Abstract
I argue that there are three reasons which speak against the possibility of naturalizing epistemic reasons. In order to make these arguments clear-cut, I clarify first the concept of naturalism (121.1). Then (11.2) I discuss the relation of practical and epistemic reasons and come to the conclusion that all reasons can be transformed into epistemic ones. The first argument against the possibility of naturalizing reasons is the (logical) fact that epistemic reasons are normative that they imply ought sentences (11.3). The second argument against the possibility of naturalizing reasons is the (logical) fact that epistemic reasons are objective, that they cannot be identified with mental states or processes (11.4). The third argument against the possibility of naturalizing reasons is the (logical) fact that at least some epistemic reasons are non-computable, that they cannot be presented in the form of an algorithm (11.5).
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. Hans Jonas: The Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of an Ethic for the Technological Age. Chicago 1985.
- 2.
Cf. JNR: “Rational Choice: Extensions and Revisions”. In: Ratio VII (1994), S. 122–144.
- 3.
Here and in other cases I use “scientific” referring to the natural sciences.
- 4.
“naturalism∗”is the kind of naturalism we described in the last paragraph.
- 5.
H. Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969). “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971). The “Frankfurt type examples” are discussed in part 5 of The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Ed R. Kane. Oxford 2002. I criticize the concept in Über menschliche Freiheit. Stuttgart 2005, chap III.
- 6.
Principia Ethica, Oxford 1903, Kap. II.
- 7.
Hilary Putnam makes a similar point in “Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized”. In: Synthese 52, 1982.
- 8.
Cf. JNR: Philosophie und Lebensform (Frankfurt a.M.: suhrkamp 2009) in print.
- 9.
The most prominent philosopher who took this stance was John Mackie in Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, Oxford University Press, 1977.
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Nida-Rümelin, J. (2010). Reasons Against Naturalizing Epistemic Reasons: Normativity, Objectivity, Non-computability. In: Carsetti, A. (eds) Causality, Meaningful Complexity and Embodied Cognition. Theory and Decision Library A:, vol 46. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3529-5_11
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