Abstract
The sense of agency and its neurocognitive underpinnings have been the subjects of increasing attention over the last several years, but their detailed mechanisms remain controversial. An excellent opportunity to investigate both the basic neurocognitive mechanisms of self-agency attribution and their pathological dysfunctions is to study abnormalities of the sense of agency in neurological or psychiatric patients. In particular, disturbances of agency processing in schizophrenia patients with delusions of influence might reveal specific central mechanisms for the self-attribution of agency, which can be specifically impaired. Patients with delusions of influence feel that someone else is guiding and executing their actions, even if the action is actually completely caused by themselves.
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Synofzik, M., Voss, M. (2010). Disturbances of the Sense of Agency in Schizophrenia. In: Michela, B. (eds) Neuropsychology of the Sense of Agency. Springer, Milano. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1587-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1587-6_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Milano
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