Abstract
In ways that at first blush seem outrageous to the liberal egalitarian moral sentiments of the west, Confucianism resolutely gives priority to family love over love for anonymous others.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
A series of articles representing the two sides of the debate have appeared in Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy VI.1 (March 2007), VII.1 (March 2008), VII.2 (June 2008), and VII.3 (September 2008). The debate has been made around the three following classical Confucian cases:
-
A.
The Father-Son Mutual Concealment Case from the Analects:
The duke of She (
) informed Confucius, saying, ‘among us here there are those who may be styled upright (zhi, 
) in their conduct. If their father has stolen a sheep, they will bear witness against him.’ Confucius said, ‘among us, in our community, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in such mutual concealment’ (Analects 13.18). -
B.
The Shun’s Brother Case from the Mencius:
Wan Zhang [
, Mencius’ student] said, ‘Xiang [
, Shun’s brother] made his daily business to slay Shun [
, a Confucian sage king]. When Shun was made sovereign, how was it that he only banished him?’ Mencius said, ‘he raised him to be a prince. Some supposed that it was banishing him.’ Wan Zhang said, ‘Shun banished Gong Gong (
), sent away Huan Dou (
), slew San Miao (
), and killed Gun (
). On these four culprits having been punished, the people in the empire bowed to his will with admiration in their hearts, for he had punished persons who were destitute of humanity (ren, 
). However, Xiang was of all the most destitute of humanity, and yet Shun raised him to be the prince of Youbi (
). What wrong had the people of Youbi done? Does a man of ren really act thus? In the case of other persons, he cut them off; in the case of his brother, he raised him to be a prince.’ Mencius replied, ‘a man of ren does not lay up anger, nor cherish resentment against his brother. All he does is to love him. Because he loves his brother, he wishes him to be honorable; because he loves his brother, he wishes him to be rich. To appoint Xiang to be the prince of Youbi was to enrich and ennoble him. If, while Shun himself was emperor, his brother had remained a commoner, could he have been said to love him?’ Wan Zhang said, ‘I venture to ask what you mean by saying that some supposed that it was a banishing of Xiang?’ Mencius replied, ‘Xiang could do nothing in his state. Shun appointed an officer to administrate its government and to collect tributes and taxes. For this reason it was described as banishment. Xiang was certainly not permitted to ill-use the people’ (Mencius 5A3). -
C.
The Shun’s Father Case from the Mencius:
Tao Ying [
, Mencius’ student] asked, “when Shun was emperor and Gao Yao (
) was the judge, if Gusou [Blind Man, 
, Shun’s father] killed a man, what was to be done?’ Mencius replied, ‘the only thing was to do was to apprehend him.’ ‘In that case, would Shun not try to stop it?’ ‘How could Shun stop it? Gao Yao had his authority from which he received from the law.’ ‘Then what would Shun have done?’ ‘Shun looked upon casting the empire as no more than discarding a worn shoe. H would have secretly carried his father on his back and fled to the edge of the Sea and lived there happily, never giving a thought to the empire’ (Mencius 7A35).
-
A.
- 2.
For a detailed discussion of this case, see Section 3.5.
- 3.
In his “response to critics” (Liu, 2008), Liu argues that all the three Confucian cases under discussion are morally defective because they violate the universal moral principle “harm no one and benefit humans.” I think it is eventually groundless to base his conclusion on “harm” considerations. It is true that if my father stole a sheep from the owner, he had harmed the owner. But I do not inflict any harm to the owner if I simply refrain from reporting the case to the authority. Liu should not forget that it is the latter (my refraining from reporting) rather than the former (my father’s steeling a sheep) that is at stake in the debate. Regarding the case of Shun’s raising his brother as the honorary prince of Youbi, Liu argues that Shun harmed the people of Youbi by this appointment because he made his brother “rich and honorable purely by the wealth created laboriously by Youbi’s subjects” (p. 308). However, honorary appointments are inevitable for any government because such appointees can play some beneficial functions that authoritative positions cannot or should not perform in society. As long as Liu agrees that it is morally justifiable to levy taxation for running a government – on which I take he agrees because he is not an anarchist, he cannot contend that setting up honorary positions would harm the people. Consequently, even if appointing an unqualified person to be an authoritative prince would tend to injure the people because the person will have the power to do so, appointing an unqualified person to be an honorary prince cannot harm the people because he is “certainly not permitted to ill-use the people,” as Mencius points out (Mencius 5A4). In short, the only issue at stake seems to be whether Shun’s brother is qualified for the honorary position, rather than whether appointing him to the position would harm the people of Youbi. Finally, it is true, again, that if one’s father murdered another person, the father certainly harmed that person. But it is too stretching to say that by helping one’s father to escape from punishment, one is also harming that person. Even if it is wrong to help one’s father to escape in this case (though this is a controversial issue; see more discussion in Chapter 3), it is wrong for reasons other than “harming” the person that was murdered by the father. As to the principle of “benefiting humans,” it is indeed naïve to believe that an agent-neutral, “impartial” utilitarian view would “objectively” trump other views, such as an agent-relative, family-based Confucian virtue ethical view. From the Confucian view, it is precisely an indication of moral corruption more than intellectual numbness for Liu to claim that in a case in which one’s mother and a stranger are about to drown and one could save only one of them, it is morally fine that “I may first save either my mother out of kinship love or the stranger according to radical altruism” (Liu, 2008, p. 307). Confucians would say that you must save your mother in this case, period! Given the Confucian understanding of human nature, human relatedness, as well as the character of a way of life guided by virtue, saving one’s mother rather than a stranger in this case is not only the only right thing to do, but it is also the only effective way of “benefiting humans.” If one cannot even be nurtured to take an action to save one’s mother, it is hard to believe that one can be successfully educated to take an action to save a stranger.
) informed Confucius, saying, ‘among us here there are those who may be styled upright (zhi, 
) in their conduct. If their father has stolen a sheep, they will bear witness against him.’ Confucius said, ‘among us, in our community, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in such mutual concealment’ (Analects 13.18).
, Mencius’ student] said, ‘Xiang [
, Shun’s brother] made his daily business to slay Shun [
, a Confucian sage king]. When Shun was made sovereign, how was it that he only banished him?’ Mencius said, ‘he raised him to be a prince. Some supposed that it was banishing him.’ Wan Zhang said, ‘Shun banished Gong Gong (
), sent away Huan Dou (
), slew San Miao (
), and killed Gun (
). On these four culprits having been punished, the people in the empire bowed to his will with admiration in their hearts, for he had punished persons who were destitute of humanity (ren, 
). However, Xiang was of all the most destitute of humanity, and yet Shun raised him to be the prince of Youbi (
). What wrong had the people of Youbi done? Does a man of ren really act thus? In the case of other persons, he cut them off; in the case of his brother, he raised him to be a prince.’ Mencius replied, ‘a man of ren does not lay up anger, nor cherish resentment against his brother. All he does is to love him. Because he loves his brother, he wishes him to be honorable; because he loves his brother, he wishes him to be rich. To appoint Xiang to be the prince of Youbi was to enrich and ennoble him. If, while Shun himself was emperor, his brother had remained a commoner, could he have been said to love him?’ Wan Zhang said, ‘I venture to ask what you mean by saying that some supposed that it was a banishing of Xiang?’ Mencius replied, ‘Xiang could do nothing in his state. Shun appointed an officer to administrate its government and to collect tributes and taxes. For this reason it was described as banishment. Xiang was certainly not permitted to ill-use the people’ (Mencius 5A3).
, Mencius’ student] asked, “when Shun was emperor and Gao Yao (
) was the judge, if Gusou [Blind Man, 
, Shun’s father] killed a man, what was to be done?’ Mencius replied, ‘the only thing was to do was to apprehend him.’ ‘In that case, would Shun not try to stop it?’ ‘How could Shun stop it? Gao Yao had his authority from which he received from the law.’ ‘Then what would Shun have done?’ ‘Shun looked upon casting the empire as no more than discarding a worn shoe. H would have secretly carried his father on his back and fled to the edge of the Sea and lived there happily, never giving a thought to the empire’ (Mencius 7A35).Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fan, R. (2010). Confucian Morality: Why It Is in Tension with Contemporary Western Moral Commitments. In: Reconstructionist Confucianism. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3156-3_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3156-3_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-3155-6
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-3156-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)