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Some Realism About Legal Certainty in the Globalization of the Rule of Law

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The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 3))

Abstract

An earlier version of this chapter was published in 31 Houston Journal of International Law 27 (Fall, 2008).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Danilo Zolo, The rule of law: a critical appraisal, The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism 3, 24 (Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo eds., 2007). Zolo seeks a uniform rule of law common to the four principal variations he sees in the rule of law—the British, North American, German, and French. See id. at 7.

  2. 2.

    Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. University of Toronto G8 Information Centre, What is the G8? http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).

  3. 3.

    G8 Foreign Ministers, Declaration of G8 Foreign Ministers on the Rule of Law (2007), http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/formin070530-law.pdf, [hereinafter G8 Declaration].

  4. 4.

    Id.; accord The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, G.A. Res. 62/70, U.N. Doc A/RES/72/70 (Dec. 6, 2007).

  5. 5.

    See James R. Maxeiner, “Legal Certainty: a European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?” 15 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law 541, 545–546 (2007) [hereinafter Maxeiner, European alternative to American legal indeterminacy].

  6. 6.

    See id. at 544.

  7. 7.

    See id. at 543–45.

  8. 8.

    See id. at 543–44.

  9. 9.

    See id.

  10. 10.

    See id. The term legal uncertainty has not, however, vanished from popular usage. See, e.g., Lisa Leff, California Gay-Marriage Ban Creates Legal Uncertainty, Associated Press, November 7, 2008, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/07/california-gaymarriage-ba_n_142013.html

  11. 11.

    The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 5, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Rule of Law and Transitional Justice] (stating that concepts such as the rule of law “serve both to define our goals and to determine our methods”).

  12. 12.

    Jane Stromseth et al., Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions 69 (2006) (emphasis omitted).

  13. 13.

    Since the purpose of this Article is to better inform the international discussion of the rule of law at international and domestic legal system levels, it focuses on the practical and the attainable. It has limited goals. It is not concerned with fine distinctions in academic writings. If professional philosophers happen to read it, they may find no use for it. See Duncan Kennedy, “Legal Formality”, 2 Journal of Legal Studies 351, 354 (1973) (“The professional philosopher, who has no understanding of the peculiar technical interests and needs of law, can see nothing in formalism but … a clear derangement of the relationship between form and content.” (quoting Rudolph von Jhering, 2 II Der Geist das römischen Recht 478–479 (1883) (A. von Mehren trans.))).

  14. 14.

    Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die Rule of Law, Juristen Zeitung, Jan. 1984, at 65, 65–66; Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, an Introduction and Provisional Conclusion, in Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the U.S. 1 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004); see also Ronald A. Cass, The Rule of Law in America 1 (2001) (“‘the rule of law’ still means very different things to different people”).

  15. 15.

    See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, Rule of Law? Whose Law?, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 10, (2004), reprinted in Festschrift für Andreas Heldrich zum 70. Geburtstag 1109 (Stephan Lorenz et al. eds., 2005); see also Danilo Zolo, supra note 4 (contending that a state must guarantee foreseeability in the law).

  16. 16.

    OECD Development Assistance Committee, Issues Brief: Equal Access to Justice and the Rule of Law 2 (2005) [hereinafter OECD], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/51/35785471.pdf. Enumerations of the requirements of the rule of law typically include legal certainty. See G8 Declaration, supra note 2; Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 11, ¶ 5.

  17. 17.

    See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America. U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 Valparaiso University Law Review 517, 522 (2006) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America].

  18. 18.

    Id.

  19. 19.

    Id.

  20. 20.

    See id. at 520–23.

  21. 21.

    Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch. “An Extraordinary Legal philosopher”, 2 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 489, 493 (2000).

  22. 22.

    Ludwig Bendix, “Das Problem der Rechtssicherheit”, Zur Einführung des Relativismus in die Rechtsanwendungslehre 2 (1914) (Author’s translation).

  23. 23.

    Reinhard Bendix, “From Berlin to Berkeley”, German-Jewish Identities 172 (1986).

  24. 24.

    Id.

  25. 25.

    See id.; Ludwig Bendix, supra note 22, at 2; see also Juha Raitio, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law 125–130 (2003).

  26. 26.

    Raitio, supra note 25, at 125; see Andreas von Arnauld, Rechtssichterheit: Perspektivische Annäherungen an eine Idée Directrice des Rechts 661–662 (2006).

  27. 27.

    See Patricia Popelier, “Legal Certainty and Principles of Proper Law Making”, 2 European Journal of Law Reform 321, 327–28 (2000) (summarizing Patricia Popelier, Rechtszekerheid als Beginsel van Behoorlijke Regelgeving (1997)); Raitio, supra note 25, at 125–130; Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law 4 (2d ed. 2006).

  28. 28.

    See Raitio, supra note 25, at 125–136.

  29. 29.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5 at 551 n.49; see also von Arnauld, supra note 26 at 661–662 (2006).

  30. 30.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 551 n. 48; see also Raitio, supra note 25, at 128.

  31. 31.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 551 n. 52.

  32. 32.

    Id. at 551 n. 50.

  33. 33.

    Id. at 550 n. 47.

  34. 34.

    Id. at 551 n. 55.

  35. 35.

    Id. at 551 n. 53.

  36. 36.

    Id. at 551 n. 56.

  37. 37.

    See Raitio, supra note 25, at 127.

  38. 38.

    Korchuganova v. Russia, No. 75039/01, Judgment, ¶ 47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 8, 2006), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=56853&sessionId=14913646&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.

  39. 39.

    See Tridimas, supra note 27, at 242–257; von Arnauld, supra note 276, Ch. 7.II (citing numerous decisions of the European Court of Justice and asserting tenets of legal certainty in European law).

  40. 40.

    See Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 553–554.

  41. 41.

    See id. at 601 (noting a belief that “wholesale indeterminacy is an inevitable feature of modern legal systems”).

  42. 42.

    Id. at 543–544.

  43. 43.

    Id. at 544.

  44. 44.

    Stephen A. Smith, “Taking Law Seriously”, 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 241, 247 (2000) (“The slogan ‘we are all realists now’ is so well-accepted in North America—in particular in the United States—that an unstated working assumption of most legal academics is that judicial explanations of a judgment tell us little if anything about why a case was decided as it was.”).

  45. 45.

    Karl N. Llewellyn, “Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound”, 44 Harvard Law Review 1222, 1223–1235 (1931).

  46. 46.

    See id. at 1236–1237.

  47. 47.

    Smith, supra note 44, at 247; Brian Z. Tamanaha, “The realism of the ‘formalist’ age”, St. John’s University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series 1, 8 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=985083.

  48. 48.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 543–544.

  49. 49.

    Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, “Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority”, 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 549, 579 n. 54 (1993). Much of the populace at large, however, clings to the idea of legal certainty. Vivian Grosswald Curran, “Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union”, 7 Columbia Journal of European Law 63, 82 (2001). American law professors report that their first year law students must “un-learn” the idea that rules decide cases. Id.

  50. 50.

    E.g., Craig M. Bradley, “The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court”, Duke Law Journal 1, 63 (1986).

  51. 51.

    Julius Paul, “Jerome Frank’s Attack on the ‘Myth’ of Legal Certainty”, 36 Nebraska Law Review. 547, 547–549 (1957); see Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 244 (1930) (asserting that legal certainty does not exist).

  52. 52.

    Id. at 547; see also Wilfrid R. Rumble, “American Legal Realism and the Reduction of Uncertainty”, 13 Journal of Public Law. 45, 45–46 (1964); Wilfrid R. Rumble, “Rule-Skepticism and the Role of the Judge: A Study of American Legal Realism”, 15 Journal of Public Law. 251, 258–260 (1966) [hereinafter Rumble II].

  53. 53.

    See Rumble II, supra note 52, at 260.

  54. 54.

    Brian Leiter, Naturalizing jurisprudence: essays on American legal realism and naturalism in legal philosophy 17 (2007).

  55. 55.

    Id. at 19.

  56. 56.

    Id. at 19–20.

  57. 57.

    Karl Llewellyn, “On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence”, 40 Columbia Law Review 581, 599 (1940) (“It does not show ‘uncertainty’ in the law . …. What it shows is lack of 100 percent certainty, and that is all it shows.”).

  58. 58.

    See Richard E. Coulson, “Private Law Codes and the Uniform Commercial Code—Comments on History”, 27 Oklahoma City University Law Review. 615, 627 (identifying Professor Llewellyn as the chief reporter of the Uniform Commercial Code).

  59. 59.

    Leiter, supra note 54, at 9.

  60. 60.

    John Hasnas, “Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument”, 45 Duke Law Journal 84, 85 (1995).

  61. 61.

    Leiter, supra note 54, at 15, 17 (speaking of “Frankification” of realism).

  62. 62.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 543.

  63. 63.

    Id.

  64. 64.

    See Ken Kress, “Legal Indeterminacy”, 77 California Law Review 283, 283 (1989); Lawrence B. Solum, “On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma”, 54 University of Chicago Law Review 462, 462 (1987) [hereinafter Indeterminacy Crisis]; Lawrence B. Solum, “Indeterminacy”, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 488 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (summarizing and challenging the “radical indeterminacy” argument).

  65. 65.

    See, e.g., Indeterminacy crisis, supra note 64; Lee J. Strang, “An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good”, 36 New Mexico Law Review 419 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 036: Indeterminacy, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/05/legal_theory_le_2.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).

  66. 66.

    According to Lawrence B. Solum:

    [1] The law is determinate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of legally acceptable outcomes contains one and only one member. [2] The law is underdeterminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of legally acceptable outcomes is a nonidentical subset of the set of all possible results. [3] The law is indeterminate with respect to a given case if the set of legally acceptable outcomes is identical with the set of all possible results.

    Solum, supra note 65.

  67. 67.

    Llewellyn, supra note 57; James Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust Law: A Comparative Study 28 (1986) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Policy and Methods] (speaking of “negative” and “positive” binding).

  68. 68.

    Karl Engisch, Einführung in das juristische Denken 136 (9th ed. 1997) (“Es wird sich immer nur um die Frage des mehr oder Minder der Bindung an das Gesetz handeln.”) (1st ed. 1956).

  69. 69.

    See Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 601.

  70. 70.

    See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 552.

  71. 71.

    See Maxeiner, Policy and Methods, supra note 67, at 10–11.

  72. 72.

    See id.

  73. 73.

    See id.

  74. 74.

    See Leiter, supra note 54, at 19–20. Leiter makes the point that the realists focused on appellate decision making. Id. Since then, many American jurists have used indeterminacy with respect to judicial decisions generally. See Chris Guthrie et al., “Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases”, 93 Cornell Law Review 1, 2 (2007). The American study of law emphasizes judicial decision making and, in particular, appellate decision making. See id. at 3–4.

  75. 75.

    See, e.g., E.W. Thomas, the judicial process: realism, pragmatism, practical reasoning and principles 108-09 (2005).

  76. 76.

    See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 523.

  77. 77.

    See Maxeiner, Policy and Methods, supra note 67, at 10–12.

  78. 78.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 546.

  79. 79.

    Id. at 11 (noting how German law distinguishes Orientierungs from Realisierungssicherheit).

  80. 80.

    Id. at 11–12.

  81. 81.

    See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 524.

  82. 82.

    Leiter, supra note 54, at 60.

  83. 83.

    See id.

  84. 84.

    Leiter speaks of decisions that may not be “rationally []determinate” but are “causally determinate.” Leiter, supra note 54, at 9.

  85. 85.

    See Maxeiner, Policy and Methods, supra note 67, at 26–27 (speaking of “negative binding”).

  86. 86.

    Von Arnauld, supra note 26, at 661–664.

  87. 87.

    Id.

  88. 88.

    Id. at 662–664, 691–692.

  89. 89.

    See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 523–525.

  90. 90.

    See Maxeiner, Policy and Methods, supra note 67, at 11.

  91. 91.

    Id. at 10–11.

  92. 92.

    See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 552 (explaining the differences in effect between certainty and indeterminacy).

  93. 93.

    Id.

  94. 94.

    Id.

  95. 95.

    Id. at 525–26, 552.

  96. 96.

    See id. at 518.

  97. 97.

    See Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 605–606.

  98. 98.

    Id. at 587.

  99. 99.

    Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 555, 573.

  100. 100.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 524.

  101. 101.

    Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 556.

  102. 102.

    Id. at 559.

  103. 103.

    Id.

  104. 104.

    Id.

  105. 105.

    Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, 599.

  106. 106.

    Id. at 602.

  107. 107.

    Id.; Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 522.

  108. 108.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 559–564.

  109. 109.

    Id. at 574.

  110. 110.

    Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 599.

  111. 111.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 532; OECD, supra note 16, at 2.

  112. 112.

    Id.

  113. 113.

    Id.

  114. 114.

    Id.

  115. 115.

    Id. at 536 (describing the way in which judges find the appropriate rules).

  116. 116.

    Except in England. See F.A. Mann, “Fusion of the Legal Professions?” 93 Law Quarterly Review. 367, 369 (1977).

  117. 117.

    See id. at 369–370 (arguing that in the English and Irish systems the law has little to do with legal decision making).

  118. 118.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 534–335; Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 562.

  119. 119.

    Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 534.

  120. 120.

    Id. at 535.

  121. 121.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 534–335.

  122. 122.

    James R. Maxeiner, Guiding Litigation: Applying Law to Facts in Germany (April 15, 2008). Common Good Forum, The Boundaries of Litigation: A Forum Addressing the Alignment of Civil Justice with Social Goals, Washington DC, April 15, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1230453). Maxeiner, Policy and Methods, supra note 67, at 83.

  123. 123.

    Ric Simmons, “Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?” 82 Boston, University Law Review 1, 61 (2002).

  124. 124.

    Id.

  125. 125.

    Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5, at 558.

  126. 126.

    Maxeiner, Policy and Methods, supra note 67, at 86.

  127. 127.

    Id.; Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 604.

  128. 128.

    Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 604; OECD, supra note 16, at 2.

  129. 129.

    Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 604.

  130. 130.

    Id.

  131. 131.

    Id.

  132. 132.

    For a refreshing exception, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists (April 2008). St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-0130. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123498. See generally Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17 (tracing the development of legal indeterminacy in American law).

  133. 133.

    See Thomas, supra note 76, at 115–116. These words are actually those of a New Zealand judge, but many American legal academics might have uttered them. Id.

  134. 134.

    See id. at 116.

  135. 135.

    E.g., Robert Allen et al., “The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship”, 82 Northwestern University Law Review. 705, 708, 761–762 (1988) (challenging the superiority of the German litigation system and calling for an empirical analysis of the respective approaches to civil procedure, experts, and qualification of judges). But see James R. Maxeiner, “Imagining Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It,” 114 Penn State Law Review No. 2 (2009) (demonstrating advantages of the German system in applying law).

  136. 136.

    Cf. Samuel R. Gross, “The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation”, 85 Michigan Law Review. 734, 742–747 (1988) (standing for the proposition that the American legal system may sacrifice efficiency in order to attain other goals such as superior accuracy, promoting citizens’ confidence, and respect for individual autonomy); see also Howard Bernstein, “Whose Advantage After All?”, 21 UC Davis Law Review. 587, 599 (1988). The opponents of codification made similar arguments. See James Coolidge Carter, The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law (1884), reprinted in The Life of the Law, Readings on the Growth of Legal Institutions 115, 118 (John Honnold ed., 1964) (explaining that unwritten law, best described as law that embraces the rights, obligations, and duties of both person and property, cannot be sufficiently codified in a scientific system of jurisprudence).

  137. 137.

    Cf. John Reitz, “Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure”, 75 Iowa Law Review 987, 988 (1990) (discussing the impracticability of modeling the American legal system after the German system).

  138. 138.

    See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 519–520.

  139. 139.

    Id.

  140. 140.

    Paul E. Campos et al., Against the Law 1 (1996).

  141. 141.

    Id.

  142. 142.

    Michael Dorf, “Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design”, 78 New York Univrsity Law Review 875, 878–879 (2003).

  143. 143.

    Id. at 876.

  144. 144.

    Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a longtime beacon, is now guiding fewer nations, New York Times, Sept. 18, 2008, at A1.

  145. 145.

    Id.

  146. 146.

    Id.

  147. 147.

    American programs include: American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, http://www.abanet.org/rol/; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy & Rule of Law http://www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/global/index.cfm?fa=proj&id=101&proj=zdrl and United States Institute of Peace, Rule of Law Program, http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/index.html

  148. 148.

    Cf. Casper, supra note 16.

  149. 149.

    Thomas M. Cooley, “The Uncertainty of the Law”, 22 American Law Review 347, 355 (1888).

  150. 150.

    See James R. Maxeiner, “Learning from Others: Sustaining the Internationalization and Globalization of U.S. Law School Curriculums”, 32 Fordham Journal of International Law 501 (2008); Ernst C. Stiefel and James R. Maxeiner, “Civil Justice Reform in the United States: Opportunity for Learning from Civilized European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?” 42 American Law Review 167 (1994); James R. Maxeiner, 1992: High time for american lawyers to learn from Europe, or Roscoe Pound’s 1906 address revisited, Fordham Journal of International Law 1, 1991.

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    James R. Maxeiner

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  1. School of Law, Center for International &, University of Baltimore, N. Charles St. 1420, Baltimore, 21201-4779, USA

    Mortimer Sellers

  2. Fac. Law & Administration, University of Warsaw, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 26/28, Warszawa, 00-927, Poland

    Tadeusz Tomaszewski

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Maxeiner, J.R. (2010). Some Realism About Legal Certainty in the Globalization of the Rule of Law. In: Sellers, M., Tomaszewski, T. (eds) The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3749-7_4

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