Abstrct
The concept of imagination is notoriously ambiguous.2 Thus one must be cautious not to use ‘imagination’ as a placeholder for diverse phenomena and processes that perhaps have not much more in common than that they are difficult to assign to some other, better defined domain, such as perception, conceptual thought, or artistic production. However, this challenge also comes with great opportunities: the fecundity and openness of ‘imagination’ appeal to researchers from different disciplines with different approaches and questions, and it draws together fields of enquiry that are initially considered far apart. Hence, arguably, the field of imagination is particularly poised for interdisciplinary enquiry. In the section on Imagination in Interdisciplinary Research, I will talk about some of the issues that have already entered that field of interdisciplinary inquiry.
This field becomes considerably larger if we also use the term ‘imagination’ for basic activities which go beyond the mere processing of perceptual data but are still considered integral to perception (e.g. because they occur in the absence of perceptual stimuli). In this respect, Hume’s and Kant’s accounts in particular are still reflected in contemporary research, albeit in ways which are not always explicit (Lohmar 1998). I will say something about this in the section on Imagination in Interdisciplinary Research too.
Before I turn to the matter of interdisciplinary research, however, I will first, in a section on Imagination in Phenomenology, sketch a general phenomenological position on imagination. I will mainly focus on Husserl’s account of phenomenology because it provides a solid reference point for understanding the context from which phenomenological contributions to interdisciplinary research on imagination are put forward.
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Notes
- 1.
Stevenson (2003) identifies thirteen different ways in which imagination is taken up in ordinary language and academic research.
- 2.
For an insightful account of Heidegger’s engagement with imagination see Elliot (2005).
- 3.
Bachelard combines an interest in the creative potential of imagination with an ethical and metaphysical committment to imagination as a principle of freedom and transcendence (Kaplan 1972).
- 4.
Ricoeur’s hermeneutical phenomenology approaches imagination in its interconnection not with perception but with language.
- 5.
Castoriadis explored the political power and effectiveness of a radical ‘imaginary.’
- 6.
Husserl’s term is ‘phantasy’ (Phantasie) (Husserl 2005). In order to make this article more readible but also in order to preserve the connections to other discourses, I decided here to use the term ‘imagination’ and its derivatives ‘imagining,’ ‘imagined’ etc. instead.
- 7.
Brough translates ‘Bildbewusstsein’ as ‘image consciousness’ (Husserl 2005). In order to make it more obvious that Husserl refers to pictures (and not to mental images) I will use ‘picture consciousness’ instead.
- 8.
This is perhaps the most important difference between Husserl’s and Sartre’s accounts. See Stawarska (2005). In this paper I can only allude to the aspects of picture-consciousness that are directly relevant to this distinction. For detailed discussions see Brough (1992, 2005), Marbach (1993), Volonté (1995), Lotz (2007).
- 9.
For example, when we look at a picture and say “this looks just like her!” we do not mean the physical picture (which looks like other physical pictures rather than like a real person), but we mean the picture object, i.e., the image that appears in the picture. On the other hand, the picture object clearly is not the depicted real ‘her’ who is probably of a different size and color, three-dimensional, moving, etc. (Husserl 1980: 121f. (112)).
- 10.
It “seems most appropriate to speak of ‘pictoriality,’ of ‘pictorial apprehension’ only in cases in which a picture, which for its part first functions as a representing object for something depicted, actually appears. Hence in the case of simple imagination, in which this does not occur (however great the temptation to assume that the situation is the same), it is best to use a different term” (Husserl 2005: 94 (87)). - Initially, Husserl thinks of imagination in pictorial terms. My summary is based on Husserl’s mature account. For the considerable changes he made to his earlier position see Jansen (2005).
- 11.
This holds for all sensory modes: visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, gustatory.
- 12.
Husserl does not use the term ‘simulation’ but speaks instead of ‘quasi-experience’.
- 13.
Noetic analyses describe the experience of imagining; noematic analyses describe the imagined object.
- 14.
Husserl’s use of the notion of implication (instead of the now common ‘simulation’) only highlights the fact that the ‘reproduced’ act is not actually performed, the ‘reproduced’ experience not actually experienced, but only ‘implied’ as a possible experience of the imagined object (Marbach: 1993: 61f).
- 15.
Similarly Sartre distinguishes between the positing of perception, which posits its object as existing, and the positing of imagination, which posits its object as nonexistent, absent, existing elsewhere or neutralised (Sartre 2004: 12).
- 16.
Given that Husserl describes imagining as involving the suspension of belief, it remains unclear whether it is possible to simulate the experience of believing. See the section on ‘imagination and belief’ below for a brief discussion of this issue.
- 17.
These two aspects are only meant as typical, not as necessary, features of a phenomenologica approach. My rendering is mainly based on Husserl’s, Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s writings.
- 18.
“I believe we can write a psychology (…) and (…) never use the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, introspectively verifiable, imagery, and the like” (Watson 1913).
- 19.
Note in this context that Pylyshyn’s description of the three levels involved in the explanation of mental imagery corresponds closely with the three moment of picture-consciousness outlined by Husserl: “At the first level we can ask about the content, or what the representation represents - what it is about. (…) At the second level of analysis, we can inquire about the form of the representation, the system of codes by which mental objects can represent aspects of the world. (…) The third level of analysis of mental representations is concerned with how representations are realized in biological tissue or implemented in hardware” (Pylyshyn 2003a).
- 20.
Not only Sartre but also Ryle and Wittgenstein were familiar with Husserl’s work, at least to some extent.
- 21.
This idea of enacted and embodied simulation, which we also find in Husserl (see above), is not to be confused with the notion of simulation employed in so-called ‘simulation theory,’ which is thought of as a mental representation rather than an embodied enactment (see below).
- 22.
The issue of visual imagination dominates debates; investigations of other modes are rare. See, for example, Reisberg (1992).
- 23.
Mirror neurons are neurons in the pre-motor cortex that display the same patterns of activity when an action is observed as they display when an action is performed. In that sense, they are said to ‘mirror’ in the observer the neurological activity present in the performer of the action.
- 24.
Lead by Semir Zeki, researchers at University College London and University of California at Berkeley founded the Institute of Neuroesthetics in 2002. For further information, see http://www.neuroesthetics.org/index.html.
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Jansen, J. (2010). Phenomenology, Imagination and Interdisciplinary Research. In: Schmicking, D., Gallagher, S. (eds) Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_8
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