The Thematic Field

Gurwitsch*, Aron

doi:10.1007/978-90-481-3346-8_10

Aron Gurwitsch*³

Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 194))

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Abstract

Fringes, “psychic overtones,” “suffusions” are defined by James as conscious counterparts of faint brain-processes. Such counterparts are experienced in the form of some awareness of “relations and objects but dimly perceived.” James also traces the difference between “knowledge about” and “acquaintance” to the presence or absence of fringes. Acquaintance consists in the mere presence of some datum; knowledge about in the appearance of the datum in relation to something else. As far as this characterization goes, fringes belong with “transitive states” in general. An transitive states are, according to James, conditioned by submaximally excited brain-processes. Descriptively, transitive states are to be characterized as vague. Their function in conscious life is to lead from one “substantive part” to another.

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Notes

1.
For the discussion of the present section, compare James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, pp. 258 ff.
2.
Cf. our article, “William James’s Theory of the ‘Transitive Parts’ of the Stream of Consciousness,” loc. cit., Section 4; SPP, Chapter XII.
3.
In his article, “The ‘Fringe’ of William James’s Psychology, the Basis of Logic,” Philosophical Review, vol. 20, 1911, pp. 138 ff., E. B. McGilvary has drawn a sharper distinction than James between “transitive states” and “fringes.” Transitive states are defined by McGilvary as experiences of relations which in the simplest possible case obtain between two terms, both given in present experience. Fringes, on the other hand, pertain, according to McGilvary, to incomplete relational complexes. Attaching to a term which is given in present experience, a fringe, by definition, points to some object which is altogether absent from present experience; it terminates in a gap void of content, void even of “objects but dimly perceived.”
4.
Cf. James, loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 472.
5.
On the basis of his aforementioned definition of fringes (this Section, note 3), McGilvary has developed a theory of meaning (loc. cit. pp. 124 ff.) and of verification and falsification of meanings (loc. cit., pp. 152 ff.). Interesting as the theories advanced by McGilvary are in several respects, we yet must forsake the presentation and discussion of them, since a systematic treatment of the problems related to the phenomenon of meaning is not within the purview of the present investigations.
6.
Cf. James, loc. cit., vol. 1, pp. 477 ff.
7.
Cf. supra, pp. 178 ff.
8.
A. Gurwitsch, “On the Object of Thought,” loc. cit., pp. 351 ff.
9.
As to the distinction in question, Cf. supra, pp. 170 f.
10.
James, loc. cit., vol. 1, pp. 275 ff.
11.
In the following, whenever we shall use the term “object” in James sense, we shall place it in quotation.
12.
Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, pp. 401 ff.; Farber, loc. cit., p. 349 f. “Dem ganzen Urteil entspricht als voller und ganzer Gegenstand der geurteilte Sachverhalt, der als identisch derselbe in einer blossen Vorstellung vorgestellt, in einem Wunsch gewünscht, in einer Frage gefragt, in einem Zweifel bezweifelt sein kann, usw. In letzterer Hinsicht betrifft der dem Urteil gleichstimmige Wunsch, das Messer sollte auf dem Tische liegen, zwar das Messer, aber in ihm wünsche ich nicht das Messer, sondern dies, dass das Messer auf dem Tische liege, dass sich die Sache so verhalte.” As to the distinction between “matter” and “quality” to which reference is made here, Cf. supra, pp. 171 f.
13.
Cf. supra, pp. 181 ff.
14.
Cf. Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, p. 372. “Die intentionalen Erlebnisse haben das Eigentümliche, sich auf vorgestellte Gegenstände in verschiedener Weise zu beziehen … Ein Gegenstand ist in ihnen gemeint, auf ihn ist ‘abgezielt,’ und zwar in der Weise der Vorstellung oder zugleich der Beurteilung usw …. Es sind … nicht zwei Sachen erlebnismässig präsent, es ist nicht der Gegenstand erlebt und daneben das intentionale Erlebnis, das sich auf ihn richtet … sondern nur Eines ist präsent, das intentionale Erlebnis, dessen wesentlicher deskriptiver Charakter eben die bezügliche Intention ist.”
15.
As to “object which is intended” as distinct from “object as it is intended” (“matter” of an intentional act), Cf. supra, pp. 171 ff. and 178 f.
16.
Cf. Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, p. 416.
17.
Cf. supra, pp. 170 ff.
18.
Cf. Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, §13.
19.
Cf. supra, Part IV, Chapter I, Section II; Chapter II, Sections I and III; Chapter III, Section I.
20.
Cf. supra, pp. 210 f. and 280 f.
21.
For the following. see James. loc. cit., vol. 1, pp. 275 ff.
22.
Cf. James, “On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology,” loc. cit., pp. 21 ff.
23.
As to the specific kind of meaninglessness involved in such a sequence of words, Cf. infra, pp. 323 f.
24.
The comparative independence of the theme with respect to its field as well as the limits within which possible variations of the field belonging to a certain given theme are to be confined will be discussed in Chapter I, Section VII of this part.
25.
This part, Section VIa.
26.
This part, Section VIb.
27.
Part II, Section Vb.
28.
Husserl, Ideen, p. 62; Cf. also Erfahrung und Urteil, pp. 24 and 74.
29.
Cf. supra, p. 110.
30.
Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la Perception, pp. 81 ff.
31.
Part II, Sections VI and VIII.
32.
Cf. Part II, Chapter I, Section X.
33.
Here, as throughout the present investigation, the term “theme” is understood in a purely phenomenological or psychological, and not in any technical, musical sense. “Theme” is meant to denote that with which the experiencing subject is dealing, that upon which he is dwelling, that to which his attention is drawn in a given act of experience, irrespective of the importance and significance which is had, from an objective musical point of view, by that which in the considered case is the theme in the phenomenological sense.
34.
This part, Section V.
35.
This part, Chapter I, Section VIc.
36.
Cf. K. Goldstein, “L’analyse de l’aphasie et l’étude de l’essence du langage,” Psychologie du langage, Paris, 1933, pp. 463 ff., and Language and language disturbances, New York, 1948, pp. 66, 72, 101 f., and 226 f. as to the phenomenon of “consciousness of spheres” (Sphärenbewusstsein, sphère de signification) and the form under which that phenomenon appears under pathological conditions.
37.
Cf. supra, pp. 178 ff.
38.
Cf. supra, pp. 171 ff. and 173 f.
39.
Husserl, Ideen, §§99 and 103.
40.
Cf. ibid., pp. 195 ff. “Ein evidentes Urteil S ist P und ‘dasselbe’ blinde Urteil sind noematisch verschieden, aber einem Sinneskern nach identisch, der für die formal-1ogische Betrachtung allein bestimmend wird.”
41.
Supra, p. 173.
42.
This part, Chapter IX, Section VII.
43.
Supra, pp. 170 f.
44.
Cf. this part, Section VI.3.
45.
Cf. supra, pp. 313 ff.
46.
Cf. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik (referred to hereafter as Logik), pp. 112 and 116 f.
47.
What has been stated above (Part IV, Chapter II, Section II) as to the strictly descriptive orientation of the phenomenological analysis of perception, respectively the perceptual noema, also applies to the analysis of the phenomenon of context.
48.
In our article, “Phänomenologie der Thematik und des reinen Ich,” loc. cit., Chapter 3, in SPP, Chapter X, we have accounted for attention and modifications of the direction of attention in terms of the theme-thematic-field structure.
49.
As to the operation of formalization, see supra, pp. 142 f. and 189 f.
50.
Cf. Husserl, Logik, §§12 ff.
51.
Cf. Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 1, Chapter 11; Logik, Abschnitt I; see also Farber, loc. cit., Chapter 5, B.
52.
Husserl, Logik, p. 192.
53.
Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, IV, Section 10; Farber, loc. cit., Chapter 11, H.
54.
Husserl, Logik, Section 13a; Cf. also supra, pp. 189 ff.
55.
Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2. IV, Section 12; Farber, loc. cit., Chapter 11, J.
56.
Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, p. 319.
57.
Husserl, Logik, §§89 f.
58.
Distinguishing, following Husserl, meaninglessness in the sense of irrelevancy to one another of material terms from meaninglessness as defined with reference to logical grammar, we wish to leave the question open as to whether, for an ultimate phenomenological justification of the laws which pertain to the “theory of pure forms of meaning,” one has not to resort likewise to the unity of experience and its specific structure.
59.
Berger, Recherches sur les conditions de la connaissance, pp. 155 ff. “Pour que l’exclusion d’une qualité ait un sens, il faut que l’attribution de cette qualité soit considérée comme possible … une proposition. logiquement correcte, nous paraît absurde si elle nie d’un sujet un attribut qui ne lui appartient pas effectivement, mais qui ne pouvait lui appartenir.”
60.
Husserl, Logik, §§33 f., 40, 51 f.
61.
For some philosophical problems of logic, cf. our article “Présuppositions philosophiques de la logique,” Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, vol. 56, 1951; “Philosophical Presuppositions of Logie,” SPP, Chapter XIV.
62.
The theme itself may be affected by such lack of distinctness, inner differentiation, and articulation of structure as when, for example, the theme is a problem, a gap to be filled, or when a mere “mood of interest” is experienced; cf. James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, p. 259.
63.
James, loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 260.
64.
A. Ménard, Analyse et Critique des Principes de la Psychologie de W. James (Lyon, 1910), p. 102.
65.
As to the “consciousness of the whence and whither,” Cf. James, loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 242. With respect to different, though kindred, phenomena, James (loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 251) speaks of “a sense of … direction.”
66.
Supra, p. 319.
67.
Part IV, Chapter II, Section III.
68.
Cf. infra, pp. 363 ff.
69.
James, 1oc. cit., vol. 1, pp. 243 ff.
70.
Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 254. Referring to Gestalt theory, Merleau-Ponty insists upon the recognition of the indeterminate positive phenomenon, (Phénoménologie de la Perception, pp. 11 ff). Cf. Koffka. “Psychologie,” Lehrbuch der Philosophie (ed. by M. Dessoir, Berlin, 1925, vol. 2) pp. 528 ff. and 547 ff.; also A. Gurwitsch, “Quelques aspects et quelques developpements de la psychologie de la forme,” loc. cit., pp. 437 ff.; “Some Aspects and Developments of Gestalt Psychology,” SPP, Chapter I.
71.
James, loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 252.
72.
Ibid., vol. 2, p. 251 f.
73.
Cf. supra, Part IV, Chapter II, Section II.
74.
A. Schutz, “On Multiple Realities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 5, 1945, pp. 549 ff.
75.
Cf. for example, ibid., pp. 567 ff.
76.
As to the “world of working,” Cf. ibid., I, 2.
77.
Ibid., p. 550.
78.
Later, (Part VI, Section IV) we shall discuss at greater length Schutz’s theory of multiple “finite provinces of meaning.”
79.
Schutz, loc. cit., p. 567.
80.
Ibid., p. 549 (Italics mine); Cf. also p. 568.
81.
Ibid., I, 3. “ Attention à la vie … defines the realm of our world which is relevant to us, … articulates our continuously flowing stream of thought, … determines the span and function of our memory, … makes us … either live within our present experiences, directed towards their objects, or turn back in a reflective attitude to our past experiences.”
82.
Infra, p. 331.
83.
Wertheimer, “Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt” I, loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 49.
84.
Cf. supra, p. 19.
85.
Cf. Husserl, Ideen, p. 254.
86.
As to phenomenal time and the experience of temporal continuity of consciousness, Cf. Husserl, Ideen, §81 f.; Vorlesungen sur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, §§8 ff.; Erfahrung und Urteil, §23; Farber, loc. cit., p. 516 f.; Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la Perception, pp. 474 ff.; Ph. Merlan, “Time consciousness in Husserl and Heidegger,” pp. 24 ff., in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 8 (1947). In our article “William James’s Theory of the ‘Transitive Parts’ of the Stream of Consciousness,” Section 1, loc. cit., we have brought out the far-reaching agreement between James and Husserl concerning the phenomena under consideration. SPP, Chapter XII.
87.
No more than the unity of the theme, that is, unity by Gestalt-coherence, can continuity of context be accounted for in terms of “retentiveness,” as Stout. A Manual of Psychology, p. 196, would have it. See our previous exposition and discussion of Stout’s theory in Part IV, Chapter II, Sections Vb and Vc.
88.
Supra, pp. 314 and 319 f.
89.
James, The Principles of Psychology, pp. 608 ff.
90.
A. Gurwitsch, “On the Intentionality of Consciousness,” loc. cit., Section III; in SPP.
91.
As to the atemporality of the noema, Cf. supra, p. 168. The noematic status of the phenomena of context and relevancy has been emphasized in Section IV.1 of this part.
92.
Husserl, Ideen, p. 63.
93.
Ibid., p. 169.
94.
Ibid., §§37 and 80; Erfahrung und Urteil, Section 17 f.
95.
Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, §23a.
96.
Cf. supra, p. 339.
97.
Cf. infra, pp. 356 ff.
98.
Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, §23b.
99.
As to the flux of phenomenal time, Cf. the references given supra, this part, Note 86.
100.
Cf. Husserl, Ideen, §122.
101.
Part I, Chapter II, Sections II and IIIb.
102.
Cf. our article “Phänomenologie der Thematik und des reinen Ich,” Chapter 2, Section 7; Chapter 3, Section 19; Chapter 4, Section 4, loc. cit.; “Phenomonology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego,” SPP, Chapter X. See also J. P. Sartre, “La transcendance de l’Ego,” Recherches Philosophiques. vol. 6, 1936–1937 and L’Etre et le Neant, Part II, Chapters 1, 5, and pp. 209 ff. We have discussed and endorsed Sartre’s thesis as formulated in “La transcendance de l’Ego” in our article, “A non-egological conception of consciousness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 1, 1941. SPP, Chapter XI. Objections to Sartre’s view and ours have been raised by A. Schutz, “Scheler’s theory of intersubjectivity and the general thesis of the Alter Ego,” p. 339, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. vol. 2, 1942.
103.
Part I, Chapter I, Section I.
104.
Supra, p. 135.
105.
Supra, pp. 14 and 18 ff.
106.
Cf. supra, pp. 128 ff.
107.
A. Gurwitsch, “William James’s theory of the ‘transitive parts’ of the stream of consciousness,” loc. cit., Sections 3, 4, and 7. SPP, Chapter XII.
108.
James ascribes this function also to some “transitive parts” other than fringes; Cf. his account of “sensation of difference” and “sensation of likeness” which we have discussed in Part II, Section VIIb.
109.
James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, pp. 259 ff.; Cf. also p. 261. “The most important element of these fringes is … the mere feeling of harmony or discord, of a right or wrong direction in the thought.”
110.
Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 259 ff. “… any thought, the quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves ‘all right’, is an acceptable member of our thinking, whatever kind of thought it may otherwise be. Provided we only feel it to have a place in the scheme of relations in which the interesting topic also lies, that is quite sufficient to make of it a relevant and appropriate portion of our train of ideas.”
111.
Cf. Part II, Sections VIc, VIII, and X.
112.
Cf. Part II, Sections VIb and VIc.
113.
Cf. this part, Section IIIa and p. 322.
114.
This part, Section IVa.
115.
Cf. supra, pp. 179 ff. as to the analogous, though not parallel, distinction between “object which is intended” and “object as it is intended.”
116.
From a different point of view, Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Section 50c insists upon the “thematic independence” of any complete proposition of the form S is P with respect to the context into which it is integrated. Such a context, e.g., a more or less complex theory, consists of interrelated and concatenated “thematically independent” propositions. The context has unity by relevancy throughout. Contributing toward shaping the context, each proposition still preserves its independence as a complete unit within the context.
117.
Cf. Part II, Section Vb for our account of Rubin’s analyses.
118.
Cf. Part II, VIIIb.
119.
This part, Sections VIa and VIc.
120.
Cf. supra, pp. 178 f. and 305 f.
121.
Cf. pp. 308 ff.
122.
The examination of these conditions which all concern the internal structure of propositions is the subject-matter of what Husserl calls “pure logical grammar”; Cf. Log. Unt., vol. 2, IV and Logik, §13; see also supra, pp. 188 ff. and 323 f.
123.
This part, Section IVa.
124.
Cf. this part, Section V.
125.
Cf. supra, pp. 322 f.
126.
Cf. supra, pp. 325 ff.
127.
Cf. infra, pp. 371 ff. and Part VI, Section V.
128.
Cf. supra, pp. 173 ff.
129.
Cf. supra, pp. 318 ff.
130.
For a more thorough analysis of the modifications which are here in question, Cf. our article, “Phänomenologie der Thematik und des reinen Ich,” loc. cit., Chapter 3, I; in SPP, Chapter X, Section III.
131.
Cf. pp. 345 ff.
132.
Wertheimer, “Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt,” I, loc. cit., pp. 48 ff.
133.
A. Gurwitsch. “Phänomenologie der Thematik und des reinen Ich,” loc. cit., Chapter 2, Section 6; in SPP, Chapter X, Sections II and VI.
134.
Cf. supra, p. 345.
135.
Cf. Rubin, Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren, p. 44.
136.
Husserl, Ideen, p. 62.
137.
Cf. supra, pp. 25 ff.
138.
Cf. this part, Section V.
139.
Cf. Husserl, Ideen, pp. 62 ff. and 169 f.
140.
Cf. this part, Section VId.
141.
Cf. Husserl, Ideen, Section 99 as to modes of presentation (perception, memory, anticipation, etc.) and Section 103 f. as to modalities (belief, doubt, question, probability, assumption, etc.).
142.
Ibid., p. 236. “Das Cogito bezeichnet … den eigentlichen Akt des Wahrnehmens. Urteilens, Gefallens, usw. Andererseits ist … der ganze Bau des Erlebnisses … mit allen seinen … noematischen Charakteren derselbe, wenn ihm diese Akualität fehlt.”
143.
Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, pp. 80 ff.; Cf. also supra, pp. 287 ff.
144.
Cf. this part, Section VId.
145.
P. 355.
146.
Cf. the description of the awareness of perceptual horizons by Merleau-Ponty, loc. cit., pp. 381 ff.
147.
Husserl, Erfahrung and Urteil, pp. 28 ff.
148.
Cf. Part IV, Chapter II, Section II.
149.
Cf. L. Landgrebe, “The World as a Phenomenological Problem,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 1, 1940, pp. 39 ff. As it appears from these indications, the phenomenon of the world is most closely connected with that of the thematic field, especially the perceptual thematic field. Apart from a few remarks to be made later (Part VI, Section II.1 and pp. 405 f.), we must abstain, in the present context, from embarking upon a systematic discussion of the world-phenomenon.
150.
Cf. Husserl, Ideen, pp. 48 ff.
151.
Cf. Part IV, Chapter III, Sections I and II.
152.
Cf. this part, Section VII.
153.
The thematization of marginal data purports abandonment even of the thematic domain.
154.
This part, Section 8.
155.
Part IV, Chapter II, Section VIIb.
156.
Cf. supra, p. 269.
157.
Part IV, Chapter III, Section III.
158.
Cf. our article “Phänomenologie der Thematik und des reinen Ich,” loc. cit., Chapter 3, Sections XI ff.; in SPP.
159.
Part IV, Chapter II, Section I.
160.
Cf. supra, pp. 266 ff. and 283 f.
161.
Part IV, Chapter II, Section III.
162.
Cf. Part IV, Chapter I, Section V.
163.
Cf. Part IV, Chapter I, Section III, and Chapter III, Section III.
164.
Cf. Part IV, Chapter II, Section IV, as to the concept of “open possibility” and its phenomenological origin in the specified indeterminateness of the perceptual noema.
165.
Cf. supra, pp. 328 f.
166.
Cf. supra, p. 239.
167.
Part VI, Section I.

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Gurwitsch*, A. (2010). The Thematic Field. In: Zaner, R. (eds) The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973). Phaenomenologica, vol 194. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3346-8_10

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