very few analytic philosophers who have developed a serious interest in the issue of humanism. See his (1983).
- 4.
This definition of humanism is intended to be wider than the ideology of secular humanism (pointed out at the beginning of this paper) in order to include religious humanist philosophies like that of Leibniz. Obviously, by claiming that Spinoza was an anti-humanist, I take him to be an enemy of both secular and religious humanism. On the other hand, speciesism (the view which suggests that we should favor human beings only by virtue of their belonging to our species) would not count as humanism for our purposes. It is not hard to detect the Kantian undertones of my definition of ‘humanism,’ though a very similar view is expressed by Max Black: “[I]n calling human beings persons, we are rightfully ascribing to them important properties that cannot, even in principle, apply to other animals or to inanimate material beings” (Black 1983, 99). According to Black, self-consciousness is such a distinctive characteristic of human beings (Black 1983, 104).
- 5.
The Renaissance humanism of Lorenzo Valla, Erasmus, and Reuchlin has much more to do with the revival of the studia humanitatis than with the glorification of man (though admittedly, these were not completely separate). Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola is almost the only figure of Renaissance humanism who is clearly a champion of the philosophical humanism I define above.
- 6.
See, for example, Audi (1995, 396–7).
- 7.
Some famous proponents of the latter view are Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-Kantian philosophers, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. Here again, Max Black provides a crystal-clear statement of this position: “I believe that there are features of human personality that are outside the purview of any of the natural or social sciences, and that there is something therefore conceptually—or, if you like, ontologically—special about human beings” (Audi 1995, 99).
- 8.
Plato, Theaetetus 152a. The “Ode to Man” in Sophocles’ Antigone (lines 332–375) is another important statement of humanism in ancient Greek culture.
- 9.
See Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics, §§34–36 in G.W. Leibniz (1989, 65–68).
- 10.
For Hegel’s observation and critique of the “annihilation of man” in Spinoza, see Hegel (1995, III 282).
- 11.
Hyppolite (1997, 20) seems to disclose a similar view of Spinoza in noting that “Hegel is still too Spinozistic for us to be able to speak of a pure humanism.” Althusser (1976, 136) too detects some anti-humanist elements in Spinoza by pointing out Spinoza’s “radical criticism of the central category of imaginary illusion, the Subject.” I discuss the so-called “elimination of the self” in § IV below. Althusser saw, however, only the tip of the iceberg, and the picture I attempt to draw in this paper is far wider and more substantial. In general, Althusser’s reading of Spinoza, while occasionally insightful, is quite crude and ideologically biased. See, for example, his ascription to Spinoza of a causality “which would account for the action of the Whole on its parts, and of the parts on the Whole—an unbounded Whole, which is only the active relation between its parts” (Althusser 1989, 141). If I am not mistaken, “the Whole” in question is Spinoza’s substance, but the latter is neither acted on by its parts, nor is the activity of substance “the active relation between its parts.” For Spinoza, substance is strictly indivisible (E1p13).
- 12.
Theological-Political Treatise, Ch. 6 (III/82).
- 13.
“The human intellect is deceived simply by its own nature, and feigns everything from the analogy of its own nature, not from the analogy of the universe” (Ep. 2 (IV/8/33)).
- 14.
For a similar understanding of rationalism (and an interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy that takes his rationalism to be the core of the system), see Michael Della Rocca’s recent book (2008).
- 15.
See E4p35 s (II/234) and E4app13 (269–70).
- 16.
Heine (1985, 175)
- 17.
For a detailed explanation of this issue, see §5.1 of my forthcoming book.
- 18.
In fact, the human mind can know only one attribute (extension) and a tiny aspect of the attribute of thought (i.e., ideas which represent bodies).
- 19.
Cf. Joel Friedman (1983, 105): “It follows, again contra Descartes, that I am much more than a thinking thing.”
- 20.
See E2p113 and E2p16. For a very helpful discussion of these passages see, Michael Della Rocca (1996, 24–29, 47–48, and 64–66). The role Spinoza assigns to self-knowledge in the attainment of blessedness (E5p15) is primarily a result of the fact that almost all of our knowledge is mediated through our knowledge of ourselves.
- 21.
Several scholars have ascribed to Spinoza a much stronger view of self-knowledge. See for example, Alan Donagan (1998, 117): “[N]o reflective human being ... can fail to perceive that the idea of himself as thinking cannot be false.” As I will argue shortly, I do not think Spinoza shared this Cartesian view.
- 22.
Though Lia Levy has recently presented a very interesting attempt to reconstruct a thicker account of self-consciousness in Spinoza based on Spinoza’s discussion of the affects.
- 23.
E2p47: “The human mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence.” Cf. E247 s: “God’s infinite essence and his eternity are known to all.”
- 24.
Recall Descartes’ memorable conclusion of the Second Meditation: “I know plainly that I can achieve an easier and more evident perception of my own mind than of anything else” (The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), vol. 2, pp. 22–3 (AT VII 34)).
- 25.
A crucial implication of the non-simplicity of the human mind is that it seems to undermine one of the most common arguments for mind eternity. Indeed, Van Blijenbergh, one of Spinoza’s correspondents and a Christian Cartesian, attacks Spinoza on precisely this point. If in death, claims Van Blijenbergh, “as the human body, when it disintegrates, is resolved again into the thousands of bodies of which it was composed, so also our mind.... And as the scattered bodies [which composed] our human body no longer remain bound to one another, but other bodies separate them, so also it seems to follow that, when our mind is disintegrates, those countless thoughts of which it was composed are no longer combined, but separated” (Spinoza 1985, Ep. 24, 391).
- 26.
Cf. Van Blijenbergh’s complaint in Ep. 20 that Spinoza “makes man dependent on God in the way the elements, stones, and plants are” (IV/103/15). For the substantiality of the human mind in Descartes, see the Second Meditation. For Descartes’s definition of substance, see his Principles of Philosophy, I 51.
- 27.
See, e.g., E2p33s2, Letter 21, Letter 58.
- 28.
Cf. Letter 58 (S 284): “[T]hat human freedom which all men boast of possessing … consists solely in this, that men are conscious of their desire and unaware of the cause by which they are determined. In the same way a baby thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry child revenge, and a coward flight.” See Michael Della Rocca, “The Power of an Idea: Spinoza’s Critique of Pure Will,” Nous 37 (2003), 200–231.
- 29.
For an insightful discussion of the “free man” as an impossible model, see Dan Garber (2004, 183–207).
- 30.
E3p6: Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. In his aforementioned article (1983, 105–6), Max Black suggests that having a need for the individual’s survival (rather than survival of the species) is another unique characteristic of human beings; he then quotes Spinoza’s conatus doctrine in support of this claim. It is hard to understand what made Black think that the conatus is particularly human, while Spinoza explicitly states “Each thing [Unaquaeque res] … .” Indeed, in Letter 58, Spinoza openly discusses the conatus of the stone which “as far as in it lies” strives “to continue in motion” (S 284).
- 31.
Spinoza’s rejection of free will seems to motivate his views on the punishment of criminals. Since Spinoza does not consider harmful actions by human beings to be anchored in free and morally responsible agents, he suggests that the punishment of criminals should be justified by the very same considerations which make people exterminate poisonous snakes (CM II, viii| I/265/23).
- 32.
Cf. KV I, 22 (I/101/3–7) and KV II xxiv (I/107/1). For Spinoza’s critique of those who claim to know God only through created things, see TTP Ch. 2 (III/30).
- 33.
Spinoza (1962, 29).
- 34.
Letter 73.
- 35.
See, for example, the first two chapters of the TTP and Spinoza’s correspondence with Van Blijenbergh (Letters 18–24).
- 36.
See Moses Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, Part I, Chapter 26. For an excellent and comprehensive account of Maimonides’ influence on Spinoza (including the critique of anthropomorphism), see Warren Zeev Harvey (1981, 151–72 [esp. 164]).
- 37.
See, for example, Babylonian Talmud, Tracatate Hulin, 4b; cf. Tractate Nedarim, 3a, and Tractate Avoda Zara, 27a.
- 38.
Notice that for Spinoza the rejection of necessity and the belief in free will are preconditions for the emergence of teleological thinking (E1app|II/78/21). The issue of teleology in Spinoza has recently been a subject of intensive debate. Unfortunately, I cannot weigh in here on this important question.
- 39.
For Spinoza’s account of universals, see E2p40s1. Cf. TdIE §99 (II/36/18) and CM I, I (I/235/22–5).
- 40.
“We, on the contrary, attribute knowledge of singular things to God, and deny him a knowledge of universals, except insofar as he understands human minds (Cogitata Metaphysica, II, vii [I/263/9]).
- 41.
Since Spinoza’s summum bonum is nothing but the knowledge of God (E4p28), it seems that his ethical discussion begins with the very first definition of Part 1 of the Ethics; hence the aptness of the title of the work.
- 42.
Spinoza himself clearly expected the charge of amoralism to be brought against him. See E4p18 s (II/223/21–4): “I have done this to win, if possible, the attention of those who believe that this principle—that everyone is bound to seek his own advantage—is the foundation, not of virtue and morality, but of immorality.”
- 43.
For a helpful discussion of Spinoza’s egoism, see Della Rocca (2004).
- 44.
For a detailed discussion of the weakness of individuation in Spinoza, see my article, “Acosmism or Weak Individuals? Hegel, Spinoza, and the Reality of the Finite” (2009).
- 45.
See E2p29 s for equally self-centered definitions of ‘praise’ and ‘blame’: “The Joy with which we imagine the action of another by which he has striven to please us I call Praise. On the other hand, the Sadness with which we are averse to his action I call Blame.”
- 46.
Theological Political Treatise, Ch. 4 (III/65). Cf. E4p37s2 (II/239). For a compelling argument regarding Maimonides’ influence on Spinoza’s conception of good and evil, see Harvey (1981, 158–60).
- 47.
See Theological Political Treatise, Preface (III/11), Chapters 16 (III/189) and 20.
- 48.
Letter 50 (IV/238–9); italics mine. Cf. Theological Political Treatise, Chapter 16, p. 177, and Chapter 20, p. 223.
- 49.
See Theological Political Treatise, Ch. 16 (III/194) “In their own interest and to retain their rule, it especially behooves [the governments] to look to the public good.”
- 50.
See Curley’s reading of Spinoza as the “most Machiavellian of the great modern political philosophers” (1996, 315). Cf. Spinoza’s own sympathetic evaluation of Machiavelli (Poiltical Treatise, Ch. 5| III/296–7)
- 51.
In E4p45d Spinoza claims that it is evil to destroy a man we hate. This is so, however, primarily because hate (which is a kind of sadness for Spinoza), is in itself evil.
- 52.
At the beginning of the 20th Chapter of the TTP (III/240), Spinoza argues that it is not within the right of a tyrant to liquidate his citizens for the most trivial reasons, since such a behavior will put the government in great risk. Thus, Spinoza continues, such behavior is not within the absolute power of the sovereign (and therefore not within his right). While this political rule of thumb may work in many, perhaps most, cases, Spinoza fails to provide any strict proof ruling out the possibility that on certain uncommon occasions it may well be within the sovereign’s interest to eliminate some or all of his citizens in order to secure his well being. It is not difficult to construct various scenarios of this sort.
- 53.
And finally, this mass killing might be imprudent, and hence evil, because society imposes certain emotions on its members, so that they will be mentally tormented by guilty feelings were they to conduct illegitimate killings. Yet, these considerations remain well within the domain of the egoistically imprudent.
- 54.
Cf. Cogitata Metaphysica, II, ix (I/267/10: “[M]an is part of Nature, which must be coherent with the other parts”).
- 55.
In E3p5 to E3p9, Spinoza explicitly claims that “all things”—rocks and hippopotamuses included—have conatus. Since his theory of the affects is mostly an explication of the doctrine of the conatus, there seems to be no reason why we could not construct similar theories of the affects of rocks and hippopotamuses (alas, the latter would be quite dull). Since the doctrine of the conatus and the theory of affects provide the foundations for Spinoza’s moral theory, it seems likely that we could even construct a moral theory for hippopotamuses and rocks (provided that Spinoza’s “moral theory” for human beings is recognized as a genuine moral theory).
- 56.
Traditional Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy (with its conception of various kinds of souls) seems to suggest much more continuity between humans and other living beings than the modern philosophies of Descartes and Kant. On this issue, Spinoza seems to be much closer to his medieval predecessors than to most modern philosophers.
- 57.
See E2p20d and its reliance on E2p3 and E2p7.
- 58.
I discuss this issue in more detail in a yet unpublished paper, “Spinoza on the Fish’s Knowledge of God’s Essence.”
- 59.
For a similar point, see Wilson (1999, 343).
- 60.
“It would follow that a tiny, but only a tiny, portion of brutes’ minds is ‘eternal’. (As much or more as in the case of human babies? Who can tell?)” (Wilson 1999, 350 n.27).
- 61.
That Spinoza considered animals to be—to some extent—rational can be seen also from his talk about “the animals which are called [dicuntur] irrational” (E3p57 s| II/187/5; my emphasis).
- 62.
Although he does not mention it explicitly, Spinoza seems to be relying here on the doctrine of the imitation of affects (E3p27).
- 63.
See Theological-Political Treatise, Chapter 3, (III/47).
- 64.
Indeed, in the TTP (Ch. 16, III/196), Spinoza makes clear that anyone who refuses to be an ally (or citizen) of the state should be considered an enemy against whom any measures may be used.
- 65.
“[In Spinoza] The world has no true reality, and all this that we know as the world has been cast into the abyss of the one identity. There is therefore no such thing as finite reality, it has no truth whatever; according to Spinoza what is, is God, and God alone. Therefore the allegations of those who accuse Spinoza of atheism are the direct opposite of the truth; with him there is too much God. They say: if God is the identity of mind and nature, then nature or the individual man is God. This is quite correct, but they forget that nature and the individual disappear in this same identity; and they cannot forgive Spinoza for thus annihilating them. Those who defame him in such a way as this are therefore not aiming at maintaining God, but at maintaining the finite and the worldly; they do not fancy their own extinction …” (Hegel 1995, vol. 3, 281–2; italics mine). Hegel is fully aware of Spinoza’s critique of modern humanism and pays very close attention to most of the issues discussed in this paper. Hegel notes that, in Spinoza’s system, there is “an utter blotting out of the principle of subjectivity, individuality, personality, the moment of self-consciousness in Being” (Hegel 1995, vol. 3, 287).
- 66.
For the contrast between market price (relative worth) and dignity (inner worth), see Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Ak. 4:434–5).
- 67.
Strikingly, Spinoza and Kant, in spite of their opposing views of the value of humanity, arrive at almost the same perspective on the issue of human treatment of animals. Compare Kant’s last sentence at the passage above with Spinoza’s claim in E4p37s1 that since we cannot use animals as friends we “may use them at our pleasure, and treat them as is most convenient for us.” For a recent endorsement of the view that grounds “the distinctive dignity of human beings” in human self-consciousness, See Manfred Frank (1995, 80).
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Melamed, Y.Y. (2010). Spinoza’s Anti-Humanism: An Outline. In: Fraenkel, C., Perinetti, D., Smith, J. (eds) The Rationalists: Between Tradition and Innovation. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 65. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9385-1_9
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