Abstract
One of the purposes of science is to provide identifications such as “water is H2O”. The process of setting such identifications goes hand in hand with the answers to many “why” questions: “Why is water boiling at 100 ∘ C and freezing at 0 ∘ C?” Such a task is ubiquitous in all empirical sciences. Consider now the sciences of the mind, from cognitive science to psychoanalysis. Can such “theoretical identifications”, to use an expression from David Lewis, be provided in case of psychological properties? If I am right in characterizing this as one of the aim of science, the importance of the question is evident: a negative answer to it would mark a limit for science. Such a boundary would extend to all those mental phenomena that have to do with mental properties, in general, and properties concerning consciousness in particular, because these have proven to resist the individuation strategies adopted for other mental properties, as the intentional ones. Phenomenal consciousness would be beyond the domain of the scientific method, not to mention our cognitive capacities (cf. McGinn 1991). Hence, mental phenomena that would prove intractable within the method of science should be considered as not naturalizable, as frequently the issue is posed, or would mark the incompleteness of science as to the natural world.
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Notes
- 1.
For ease of formulation, in this paper I will use, somewhat interchangeably, “properties” and “states”. I take mental states to be exemplifying mental properties, so that being in a pain state is having the property of being in pain.
- 2.
At least prima facie.
- 3.
As I said, my argument is not restricted to heat. The identity “light = electromagnetic radiation” is schematic as well. Its specific applications have this form: “white light = electromagnetic radiation at n wavelength”. The same applies to “gene = chain of DNA”. The identity then has the form (x) Hx = Mx with both H and M being functional descriptions ranging over variables that could be replaced by names or natural kind terms.
- 4.
I think we should take the nomological and causal relation to obtain also in the case of cones in the retina regarding colours perception. We would not be justified in asserting that we perceive colors unless we admit that cones activation is the causal effect of a necessary causal relation between light being reflect at such and such wavelength and these structures reacting so-and-so to such a reflection. This point has many consequences on arguments regarding qualia such as the absent qualia and the inverted spectrum ones. For reason of space and of argumentation I will not consider these issues here.
- 5.
Here is pretty evident the sloppiness in Kripke’s use of the term “heat” instead of “temperature”.
- 6.
After all this is Chalmers’ definition of quale: “those properties of mental states that type those states by what it is like to have them” 1996, p 359, n.2.
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Gozzano, S. (2009). Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity. In: Suárez, M., Dorato, M., Rédei, M. (eds) EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_10
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