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Procedural Rights in EU Antitrust Proceedings

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Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China

Part of the book series: China-EU Law Series ((CELS,volume 3))

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Abstract

In the European Union (EU), the rights of parties to antitrust proceedings before the Commission are dispersed in a jungle of legal instruments. Some are enshrined in statutory instruments: the founding Treaties (Treaty on the European Union (hereafter TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter TFEU), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereafter Charter), the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR)) and EU secondary legislation (in particular Regulation 1/2003 and the Implementing Regulation 773/2004). Those instruments do not necessarily have equal legal value. Others can be found in the case law of the EU courts and of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR). They often stem from general principles of law or from the legal traditions and case law of the Member States. Finally, several important procedural rights originate from the EU Commission’s administrative practice. Those rights are usually described in soft law instruments, such as Communications, notices, best practices, manuals, etc.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01.

    This paper was finalized on January 8, 2015.

  2. 2.

    See Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union, 18 December 2000, 2000/C 364/01.

  3. 3.

    See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.

  4. 4.

    See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] O.J. L 1/1 (hereafter “Regulation 1/2003”), in particular Preamble at Recital 37.

  5. 5.

    See Commission Implementing Regulation (EC) No. 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (O.J. L 123/18).

  6. 6.

    In this Chapter, we use CJEU and GC to refer also to cases dealt by the former ECJ and CFI. We use EU courts to refer to both CJEU/ECJ and GC/CFI rulings.

  7. 7.

    See Forrester (2010), pp. 13−16.

  8. 8.

    Ibid. This paper does not specifically address the role of the Hearing Officer or the controversial issues generated by the fact that the EU Commission acts as investigator, prosecutor and judge.

  9. 9.

    See Case C-347/87, Orkem v Commission, [1989] ECR 3283, para 30.

  10. 10.

    See Case T-348/94, Enso Española SA v Commission, [1998] ECR, 1998, II-1875, para 60 and C-341/06 P and Case C-342/06 P, Chronopost SA and La Poste v UFEX, [2008] ECR, I-04777, paras 44−45: “The right to a fair trial, which derives inter alia from Art. 6(1) of the ECHR, constitutes a fundamental right which the European Union respects as a general principle under Art. 6(2) of the EU. That right to a fair trial means that everyone must be entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Such a right is applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a Commission decision.”

  11. 11.

    See ibid.

  12. 12.

    See Case C-155/79, AM & Europe Limited v Commission, [1982] ECR 1575, paras 18−27.

  13. 13.

    See Case C-85/87, Dow Bénélux v Commission, [1987] ECR 3150, para 27. The ECJ has recognised the role of the lawyer as collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts and as being required to provide the independent legal assistant the client needs without any constraints. See also Case 94/00 Roquette Frères, [2002] ECR I-9011, para 46; Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Limited v Commission, [1982] ECR 1575, paras 18−27. Suspected firms can also dispense with external counsels and use their in-house lawyers or other corporate executives to represent themselves directly before the Commission. What matters is that firms swiftly come forward with a representative who may act on their behalf during the inspection. EU law does not mention the precise identity of the persons entitled to assist undertakings during the proceedings.

  14. 14.

    See Art. 18(4) of Regulation 1/2003, which provides that “The owners of the undertakings or their representatives and, in the case of legal persons, companies or firms, or associations having no legal personality, the persons authorised to represent them by law or by their constitution shall supply the information requested on behalf of the undertaking or the association of undertakings concerned. Lawyers duly authorised to act may supply the information on behalf of their clients. The latter shall remain fully responsible if the information supplied is incomplete, incorrect or misleading.” Even if the right to participate effectively to antitrust proceedings is not included in Regulation 1/2003, we pinpoint that Art. 27 is dedicated to the right to be heard. Before taking decisions of imposing a fine or periodic penalty payments, of ordering interim measures and finding infringement, the Commission shall give the undertakings which are the subject of the proceedings “the opportunity of being heard on the matters to which the Commission has taken objection”. After mentioning the right to be heard, Regulation 1/2003 states more generally “the right of defence of the parties concerned shall be fully respected in the proceedings”. This can imply a right of the accused to participate in an effective manner in a criminal or administrative-sanctions procedure.

  15. 15.

    See, for example, Ortiz Blanco (2013), pp. 336−337; Lianos and Geradin (2013), p. 153; Chalmers et al. (2010), p. 927; Van Gerven (1966), p. 355.

  16. 16.

    See Ortiz Blanco (2013), pp. 336−337.

  17. 17.

    It seems nonetheless appropriate to give the employee the opportunity to consult a lawyer where there is a clear risk of self-incrimination and surely in case the employee has explicitly requested this. This would ensure the protection of the employee’s rights of defence.

  18. 18.

    See Art. 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003: “Information exchanged pursuant to paragraph 1 can only be used in evidence to impose sanctions on natural persons where: (i) the law of the transmitting authority foresees sanctions of a similar kind in relation to an infringement of Art. 81 or Art. 82 of the Treaty or, in the absence thereof, (ii) the information has been collected in a way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for under the national rules of the receiving authority. However, in this case, the information exchanged cannot be used by the receiving authority to impose custodial sanctions.”

  19. 19.

    See Boykin (2006), pp. 19−21 (available at http://www.hugheshubbard.com/ArticleDocuments/Boykin_article%20_2.pdf).

  20. 20.

    See Case C-155/79, AM & S v Commission, [1982] ECR 1575, para 18: “Community law, which derives not only the economic but also the legal interpretation of the Member States, must take into account the principles and concepts common to the laws of those States concerning the observance of confidentiality, in particular, as regards certain communications between lawyer and client.” This principle is itself derived from national case law in criminal cases.

  21. 21.

    See Case C-155/79, AM & S v Commission, [1982] ECR 1575, para 21: “Apart from these differences, however, there are to be found in the national laws of the Member States common criteria inasmuch as those laws protect, in similar circumstances, the confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client provided that, on the one hand, such communications are made for the purposes and in the interests of the client’s rights of defence and, on the other hand, they emanate from independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment.” See also Order of the General Court, T-30/89, Hilti Aktiengesselschaft v Commission, [1990] ECR II-163; Joined Cases T-125/03 and 253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3523, para 117. The Court of Justice has confirmed the GC ruling. See Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2010] ECR I-8301.

  22. 22.

    See Joined Cases T-125/03 and 253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3523, para 134.

  23. 23.

    See ibid., para 128.

  24. 24.

    See ibid., para 127.

  25. 25.

    Documents prepared in the context of a compliance program are excluded from legal professional privilege. See Joined Cases T-125/03 and 253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3532, para 124.

  26. 26.

    See ibid., para 44.

  27. 27.

    See Coen and Roquilly (2014).

  28. 28.

    See Order of the General Court, T-30/89, Hilti Aktiengesselschaft v Commission, [1990] ECR II-163.

  29. 29.

    See Joined Cases T-125/03 and 253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3532, para 123.

  30. 30.

    See Case C-136/79, National Panasonic v Commission, [1980] ECR 2033, para 19.

  31. 31.

    See Case T-37/91, Imperial Chemical Industries plc. v Commission, [1995] ECR II-1901, para 64.

  32. 32.

    See Art. 41 of the ECHR.

  33. 33.

    See Art. 27(1) of Regulation 1/2003 and Art. 15 and 16 of Commission Regulation 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (hereafter “Regulation 773/2004”).

  34. 34.

    See Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359; Joined Cases T-25, 26, 30−32, 34−39, 42−46, 48, 50−56, 68−71, 87, 88, 103 & 104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others, [2000] ECR II-491.

  35. 35.

    See Notice on Access to file; see also Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU, O.J. C 308/6−32 (hereafter “Best Practices Guidelines”), paras 92 and ff.

  36. 36.

    See Commission Notice on the Rules for Access to the Commission File in Cases pursuant to Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU, Arts. 53, 54 and 57 of the EAA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, [2005] O.J. C 325/7, (hereafter “Notice on Access to file”), Art. 1.

  37. 37.

    See Case T-161/05, Hoechst GmbH v Commission, [2009] ECR II-3555, para 160; Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission, [1999] ECR I-4235, para 76; Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to 214/98 Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission [2003] ECR II-3275, para 334; Case T-161/05 Hoechst GmbH v Commission [2009] ECR II-3555, para 160.

  38. 38.

    See Case T-10/92, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission [1992] ECR II-2667, para 38: “The procedure for access to the file in competition cases is intended to allow the addressees of an SO to examine evidence in the Commission’s files so that they are in a position effectively to express their views on the conclusions reached by the Commission in its SO on the basis of that evidence. Access to the file is thus one of the procedural guarantees intended to protect the rights of the defence and to ensure, in particular, that the right to be heard provided for in Art. 19(1) and (2) of Regulation 17 and Art. 2 of Regulation 99/63 can be exercised effectively. It follows that the right of access to the file compiled by the Commission is justified by the need to ensure that the undertakings in question are able properly to defend themselves against the objections made against them in the SO.”

  39. 39.

    See Joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 and C-532/07 P, Sweden and API v Commission, para 88.

  40. 40.

    See Joined Cases 56 and 58−64, Etablissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission, [1966] ECR 299, 338.

  41. 41.

    See Commission Regulation 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (hereafter “Regulation 773/2004”).

  42. 42.

    The SO sent to the parties will meet this requirement, whereas it will include the facts alleged against the undertaking, the legal classification of those facts, the legal arguments and evidence the Commission relies upon, and the factors taken into consideration to set the fine: see Case C-45/69, Boehringer Mannheim v Commission, [1970] ECR 769, para 9; Case C-136/79, Atlantic Container Line [1980] ECR 2033, paras 172−173.

  43. 43.

    See Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, [1995] ECR II-1847, paras 216 and ff.

  44. 44.

    See Opinion of AG Vesterdorf, T-1/89, Rhone-Poulenc SA v Commission, [1991] ECR II-867, II-884.

  45. 45.

    See Art. 15 of Regulation 773/2004.

  46. 46.

    See Case C‑506/08 P, Sweden v Commission, [2011] ECR, I-06237, paras 9 and ff. See also Notice on Access to file, para 12.

  47. 47.

    Disputes between the parties and the Commission over the access to file are under the authority of the Hearing Officer. His main responsibilities in ensuring the effective right to be heard is to ensure that the SO meets the minimum requirements to inform the undertaking of the allegations raised against it and that it is consistent with the grounds relied on by the Commission in its final decision: see Art. 7(1) and 7(2) of the Hearing Officer’s Mandate.

  48. 48.

    See infra Section “The Right to Professional Secrecy”. See also Bernatt (2010), pp. 53−70 (available at www.ssrn.com).

  49. 49.

    See Notice on Access to file, para 17.

  50. 50.

    See ibid., para 21.

  51. 51.

    See ibid., para 22.

  52. 52.

    See Case C-110/10 P, Solvay SA v Commission, [2011] ECR I-10439.

  53. 53.

    In Soda Ash, the Commission had moreover failed to provide a comprehensive list of documents in its possession, considering that it was of no use for the case. The Commission had also considered that a non-confidential summary of the documents was not possible (European Commission decision, Soda-ash – Solvay, CFK, 13 December 2000, COMP/M 33.133-B). The GC took the view that it is not up to the Commission to decide which evidence should be made available to the concerned parties and could consequently be useful for their defence (T‑58/01 Solvay v Commission, [2009] ECR II‑4781).

  54. 54.

    See Case T-7/89, SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission, [1991] ECR II-1711.

  55. 55.

    See ibid.

  56. 56.

    See Joined Cases T-305−307/94, T-313−316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission, [1999] ECR II-931. The ECtHR has nevertheless held that compliance with the adversarial principle of access to file relates only to judicial proceedings before a tribunal. There is no general, abstract principle that the parties must in all instances have the opportunity to attend the interviews carried out or to receive copies of all the documents taken into account in the case of other persons.

  57. 57.

    See Van Bael (1993), p. 742.

  58. 58.

    See Best Practices Guidelines, para 78.

  59. 59.

    See Best Practices Guidelines, paras 81, 99−103, 106−108.

  60. 60.

    See Case C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission of the European Communities, [1974] II-1063, para 15.

  61. 61.

    See Art. 27(1) of Regulation 1/2003.

  62. 62.

    See Art. 12 of Regulation 773/2004.

  63. 63.

    See Best Practices Guidelines, paras 99–103 and paras 106 and ff.

  64. 64.

    See Art. 41 of the ECHR.

  65. 65.

    See Art. 27 of Regulation 1/2003.

  66. 66.

    This right is normally exercised in writing by way of reply containing observations on the accuracy of the facts and the validity of the arguments. The undertaking may also adduce evidence of its own in support of its defence.

  67. 67.

    See Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings.

  68. 68.

    See Forrester (2009), p. 833. See also Killick and Berghe (2010), p. 273, Huyue Zhang (2011), pp. 630−663 (available on www.ssrn.com), Flatery (2010), p. 54.

  69. 69.

    See Case 17−74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission of the European Communities, [1974] II-1063, paras 15 and 21.

  70. 70.

    See Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission, [1998] ECR I-08417, para 21; Joined Cases C-341/06 and C-342/06 P, Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and others, [2008] ECR I-4777, para 45.

  71. 71.

    See Art. 47 of the Charter; Case C-282/95 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission, [1997] ECR I-1503, para 38.

  72. 72.

    See Joined Cases 96−102, 104/82, 105/82 and 110/82 IAZ v Commission [1983] ECR 3369, para 16; Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96, SCK and FNK v Commission, [2008] ECR II-01739 and Case T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission, [2000] ECR II-2707, para 281.

  73. 73.

    See Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96, SCK and FNK v Commission, [2008] ECR II-01739.

  74. 74.

    See Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007], ECR I-2271, para 37; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 Kadi and Al Barakaat international Foundation v Council and Commission, [2008] ECR I-0000, para 355; Case C-47/07 P, Masdar (UK) v Commission, [2008] ECR I-0000, para 50.

  75. 75.

    See Art. 6(1) of the ECHR.

  76. 76.

    See Case T-276/04, Compagnie Maritime Belge v Commission, [2008] ECR II-01277, paras 41 and ff.

  77. 77.

    See Case C-254/99, LVM v Commission, [1999] ECR II-00931, paras 192 and ff.

  78. 78.

    See Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission, para 29; see, by analogy, the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Erkner and Hofauer of 23 April 1987, Series A No. 117, para 66; Kemmache of 27 November 1991, Series A No. 218, para 60; Phocas v France of 23 April 1996, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1996-II, 546, para 71, and Garyfallou AEBE v Greece of 27 September 1997, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1997-V, 1821, para 39.

  79. 79.

    See Joined Cases T-305−307/94, T-313−316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T329/94 and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission, [1999] ECR II-931, para 188.

  80. 80.

    In contrast, “if the authorities have taken prompt and appropriate remedial action to manage the temporary unpredictable overload of the courts, the longer processing time of some cases may be justified”. See Albers (2007), p. 10 (available at http://www.eipa.eu/modules/EuroMedJustice/Conferences/Istanbul_16_19Apr07/speeches/1_Speech_PIM_ALBERS_TheManagementJudicialTime.pdf).

  81. 81.

    See Joined Cases T-5/00 and T-6/00, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied and Technische Unie BV v Commission, [2003] ECR II-05761, paras 77−80.

  82. 82.

    See Case C-105/04 P, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied and Technische Unie BV v Commission, [2006] ECR I-8725, paras 49−51. Furthermore, the ECtHR pointed out that the ECHR places a duty on the Member States to organise their legal systems to allow the courts to comply with the requirements of Art. 6(1), including that of a trial within a reasonable time: see Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96, SCK and FNK v Commission [2008] ECR II-01739, para 56; Joined Cases T-305/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, [1999] ECR II-931, paras 120 and ff.; Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission [1999] ECR II-2969, paras 276 and ff. and Joined Cases T-5/00 and T-6/00 Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektronisch Gebied v Commission, [2003] ECR II-5761, paras 73 and ff.

  83. 83.

    See Case C-105/04 P, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied and Technische Unie BV v Commission, [2006] ECR I-8725, paras 49−51.

  84. 84.

    See Joined Cases T-305−307/94, T-313−316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T329/94 and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission, [1999] ECR II-931.

  85. 85.

    See Case T-62/98, Volkswagen v Commission, [2000] ECR II-2707, para 270.

  86. 86.

    See Case C-254/99, LVM v Commission, [2002] ECR, I-08375, para 122.

  87. 87.

    See Joined Cases T-5/00 and T-6/00, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektronisch Gebied and Technische Unie BV v Commission, [2003] ECR II-5761, paras 78−79.

  88. 88.

    See Case C-238/12 P, FLSmidth & Co. A/S v European Commission, paras 116−117 (unpublished).

  89. 89.

    This solution was previously applied in C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission, ECR 1998 I-08417, para 48, where the CJEU held that a fine reduction should apply for “reasons of economy of procedure and in order to ensure an immediate and effective remedy regarding a procedural irregularity of that kind”.

  90. 90.

    On the preference for a fine reduction solution, see Opinion of AG Wathelet, C-580/12 P, Guardian Industries Corp. v Commission, paras 106 and ff.; Scheidtmann (2014) (available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/haste-makes-waste?utm_source=July+24%2C+2014&utm_campaign=April+30%2C+2013&utm_medium=email), Beumer (2013) (available at http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2093#sthash.X98P8Okm.dpuf).

  91. 91.

    See Case C-50/12 P, Kendrion NV v Commission, para 87 (unpublished), and C-385/07, Der Grüne Punkt—Duales System Deutschland GmbH v Commission, [2009] ECR I-6155, paras 193 and ff.

  92. 92.

    See Art. 20 of Regulation 1/2003.

  93. 93.

    See Art. 21(1) of Regulation 1/2003: “If a reasonable suspicion exists that books or other records related to the business and to the subject-matter of the inspection, which may be relevant to prove a serious violation of Art. 81 or Art. 82 of the Treaty, are being kept in any other premises, land and means of transport, including the homes of directors, managers and other members of staff of the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned, the Commission can by decision order an inspection to be conducted in such other premises, land and means of transport.”

  94. 94.

    See Chalmers et al. (2010), p. 927.

  95. 95.

    The Reading Guide of the Charter (available at http://www.coe.int/t/ngo/Source/reading_guide_charter_en.pdf) makes reference to the ECHR. The same interpretation can therefore be used.

  96. 96.

    See Ortiz Blanco (2013), p. 32.

  97. 97.

    See Case Niemetz v Germany (Application No. 13710/88) 16 December 1992 [1992] ECHR A-251-B.

  98. 98.

    See Case Société Colas Est and Others v France (Application No. 37971/97) 16 April 2002 [2002] ECHR 418, para 49.

  99. 99.

    See Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères, [2002] ECR I-9011.

  100. 100.

    See ibid., para 29.

  101. 101.

    Article 20 paras 7, 8, and Art. 21 of Regulation 1/2003. See Art. 21(3) of Regulation 1/2003. This requirement was included for the investigation to be in accordance with the principle of inviolability of the home. See Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst AG v Commission, [1989] ECR 2859.

  102. 102.

    See Case T‑135/09, Nexans v Commission, [2012].

  103. 103.

    See Case T-474/04, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse v Commission, [2007] ECR II-4231, para 76. It is prohibited to make formal findings of liability against a natural or legal person without granting that person the benefit of all guarantees inherent to the exercise of the rights of the defence. See Ortiz Blanco (2013), p. 25; Case T-474/04 Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse v Commission, [2007] ECR II-4231, paras 75−77; Case T-174/05 Elf Aquitaine SA v Commission [2009] ECR II-183, para 196. In the same vein, the indictment or formal charge against any person is not an evidence of guilt. See Ortiz Blanco (2013), p. 24.

  104. 104.

    See Case C-199/92 P, Huls v Commission, [1999] ECR I-4287, para 150; Case T-62/98, Volkswagen v Commission, [2000] ECR II-2707, para 281.

  105. 105.

    See Case T-62/98, Volkswagen v Commission, [2000] ECR II-2707, para 281; Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00, JFE Engineering Corp. v Commission, [2004] ECR II-2501, para 177; Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, [1975] ECR 1663, paras 203, 304, 359 and 363 and Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, para 265, Opinion of Judge Vesterdorf, acting as Advocate General, in Case T-1/89 Rhône-Poulenc v Commission, [1991] ECR II-867, II-954.

  106. 106.

    The first two rights are discussed thereafter. The right not to incriminate oneself is described in a separate title. See infra, Section “The Right to Silence”.

  107. 107.

    See Art. 6(2) of the ECHR.

  108. 108.

    See Case T-110/07, Siemens AG v Commission, [2011] ECR II-00477, para 46; and Minelli v Switzerland (Application No. 8660/79) 25 March 1983 [1983] ECHR A62. Same goes for the Commission: see Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn in Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique diffusion française v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, 1914; C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, para 58; Case C-49/92 P, Commission v Anic Partecipazioni, [1999] ECR I-4125, para 86.

  109. 109.

    See Petit and Rato (2008).

  110. 110.

    See Case C-199/92 P, Huls v Commission, [1999] ECR I-4287, paras 149−150.

  111. 111.

    See Joined Cases C‑89/85, C‑104/85, C‑114/85, C‑116/85, C‑117/85 and C‑125/85 to C‑129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission, [1993] ECR I‑1307, para 127; Case C-407/08 P, Knauf Gips KG v Commission, [2010] ECR I-06375, para 47: “The Commission must produce firm, precise and consistent evidence. However, it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by that institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement.” On the use of presumptions and the burden of proof in antitrust cases, see Volpin (2014), pp. 1159–1186.

  112. 112.

    This question is still to be discussed in EU case law since the rules governing the standard of proof are not legally codified. See Joined Cases C-310/98 and C-406/98, Hauptzollamt Neubrandenbrug v Leszek Labis and Sagpol SC Transport Miedzynarodowy i Spedycja, [2000] ECR I-1797, para 29.

  113. 113.

    See Case T-62/98, Volkswagen v Commission, [2000] ECR II-2707.

  114. 114.

    See ibid., para 281.

  115. 115.

    See Joined Cases T-305−307/94, T-313−316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission, [1999] ECR II-931, paras 444 and ff. The undertaking’s right against self-incrimination is sometimes also said to be protected under Art. 18(2) of Regulation 1/2003. See Chalmers et al. (2010), p. 925.

  116. 116.

    See Art. 19 of Regulation 1/2003.

  117. 117.

    See Case T-34/93, Société Générale v Commission, [1995] ECR II-545, para 72. This means that an undertaking will need to answer factual questions and has to provide documents, even if this information could be used to establish the existence of an infringement.

  118. 118.

    See Case 43/1994/490/572, Saunders v United Kingdom, [1997] 23 EHHR 313, paras 68−69.

  119. 119.

    See Case C-179/93, O’Halloran v Council and Commission, paras 55−57 (publication information unavailable).

  120. 120.

    See Case C-347/87, Orkem v Commission, [1989] ECR 3283, para 18.

  121. 121.

    See ibid., para 18.

  122. 122.

    See ibid., para 33.

  123. 123.

    See Case C-347/87, Orkem v Commission, [1989] ECR 3283, para 34: “Accordingly, whilst the Commission is entitled, in order to preserve the useful effect of Art. 11(2) and (5) of Regulation 17, to compel an undertaking to provide all necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even if the latter may be used to establish, against it or another undertaking, the existence of anti-competitive conduct, it may not, by means of a decision calling for information, undermine the rights of defense of the undertaking concerned.”

  124. 124.

    See Case T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission, [2001] ECR II-00729, paras 25, 59 and ff.

  125. 125.

    See Chalmers et al. (2010), pp. 925−926.

  126. 126.

    See Joined Cases T-305−307/94, T-313−316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others v Commission, [1999] ECR II-931, paras 444−445.

  127. 127.

    Ibid., para 447.

  128. 128.

    See Commission decision COMP/36.571/D-1, Austrian Banks [2002] O.J. L 56/1, para 488; Chalmers et al. (2010), pp. 925−926.

  129. 129.

    See Art. 18(3) of Regulation 1/2003.

  130. 130.

    Hence, the right to remain silent cannot be invoked against decisions taken on the basis of information delivered, whilst the undertaking had no duty to reply. See Case C-407/04 P, Dalmine SpA v Commission [2007] ECR I-835, paras 33−36. See also Manproc, Module 6, para 72.

  131. 131.

    See Antitrust Manual of Procedures, Internal DG Competition working documents on procedures for the application of Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU March 2012, (hereafter “Manproc”). The text is made available on the internet: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/information_en.html. In this Manual, the Commission commits to respect established case law. The Manuel forbids officials from asking questions that may force undertakings to admit the existence of an infringement of EU competition law. See Manproc, Module 6, para 71. The Commission expresses that it is only entitled to ask questions intended to secure factual information. See Manproc, Module 6, paras 71−73: “The privilege against self-incrimination protects undertakings against the obligation to reply to self-incriminating questions, i.e. to admit the existence of an infringement of EU competition law (in which they participated). According to the case-law as established in Orkem16 an undertaking can only invoke the privilege against self-incrimination if two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the undertaking was asked to admit the existence of an infringement of EU competition law (in which it participated) and (2) it was compelled to answer the question. However, the Best Practice Guidelines and the Hearing Officer’s Mandate foresee the possibility for undertakings to raise concerns with DG Competition (Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission [1989] ECR 3283) and the Hearing Officer about self-incrimination already when they are the addressees of request for information pursuant to Art. 18(2), in order to settle discussions at the earliest stage. The privilege against self-incrimination does not apply when answering questions asked in the context of requests made under Art. 18(2) (simple requests for information, interviews, simple inspections). This is due to the fact that the undertaking is not compelled to answer these questions. It replies on a voluntary basis. If an undertaking replies in a self-incriminating manner to questions that it is not compelled to reply to (i.e. a reply which goes beyond the Commission’s investigatory powers) that reply may be considered as spontaneous cooperation on the undertaking’s part capable of justifying a reduction in a possible fine outside the scope of the Leniency Notice.”

  132. 132.

    Schwarze and Bechtold (2008) (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2008_regulation_1_2003/gleiss_lutz_en.pdf).

  133. 133.

    See Case T-322/01, Roquette Frères SA v Commission, [2006] ECR II-3137, para 266.

  134. 134.

    See Case T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission, [2001] ECR II-00729, paras 25, 59 and ff.

  135. 135.

    See Art. 339 of the TFEU: “The members of the institutions of the Union, the members of committees, and the officials and other servants of the Union shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components. See also Art. 28(2) of the TFEU: The members of the institutions of the Union, the members of committees, and the officials and other servants of the Union shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components.”

  136. 136.

    See Art. 28 of Regulation 1/2003.

  137. 137.

    See Case T-65/89, BPB Industries and British Gypsum, [1993] ECR II-389; Case C-310/93P, BPB Industries and British Gypsum, [1995] ECR I-865.

  138. 138.

    See Case 145/83, Stanley Adams [1985] ECR 3539, para 34.

  139. 139.

    By way of illustration, the Commission has indicated by way of example a series of information, which it does not consider as business secrets. See Notice on Access to file, para 23: “The members of the institutions of the Union, the members of committees, and the officials and other servants of the Union shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components”.

  140. 140.

    See Notice on Access to file, para 23.

  141. 141.

    See Case T-36/91, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, [1991] ECR 1995 II-01847, para 102.

  142. 142.

    See Case T-198/03, Bank Austria Creditanstalt v Commission, [2006] ECR II-1429, para 71; Case T-474/04 Pergan Hilfstoffe fur industrielle Prozesse v Commission, [2007] ECR II-4225, para 65.

  143. 143.

    See Notice on Access to file, para 25: “The members of the institutions of the Union, the members of committees, and the officials and other servants of the Union shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components.”

  144. 144.

    See Manual of procedure, Module 12, para 34.

  145. 145.

    See Case C-110/81, SA Roquette frères v Council, [1982] ECR I-3159, para 24; Case T-59/99 Ventouris Group Enterprises SA, [2003] ECR II-5257, para 124; T-65/99, Strintzis Lines Shipping SA, [2003] ECR II-5433, para 44.

  146. 146.

    See Art. 296 para 2 of the TFEU: “Legal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals, initiatives, recommendations, requests or opinions required by the Treaties.”

  147. 147.

    See Case C-350/88, Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, para 15; Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v Commission [1997] ECR II-923, para 149.

  148. 148.

    See Art. 296 of the TFEU.

  149. 149.

    See Case T-150/89, GB Martinelly v Commission, [1995] ECR II-1165, para 65; Case C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, [1998] ECR I-1179, para 63.

  150. 150.

    See Joined Cases 8 to 11−66, Société anonyme Cimenteries C.B.R. v Commission, [1967] ECR 93; T-62/98, Volkswagen AG v Commission, [2000] ECR II-2707, para 269.

  151. 151.

    A decision concerning the substance of the case will require more explanation than one based on procedural issues.

  152. 152.

    See Joined cases C-46/87 and C-227/88, Hoechst v Commission, [1989] ECR I-2859, paras 41−42; Case 73−74, Groupement des fabricants de papiers peints v Commission, [1975] ECR 1491.

  153. 153.

    See Case T-24/05, Alliance One International and others v Commission, [2010] ECR II-5329, para 149; Joined cases T-117/07 and T-121/07, Areva and others v Commission, [2011] ECR II-633, para 88.

  154. 154.

    See Case C-279/98 P, Cascades v Commission, ECR [2010] I-9693, paras 38−47.

  155. 155.

    See Case T-220/00, Cheil Jedang Corp. v Commission, [2003] ECR II-2473, para 218; Joined cases T-236/01, 239/01, T-244/01−T 246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01, Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd and others v Commission, [2004] ECR II-1181, para 252.

  156. 156.

    See Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission, [1992] ECR II-02223.

  157. 157.

    See Case C-450/98 P, IECC v Commission, [2001] ECR, I-03947, para 84.

  158. 158.

    An often-heard joke in Brussels is that it is so discretionarily easy for the Commission to reject a complaint that the drafting of such decisions is delegated to young trainees that have just left law school.

  159. 159.

    Case 73/74, Groupement des fabricants de papiers peints de Belgique and Others v Commission, [1975] ECR 1491, para 31.

  160. 160.

    See Case 73−74, Groupement des fabricants de papiers peints de Belgique and Others v Commission, [1975], ECR, 1491, paras 30 and ff.

  161. 161.

    See Case T-115/94, Opel Austria GmbH v Council, [1997] ECR II-39, para 93.

  162. 162.

    See Case T-29/05, Deltafina SpA v Commission, [2010] ECR II-4077, para 427; Case T-13/03 Nintendo Co Ltd, Nintendo Europe GMBH v Commission [2009] ECR II-975, paras 202 and ff.

  163. 163.

    See Case T-190/95 and T-45/96, Sodima v Commission, [1999] ECR II-3617, para 25; Case T-195/95 P, Guérin Automobiles v Commission, [1996] ECR II-679, para 20; Joined cases T-213/95 and T-18/96, SCK FNK v Commission, [1997] ECR II-1739, para 83.

  164. 164.

    See Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v Commission, [2003] ECR II-4653, para 192.

  165. 165.

    See Joined Cases C-181/86 to 184/86, Del Plato and Others v Commission, [1987] ECR 4991, para 10; Joined Cases C-189/02 P, 202/02 P, 205/02 P—208/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rorindustri A/S v Commission, [2005] ECR I-5425, paras 209−211; Case C-397/03 P, Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midlands Ingredients v Commission, [2006] ECR I-4429, para 91.

  166. 166.

    See ibid.

  167. 167.

    See Case T-7/89, SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission, [1991] ECR II-1711. The GC however dismissed the application for annulment, because on the facts, access to file had been effectively given.

  168. 168.

    See Case 148−73, Louwage v Commission, [1974] ECR 00081, para 12; Case C-189/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, [2005] ECR I-05425, paras 453 and ff.

  169. 169.

    See Ortiz Blanco (2013), p. 17; Case T-44/00, Mannesmanröhren – Werke AG v Commission, [2004] ECR II-2233, para 55; Case T-62/98, Volkswagen v Commission, [2000] ECR II-2707, paras 279−83. Not all breaches of the rights of defence give rise to annulment. Rather, as explained previously, annulment only happens if the condemned undertaking can show that absent the irregularity, the decision would have been different. Moreover, depending on the scale of the violation, the annulment may be complete or partial.

  170. 170.

    See Case C-385/07, Der Grune Punkte—Duales System Deutschland GmbH v Commission, [2009] ECR I-06155, para 195.

  171. 171.

    European Ombudsman, Overview 2012, 3.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Liege Competition and Innovation Institute (LCII), University of Liege (ULg), Liege, Belgium

    Daniel Muheme, Norman Neyrinck & Nicolas Petit

  2. Philippe and Partners, Liege, Belgium

    Norman Neyrinck

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  1. Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Caroline Cauffman

  2. China University of Political Science an, School of Rule of Law and Government, BEIJING, China

    Qian Hao

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Muheme, D., Neyrinck, N., Petit, N. (2016). Procedural Rights in EU Antitrust Proceedings. In: Cauffman, C., Hao, Q. (eds) Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China. China-EU Law Series, vol 3. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48735-8_6

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