Abstract
Thomas Jefferson once said that ploughmen are more likely to find the right answer to moral questions than professors. Why? Because the former have not been led astray by overly abstract, theoretical rules and ideas, which are impressive in their elegance, complexity, and nuance, but unable to capture true morality. By eliminating formal education as a criterion for moral knowledge, Jefferson rejected the elitism of other philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, Mill, and Hare. As long as moral agents are not distracted by irrelevancies, ethics is something each of them can do correctly.
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Notes
- 1.
This value system or axiology will be developed in Chapter 3 and 4.
- 2.
The details of how to make this case work out so that utility is maximized might seem unlikely, but so many of the counter-examples to utilitarianism are unlikely to happen. The reason they are so effective against the theory and principle is that they actually do occur.
- 3.
There are some who argue that some actions, such as trivial ones, are morally neutral or that trivial actions for the agent are unclassifiable, while trivial actions affecting other people are classifiable. The problem with making a third classification beyond that of morally right or wrong is that it is difficult to draw the line between what counts as a morally neutral action and one that can be evaluated. Should the line be drawn by each individual agent? If so, then the line could vary widely from one person to the next depending on what each thinks is insignificant. The same problem holds for any relativistic demarcation, including but not limited to what societies or human persons as a whole think unimportant. In order not to create additional controversy and to incorporate the common moral sense idea that we are obligated always to act ethically, all actions are classifiable as morally right or wrong, and obligatory, permissible, or forbidden.
- 4.
The reasonable person standard has been adopted by tort law to determine if an agent’s action negligently caused damages to others (Robinson 1972, p. 178).
- 5.
It might be simpler to make the reasonable person into an economist who is an expert in cost/benefit analysis. However, I take seriously Sagoff’s rejection of economic science as sufficient for adequate decision making. Economics “cannot measure the benefit, value in use, or the utility an object provides” (Sagoff 2004, p. 7). The reasonable person takes all relevant values into account.
- 6.
My standard for a reasonable person may appear to be too high, but, in order to reduce the probability of action misclassifications based upon some defect of the individual, I would rather set a higher standard than one that is too low.
- 7.
Gordon Graham adopts a contemporary Aristotelian line when he states, “the biology of a thing should be so ordered as to promote and maximize its flourishing” (Graham 2002, p. 181).
- 8.
From US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 10 May 1972, 464 Federal Reporter, 2nd series, pp. 772–96, West Publishing Company.
- 9.
These virtues are from Peter Wenz’s work (Wenz 2005, p. 197).
- 10.
I believe that Aristotle’s definition of the human good as activity of the soul in accordance with virtue can be made consistent with this view of ethics (Aristotle 1941b, 1098a).
- 11.
As will be seen in Chapter 6, the labeling issue can be settled by the simple expedient of labeling being paid for by those who desire it, while those who do not want labeling need not do so for their own products.
- 12.
Kant does not believe that moral sentiments have any role to play in normative ethics (Callicott 1999, p. 102).
- 13.
Callicott claims that these feelings and moral sentiments can vary but there is a range of normalcy for all human beings (Callicott 1999, p. 108).
- 14.
Kheel calls empathy “the culmination of many small acts of attention” (Kheel 2008, p. 227).
- 15.
Another difference is that rational goals may not be reasonable ones because of the differences in ethical considerations included in the decision process.
- 16.
An activity is risky or an object poses a risk if and only if there is a probability that the activity or object will lead to some harm or other negatively valued outcome (Lehman 1995, p. 22). The definition’s broadness entails a great deal of things are risky or have risk to them, but it captures the essence of what risk is.
- 17.
Jessica Hutchings has done some excellent work on the Maori’s opposition to transgenic technology. Many of the objections raised to TOs also surface in the Maori study, including TOs violating Maori culture and causing spiritual and moral offense (Hutchings 2004, p. 181).
- 18.
These are never great sources of evidence to establish a claim, but are useful to indicate a direction in which to begin to find an argument.
- 19.
The general consensus to rectifying this situation seems to be for greater engagement of the public in science and scientists in non-scientific areas affecting their work. Scientists should consider the consequences of their work on society and elsewhere and take advantage of the “cooperative rationality and social wisdom in the social enterprise” before they begin their research or create new technology (Zimdahl 2006, pp. 23–4).
- 20.
As will be seen in Chapter 6, conventional and organic produce can be much more dangerous than transgenic goods, even though many people have used the former for many years.
- 21.
See Fox (1999, p. 124).
- 22.
Bernhard Glaeser claims that in human ecology the sciences of biology, geography, psychology, sociology, anthropology, medicine, geology, mineralogy, botany, zoology, and ecology are involved (Glaeser 1995, pp. 7–9).
- 23.
Ralph Nader thinks that openness, vigorous peer review, and intolerance of commercial repression are sufficient for good science (Nader 2002, p. 48).
- 24.
It would be useful for findings in controversial areas to be made more available to the public. One of the greatest problems to finding solutions to such issues is a lack of reliable information.
- 25.
PB Thompson argues that science and scientists have a moral duty to “develop a better conceptualization of risk and to engage the broader public in conversation and deliberation on the types of science that they undertake” (Thompson 2007, p. 304). Fulfilling the obligations would eliminate some of the unwarranted fears about technology so that people could make decisions based on evidence rather than mere feelings.
- 26.
Many people believe in psychic powers such as mind reading and premonitions (BBC News 2007). There also seems to have been a rejection of science and an acceptance of mysticism such as that of crystals and Wicca (Rollin 2006, p. 5). Such beliefs are permissible for the individual if and only if there is no evidence readily available that debunks the beliefs. In the cases of psychic powers, the fact that no legitimate scientific test has ever found evidence for their existence is more than sufficient to show that belief in them is irrational.
- 27.
As Reiss and Straughan recognize, when risk and safety raise questions about responsibility, accountability, and justifiability, they become matters of moral concern (Reiss and Straughan 2001, p. 53).
- 28.
Sunstein takes a similar approach when discussing regulation. According to him, cost/benefit analysis is important, but democracies can choose to do what is important to them even when it is not cost efficient (Sunstein 2005, pp. 129–30).
- 29.
Philip Davies requires that TOs not be released until there is sufficient evidence to establish that they will not have a significant effect on the environment, but never states how much and what kind of information would be enough (Davies 2004, p. 75). Given the rest of his claims about the possible dangers, it appears that he requires certainty that TOs will not pose a threat which is a scientific impossibility.
- 30.
Judy Carman argues that all transgenics should undergo extensive animal trials in the same way that drugs are tested (Carman 2004, p. 90). Given her acknowledgement that there is a lack of funding and interest to investigate transgenics and the virtual impossibility of connecting transgenics to disease, it is clear that the evidentiary burden will be too high to satisfy.
- 31.
Gordon Graham argues along similar lines when he states that a Precautionary Principle based on the possible catastrophic results caused by adopting biotechnology leads to a situation in which no action is permissible. Simultaneously, accepting and rejecting the technology is forbidden because each has a possibility of creating a catastrophe (Graham 2002, p. 130).
- 32.
Here is where we begin to see the non-rational desire to maintain the status quo for our species, society, environment, and biosphere.
- 33.
Jones states that, “If that egg and that sperm do not unite, he cannot come to exist” (Jonas 1981, p. 249). Unlike Parfit, Jones places too much emphasis on the impact a person’s genetic endowment has on the person’s identity (Jonas 1981, p. 248). Kripke makes a stronger claim that both an object’s origin and the substance from which it is made are essential to the object (Kripke 1980, p. 114 footnote). A table’s identity, for example, is bound up essentially with the exact wood that is used to make it. With Parfit, it seems if the genetic information is exactly the same, the result is the same individual.
- 34.
Whiteside rejects Golkany’s position as a Precautionary Principle on the grounds that Precautionary Principles entail “no presumption in favor of either the environment or human mortality” (Whiteside 2006, p. 45). I think Whiteside’s attack requires an unnecessarily narrow criteria set for Precautionary Principles. If the principle deals with precaution and technology, then it should receive the Precautionary Principle label regardless of whether or not we agree with it.
- 35.
The distributive justice principle for accomplishing this goal will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.
- 36.
The US Regulations will be revisited in Chapter 5’s free market and trade barriers argument.
- 37.
There are those who attempt to manipulate the system or commit some type of deception or fraud. These people are of serious concern, but their bad behavior is not localized to transgenics and biotechnology. Whatever works to correct the condition for other businesses should work here as well.
- 38.
A lingering problem for RPU and all consequentialist theories is if Jane would have done the wrong thing by leaving if she had good reason to believe a rapist was on the loose in the area. I think the solution lies in whether or not she treats herself as a mere means. Hence, the Kantian principle coming next, QCI, when conjoined to RPU, will classify these situations correctly.
- 39.
This is the same problem Kant’s purely rational agent has.
- 40.
Attempts to formulate a rule utilitarian principle that is not merely extensionally equivalent to act-utilitarianism or based on implausible assumptions about ideal societies are unhelpful here.
- 41.
Of course, the rule to always maximize utility will have the highest overall utility, but it is not a practical rule to use, so it is rejected.
- 42.
Although if the two parts of the theory were universally adopted, the best state of affairs would be most likely brought about. People would be trying to maximize utility in the consequences of their actions at the same time they are treating people with respect in both thought and deed. The world in which both of these goals are met has to have greater value than a world lacking either.
- 43.
Since there are a large number of exceptions to just about any simple rule, such as promise-keeping, the rule becomes too complex and open to interpretation the moral community’s members. After all, if there are many exceptions focusing on this or that matter, people will reasonably start expecting that unforeseeable exceptions will arise. This fact leads to a further conclusion: no matter how diligent we may be in formulating a rule, we are bound to be unable to account for all circumstances that might arise in the future. The best we can do is to make the rule specific enough to deal with most exceptions, but it has to be general enough to be useful overall.
- 44.
Though they might not be of the technical sense in which all alternatives open to the agent are prohibited.
- 45.
Of course there must be an informational component to the deal. The fact that the consequences are not clearly known should be imparted to the intended recipient of the product. Information is a vital necessity for making autonomous decisions. (See Judge Robinson’s decision in “Opinion in Canterbury v. Spence” and the articles by Ingelfinger and Bok.)
- 46.
Some may argue that the only rational goal for a person is what is in the person’s best interest (Derek Parfit calls this the “Self-interest Theory”. (Parfit 1992, p. 4)). The problem with this view is that it classifies altruistic acts, especially supererogatory ones, as irrational without any sort of argument.
- 47.
Of course, this particular law is flawed. Many actions would be wrong merely because not everyone should perform them. For example, the devastation caused by lack of necessary services from everyone being brain surgeons would destroy society; thereby, making it wrong for everyone to become a brain surgeon. However, common sense tells us that it is permissible for some to follow this career path, especially if they are really suited for it. This problem is eliminated if the Law is tempered with the proper respect for persons.
- 48.
Unfortunately, this is one of the places where hand waving is appropriate. It is impossible to prove that intrinsic value creates duties of respect for whatever has the value. This could be one of the axioms of ethics that cannot be proved but allow us to have the ethical system we actually do. However, anyone who rejects the linkage between intrinsic value and respect to me seems to be an unreasonable person unlikely to understand morality.
- 49.
Kant tries to eliminate this problem by formulating a linked theory of virtues. According to Kant, rational persons are virtuous persons; hence, a fully rational person would never act in a way that disrespects the intrinsic value of any person affected by his action.
However, the connection between a fully rational person who uses pure reason without much emotion and a virtuous person is dubious. Many of the virtues demand a caring attitude to others, including but not limited to charity, care, compassion, empathy, and so on. It is difficult at best to see how a pure sense of duty allows people to have the virtues. Being charitable out of a pure sense of duty is cold and does not seem to treat people as they ought to be treated. Being charitable out of duty and because one cares for the plight of those less fortunate than oneself seems to capture better what it means to respect individuals because of the care one has for them as persons. Of course, a footnote cannot contain a full discourse on Kant’s complex moral theory; so I will have to leave it at this state of development and move on.
- 50.
Kant (1956, p. 96, 104, and 105).
- 51.
Unfortunately, the definition for treating someone as a mere means is very vague.
- 52.
Some may argue that treating someone as a mere means is equivalent to exploiting them by forcing the person to unfairly shoulder the burdens of an action without reaping an adequate amount of the benefits. (This counter argument is a modification of the positions found in the Crouch and Arras, Grady, Glantz et al. articles.) The argument, however, only works if the person does not autonomously choose to have this happen to her. If relevant information is withheld from her during the decision procedure, then she cannot autonomously select the alternative in which she is required to receive more burdens or fewer benefits than she deserves because this was not one of the options from which she had to choose initially. Since an agent must act intentionally, which requires making plans to bring the action about, she could not have acted intentionally to be exploited. She did not have the information needed to form the proper plan or intention. However, if she did have the relevant information, then she could have agreed to accept the additional burdens or fewer benefits. In this particular instance, though the act is imprudent, it is autonomous, and should be respected as such.
- 53.
GEM Anscombe rejects this distinction in Section 12 of Intention on the grounds that the two terms have more overlap than can be accounted for by the distinction.
- 54.
Some utilitarians such as Mill claim that the agent’s intentions and motives are irrelevant to the act’s morality. Others such as GEM Anscombe hold that the intentions are parts of the act. I will adopt the latter position and also include motives.
- 55.
It might be possible to insert a care ethic along the lines of Kheel if someone has an objection to respect (See Kheel 2008, Chapter 7). Although empathy and care are important to understanding my tenuous concept of respect, the combination is not equivalent to it. Respect carries an esteem or regard connotation that will make it more likely that people will act in a certain positive way that is missing from empathy and care. A person has empathy and care for a child, but will not take a child’s advice in the same way that she will for a person she respects.
- 56.
First, the contracting group is divided into two groups of equal or almost equal number. One group will write the social contract, all the time knowing that the second group will be allowed to pick their positions in society first. Whatever is left over will go to the members of the first group. The result is the same as that of Rawls’ thought experiment. The first groups will try to make the distribution of benefits and burdens as equal as possible because they know that the second group will take the very best positions.
- 57.
There can be disparities in wealth to foster the best utility, but they must not be implemented or maintained if it would treat people as mere means.
- 58.
I will not consider the problem if there are insufficient resources to give everyone at least a subsistence level life. In those cases the value of the society cannot be positive because at least someone is dying from her needs not being met. In societies in which there is little available, the reasonable person will take the least evil alternative.
- 59.
This will be as much as will be said about theoretical examples such as these. Since ethics is practical, counter-examples that are possible but extremely improbable will not be considered to be legitimate.
- 60.
I am assuming that Earth has the resources required to give everyone on it a good life. Of course, this would require a major attitude change from consumerism to sustainability.
- 61.
There is a difference between the duties of governments and those of corporations. Although the social good is a vital consideration for companies, in order to survive and increase overall utility, they must ethically compete in fair markets. One of their primary foci, therefore, needs to be upon their own probable agent-utility. Agent-utility is defined as the result of subtracting all the evil produced for the agent of an action by the action from all the good produced for the agent by the action. Governments, on the other hand, should focus on the needs of their citizens, which entails the pursuit of the society’s “agent utility.” Once social agent-utility seems to be maximized, the governments should help other countries’ to sustainable achieve and maintain the subsistence, minimal utility, and maximal utility, in that order.
- 62.
Recall that we are trying to avoid needless controversy and work. If we assert that angels or divine entities exist, then we automatically become responsible for proving our contention is true or at least prima facie plausible. In order to make the practical moral code as practical as possible for all, then it is best not to introduce elements that are not needed to make it work and would cause some to abandon it because it does not represent their beliefs.
- 63.
The information that a reasonable person would need to evaluate the outcomes of actions would be used here as well.
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Cooley, D.R. (2010). A Practical Moral Code. In: Technology, Transgenics and a Practical Moral Code. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3021-4_2
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