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Procedural Rights in EU Administrative Competition Proceedings: Ex Ante Mergers

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Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China

Part of the book series: China-EU Law Series ((CELS,volume 3))

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Abstract

The present contribution has two inter-related purposes: first, to analyse the context and legal framework of procedural rights in EU competition law, in particular, the administrative notification of mergers, and second, to critically review any perceived flaws in the substantive, institutional design or exercise of these procedural rights in practice, thereby offering proposals for institutional reform.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004, 20 January 2004, on the control of concentrations between undertakings which came into force on 1 May 2004, O.J. [2004] L 24/1, replacing the Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, 21 December 1989, on the control of concentrations between undertakings, O.J. [1989] L 395/1, as amended by the Council Regulation (EC) 1310/97, 30 June 1997, O.J. [1997] L 180/1; see also EU Implementing Regulation 1269/2013, 5 December 2013, O.J. L 336/1, amending the EC Regulation No. 802/2004, 7 April 2004, implementing the Council Regulation No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, O.J. L 133/2004.

  2. 2.

    Article 9 MR.

  3. 3.

    Article 14(2) MR.

  4. 4.

    See EC, Directorate‐General for Competition, 20 January 2004, Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., 446.

  6. 6.

    Rosenthal and Thomas (2010), para 134, 320.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., 30.

  8. 8.

    Article 6.

  9. 9.

    See, e.g., Rosenthal and Thomas (2010), supra note 6, para 97, 312; for excellent commentaries on merger procedure, see Hirsch et al. (2008), pp. 1910 ff.; Rose and Bailey (2013), pp. 570 ff.; Blanco (2013), p. 741; on appeals, see Kerse and Khan (2005), p. 467, Whish and Bailey (2012), p. 858.

  10. 10.

    Rosenthal and Thomas (2010), para 97, 312.

  11. 11.

    Article 9(2) MR.

  12. 12.

    Article 6(1) MR.

  13. 13.

    Article 6(1)(c) MR.

  14. 14.

    Article 18 MR.

  15. 15.

    Article 8(1) or (2) MR.

  16. 16.

    Article 8(3) MR.

  17. 17.

    Article 8(1)−(3) MR.

  18. 18.

    Article 9 MR.

  19. 19.

    Article 6(1)(b) MR.

  20. 20.

    Article 9(3) MR.

  21. 21.

    Article 7(3) MR.

  22. 22.

    Bellamy and Child, cited above, p. 571, para 8107–8.

  23. 23.

    Wils (2010), p. 5, Wils (2004), Wils (2008), p. 12, Wils (2011), Cumming (2012), Kekelekis (2006).

  24. 24.

    See Cumming (2012).

  25. 25.

    On the effectiveness of merger control during 1990–2002, see, e.g., Duso et al. (2011), p. 980.

  26. 26.

    See Christiansen, 47, on the controversies around the prohibition decisions by the EC in General Electric/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonell Douglas; see Monti (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/; on the recognition of efficiency gains under MR 139/2004, see Schwalbe and Zimmer (2009), p. 331; for criticism on the use of economics in mergers, see Witt (2012), p. 227.

  27. 27.

    Grant and Neven (2005), p. 631.

  28. 28.

    See Wils (2004).

  29. 29.

    Araujo (2005), p. 511.

  30. 30.

    Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Note on “Alternatives in Drafting an EU Administrative Procedure Law” 2011, 13.

  31. 31.

    See Cumming (2012), p. 37, on the interplay between the MR and Art. 6(1) ECHR; at 114, the author rightfully notes that the UK Civil Procedure Rules and Competition Appeal Tribunal reflect distinctive models as regards the relationship between “party-led” as opposed to “judge-led” proceedings by the ECJ.

  32. 32.

    Cumming (2012), p. 114, “the uncertainty of the rules renders in turn the operation of other methods for information gathering which are judge led: notably, the lack of specific clarity in the pleadings renders the request for documents or the categories of documents uncertain”.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    For this argument in light of the increasing workload pressures of the EU courts, see, e.g., Bellamy (2010), p. 36. However, changes have been made to ensure that the GC enjoys greater autonomy such as increasing the use of chambers of three instead of five judges.

  35. 35.

    See Art. 254 TFEU.

  36. 36.

    See Cumming (2012), p. 229.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    For example, the German competition authority, Bundeskartellamt, is not subordinated to the Ministry of Economics. So are most of the national competition authorities in order to guarantee independence. This aspect alone is at odds with the subordination of the DG Competition to the College of Commissioners in merger cases. See also para 42 on the Ministerial Authorisation needed from the Minister of Economics if the concentration is justified by an “overriding public interest” and the so-called public interest mergers in the UK; see, e.g., Graham (2013), p. 383, Basedow (2003), Mestmäcker and Veelken (2007).

  39. 39.

    See, e.g., Forrester (2009), p. 817, and Bronckers and Vallery (2011), p. 535.

  40. 40.

    Further reference to the goals of EU merger control are to be found in the recitals of EU Merger Control Regulation 134/2004, namely, the goals of “undistorted” competition (now Protocol No. 27 TFEU), conducted in accordance with the principle of an “open market economy with free competition” (see Art. 119 TFEU), the principles of which “are essential for the further development of the internal market”. Furthermore, Recital 4 refers to dynamic competition which is “capable of increasing the competitiveness of European industry, improving the conditions of growth and raising the standard of living in the Community”. At the same time, Recital 5 explains that merger control aims to ensure that “the process of reorganisation does not result in lasting damage to competition”. Therefore, specific provisions should govern concentrations which may significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it.

  41. 41.

    For an excellent article on horizontal effect, see Phillipson and Williams (2011), p. 882.

  42. 42.

    Cumming (2012), p. 150.

  43. 43.

    See, e.g., Kekelekis (2006), p. 15.

  44. 44.

    See Mole and Harby (2006); Council of Europe available at http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/DG2/HRHAND/DG2-EN-HRHAND-03%282006%29.pdf.

  45. 45.

    ECtHR, Delcourt v Belgium, 17 January 1970, para 25.

  46. 46.

    ECtHR, König v the Federal Republic of Germany, 28 June 1978, para 89.

  47. 47.

    ECtHR, Roche v United Kingdom, 19 October 2005.

  48. 48.

    For example, in contract, commercial, tort, family, employment, and property laws in ECtHR, Ringeisen v Austria, 16 July 1971; ECtHR, Edificaciones Gallego S.A. v Spain, 19 February 1998; ECtHR, Axen v the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 December 1983, and ECtHR, Golder v the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975; ECtHR, Airey v Ireland, 9 October 1979; ECtHR, Rasmussen v Denmark, 28 November 1984; ECtHR, Buchholz v the Federal Republic of Germany, 6 May 1981; ECtHR, Pretto v Italy, 8 December 1983.

  49. 49.

    ECtHR, Ringeisen v Austria, 16 July 1971, para 94.

  50. 50.

    ECtHR, H v France, 24 October 1989, para 47.

  51. 51.

    ECtHR, Philis v Greece, 27 August 1991; ECtHR, Editions Périscope v France, 26 March 1992; ECtHR, Barraona v Portugal, 8 July 1987; ECtHR, X v France, 3 March 1992.

  52. 52.

    ECtHR, Ferrazzini v Italy, 12 July 2001; ECtHR, Janosevic v Sweden, 23 July 2002, para 66, where a Swedish rule on tax surcharges was covered by Art. 6 even if it was not considered to be of a criminal nature; ECtHR, Justilla v Finland, 5 July 2006.

  53. 53.

    Wils (2005), para 577, 159. See, e.g., the EU Parliament’s concerns over the potentially criminal nature of antitrust fines at the first reading of Regulation 1/2003, footnote 35 in Slater et al. (2008), p. 9. Thus, the authors’ emphasis on the higher level of fines imposed on corporations does not make the fines criminal in the absence of imprisonment, 12.

  54. 54.

    Wils corrected his previous statement as merger control is a procedure of administrative authorisation and, therefore, not of a criminal nature: see, e.g., Wils (2012), p. 9.

  55. 55.

    Opinion of AG Kokott, 14 April 2011, Case C-109/10 P Solvay, [2011] ECR I-10329, para 256; Opinion of AG Sharpston, 10 February 2011, Case C-272/09 P, KME, paras 65−67. See also Case T-138/07, Schindler, 13 July 2011, para 53.

  56. 56.

    ECtHR, Engel and others v Netherlands, 8 June 1976, para 81.

  57. 57.

    ECtHR, Lauko v Slovakia, 2 September 1998.

  58. 58.

    ECtHR, Öztürk v the Federal Republic of Germany, 21 February 1984; ECtHR, Ezeh and Connors v the United Kingdom, 9 October 2003; ECtHR, Benham v the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, para 61; ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, para 72.

  59. 59.

    Impala, para 61.

  60. 60.

    See, inter alia, Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission, [1974] ECR 1063, para 15; Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80, Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission, [1983] ECR 1825, para 10; Kali and Salz, para 174; Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, para 66.

  61. 61.

    Recital 37 MR; Art. 18 MR.

  62. 62.

    Article 11 Implementing MR; Navarro et al. (2005), para 1370, 387.

  63. 63.

    See Case T-290/94, Kaysersberg v Commission, [1997] ECR II-2137, on the right of third parties to be heard. Also http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/ai0038_en.htm.

  64. 64.

    Article 15.

  65. 65.

    Navarro et al. (2005), cited below, para 1378, 389. On a lighter side, stakeholders suggested that “the hearing officer makes sure the coffee is served at the right time”, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/lawyersen.pdf.

  66. 66.

    ECtHR, Axen v the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 December 1983, para 25.

  67. 67.

    ECtHR, Diennet v France, 26 September 1995, para 34.

  68. 68.

    ECtHR, Fischer v Austria, 26 April 1995, para 44.

  69. 69.

    ECtHR, K v Switzerland 41 DR 242; ECtHR, Håkansson and Sturesson v Sweden, 21 February 1990, para 66; ECtHR, Deweer v Belgium, 27 February 1980, paras 51−54; ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, para 87.

  70. 70.

    Article 15 (6) Implementing MR.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., para 1379, 389.

  72. 72.

    See Recital 20 of the Decision of the President of the EC, 13 October 2011, on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, O.J. L 275/29.

  73. 73.

    Kerse and Khan (2005), para 4029, 201.

  74. 74.

    ECtHR, Ferrari, A.P., Di Mauro and Bottazi v Italy, 28 July 1999.

  75. 75.

    ECtHR, Stögmüller v Austria, 10 November 1969, para 5.

  76. 76.

    ECtHR, Katte Klitsche de la Grange v Italy, 27 October 1994, para 62; ECtHR, Triggiani v Italy, 19 February 1991, para 17; ECtHR, Angelucci v Italy, 19 February 1991, para 15 and ECtHR, Andreucci v Italy, 27 February 1992, para 17; ECtHR, Manzoni v Italy, 19 February 1991, para 18; ECtHR, Diana v Italy, 27 February 1992, para 17; ECtHR, Manieri v Italy, 27 February 1992, para 18.

  77. 77.

    See, e.g., ECtHR, Jablonski v Poland, 21 December 2000.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., 44, where the average duration of direct actions in the GC was 29.5 months in 2007; also see Cowen (2008).

  79. 79.

    On the history of merger control, see, e.g., Kokkoris (2009), p. 39.

  80. 80.

    See, e.g., Kekelekis (2006), p. 73, with insightful suggestions from practice where the EC allows more time for prior notification.

  81. 81.

    See, e.g., Kokkoris and Katona (2009), p. 447. See also Chen (2008), p. 57. For the previous amendments to the MR by the Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, COM (2001) 745/6 final, see, e.g., Christiansen (2010), p. 46; Arhold (2002), p. 449.

  82. 82.

    Case T-251/00, Lagardere v Commission, [2002] ECR II-4825, para 136.

  83. 83.

    See Rosenthal and Thomas (2010), p. 359.

  84. 84.

    Case COMP/M 1439, Telia/Telenor, 1999 [2001] O.J. L 40/1.

  85. 85.

    Case IV/M 1524, Airtours/First Choice, 1999 [2000] O.J. L 93/1; Case COMP/M 2220, GE/Honeywell, 2001 [2004] O.J. L 48/1.

  86. 86.

    Navarro et al. (2005), para 1208, 353.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., 383, para 1356.

  88. 88.

    Ibid.

  89. 89.

    See ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, para 78.

  90. 90.

    ECtHR, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium, 23 June 1981, para 57; ECtHR, McGonnell v the United Kingdom, 8 February 2000.

  91. 91.

    ECtHR, Kleyn v the Netherlands, 6 May 2003; ECtHR, Van de Hurk v the Netherlands, 8 April 1994; ECtHR, Findlay v the United Kingdom, 25 February 1997, para 77.

  92. 92.

    ECtHR, Hauschildt v Denmark, para 47; ECtHR, Lavents v Latvia, 28 November 2002.

  93. 93.

    ECtHR, Fey v Austria, 24 February 1993, para 30; ECtHR, Sigurdsson v Iceland, 10 July 2003.

  94. 94.

    ECtHR, Piersack v Belgium, 1 October 1982; ECtHR, Hauschildt v Denmark, 24 May 1984; ECtHR, Ferrantelli and Santangelo v Italy, 7 August 1996; ECtHR, Oberschlick (No. 1) v Austria, 23 May 1991, etc.

  95. 95.

    Wils (2005), p. 46.

  96. 96.

    Ibid.

  97. 97.

    See, e.g., Ahlborn (2002) available at http://www.linklaters.com/incompetition/200206.htm, MacGregor and Gecic (2012), p. 437.

  98. 98.

    Temple Lang (2013), p. 149. See EC, “The Antitrust Manual of Procedures: Internal DG Competition working documents on procedures for the application of Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU”, March 2012, which does not include merger procedures.

  99. 99.

    See, e.g., ECtHR, 43509/08, Menarini Diagnostics SRL v Italy, 27 September 2011; Cases C-386/10 P Chalkor v Commission, C-389/10 P [2010] ECR II-1895; KME v Commission [2011] ECR I-13125 and C-272/09P KME v Commission [2009] ECR II-1167.

  100. 100.

    See the foreword of Forwood (2014).

  101. 101.

    See, e.g., Wils (2005), note 95.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., 164.

  103. 103.

    Kerse and Khan (2012), para 4002, 184.

  104. 104.

    Generally on administrative rights, see the Working Group on EU Administrative Law: State of Play and Future Prospects for EU Administrative Law, 19 October 2011, 10.

  105. 105.

    See the EC’s recent focus on the same institutional design in some Member States in the context of Regulation 1/2003, EC Staff Working Document: Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues, accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, SWD (2014) 231/2.

  106. 106.

    See Research Division of the ECtHR, “The Role of the Public Prosecutor outside the criminal law field in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights”, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_prosecutor_ENG.pdf, last accessed on July 2013.

  107. 107.

    ECtHR, Zlinsat v Bulgaria, 57785/00, 15 June 2006, para 78; ECtHR, Research Division, “The role of public prosecutor outside the criminal law field in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights”, March 2011, 5.

  108. 108.

    The HO’s independence from those investigating breaches of the competition rules is also reflected in his mandate. For the criticism that the mandate is inadequate to ensure the HO’s independence and impartiality, see, e.g., Celli et al. (2010), p. 475.

  109. 109.

    See EC decision 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of Hearing Officers in certain competition proceedings, [2001] O.J. L 162/21.

  110. 110.

    Navarro et al. (2005), para 1391, 392.

  111. 111.

    See also Holles (2013), p. 1, 16.

  112. 112.

    Navarro et al. (2005), para 1505, 437; see, e.g., “Judicial Review by the EU Courts” in Rose and Bailey (eds.) in Bellamy and Child: European Union Law of Competition, available online from Oxford Competition Law.

  113. 113.

    See Case T-290/94, Kaysersberg SA v Commission, [1997] ECR II-2137, cited in Navarro et al. (2005), para 1506, 437.

  114. 114.

    See also Laguna de Paz (2014).

  115. 115.

    Impala, para 69.

  116. 116.

    Para 72.

  117. 117.

    Para 76.

  118. 118.

    Para 41.

  119. 119.

    Para 44.

  120. 120.

    Para 54.

  121. 121.

    Para 60.

  122. 122.

    Para 63.

  123. 123.

    Para 75.

  124. 124.

    Case T-79/12, Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet, para 50.

  125. 125.

    Ibid.

  126. 126.

    Ibid., para 63.

  127. 127.

    ECtHR, Saunders v the United Kingdom, 17 December 1996, paras 68−69.

  128. 128.

    ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, paras 111−113.

  129. 129.

    ECtHR, Borgers v Belgium, 30 October 1991, para 24.

  130. 130.

    ECHR, “The Role of Public Prosecutor Outside the Criminal Law”, para 11.

  131. 131.

    ECtHR, Krcmar v the Czech Republic, 3 March 2000.

  132. 132.

    ECtHR, Jespers v Belgium, 27 DR 61. See also ECtHR, Foucher v France, 18 March 1997, where a defendant was denied access to the file by the prosecutor and therefore was unable to prepare an adequate defence.

  133. 133.

    See the EC Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Arts. 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004, 2005/C 325/07.

  134. 134.

    Bellamy and Child, cited above, p. 40.

  135. 135.

    See Art. 15(1) Implementing MR: “Hearings shall be conducted by a Hearing Officer in full independence”; see Khan, cited above, para 4027, 199.

  136. 136.

    Article 9(1).

  137. 137.

    Wils (2012), p. 10.

  138. 138.

    See Recital 12.

  139. 139.

    Case C-440/07 P, Court (Grand Chamber), 16 July 2009, Commission v Schneider Electric SA, ECR [2009] I-06413, para 131.

  140. 140.

    Ibid., para 164; Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, para 63.

  141. 141.

    See Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric v Commission, [2002] ECR II-4071, paras 445 and 453; see also the Opinion of AG Colomer, Case C-440/07 P, Commission of the European Communities v Schneider Electric SA, 3 February 2009, para 3.

  142. 142.

    Ibid., 322.

  143. 143.

    Para 440.

  144. 144.

    Case C-413/06 P, 10 July 2008, Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala), para 85.

  145. 145.

    Case COMP/M 3333, Sony/BMG.

  146. 146.

    Case T-464/04, Impala v Commission, [2006] ECR II-2289, para 335, 446.

  147. 147.

    Para 63.

  148. 148.

    Case C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, [2008] ECR I-4951, paras 63−66.

  149. 149.

    Rosenthal and Thomas (2010), paras 144 and 323; Case COMP/M 4404, Universal/BMG; Case COMP/M 4956, STX/Aker Yards; Case COMP/M 4726, Thomson Corporation/Reuters Group; COMP/M 4731, Google/Double Click.

  150. 150.

    Impala, para 63.

  151. 151.

    Ibid.

  152. 152.

    See the order in British American Tobacco and Reynolds Industries v Commission, para 13.

  153. 153.

    Para 66.

  154. 154.

    Opinion of AG Kokott, 13 December 2007, Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America, Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala), Sony BMG Music Entertainment BV and Commission, para 139.

  155. 155.

    Para 190.

  156. 156.

    Notice on Best Practices in antitrust proceedings, paras 110 and 112.

  157. 157.

    Kekelekis (2006), p. 85.

  158. 158.

    Impala, para 89.

  159. 159.

    Para 92.

  160. 160.

    Para 94.

  161. 161.

    Para 95.

  162. 162.

    Para 191.

  163. 163.

    Para 194.

  164. 164.

    Generally, on legitimate interest, see Art. 7 (2) Regulation 1/2003; see the Notice on complaints which offers guidance on the meaning of legitimate interest.

  165. 165.

    Article 17(1).

  166. 166.

    Para 43.

  167. 167.

    Kekelekis (2006), p. 150.

  168. 168.

    According to Art. 18 Implementing MR, business secrets refer to know-how, methods of assessing costs, production secrets and processes, supply sources, quantities produced and sold, market shares, customer and distributor lists, marketing plans, cost and price structure, and sales strategy.

  169. 169.

    See Recital 16 Implementing MR.

  170. 170.

    Rosenthal and Thomas (2010), para 147, 324.

  171. 171.

    Navarro et al. (2005), para 1383, 390.

  172. 172.

    Christensen et al. (2007), para 5589.

  173. 173.

    See Recital 15 of the Decision of the President of the EC, 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, O.J. L 275/29.

  174. 174.

    See Art. 8 of the Decision of the President of the EC, 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, O.J. L 275/29.

  175. 175.

    Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v Commission, [2002] ECR II 4381, paras 89−90.

  176. 176.

    Joined cases T-10/92, T-11/92, T-12/92 and T-15/92, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, [1992] ECR II-2667 para 41; Case T-65/89, BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission, [1993] ECR II-389, para 29.

  177. 177.

    Albers and Jourdan (2011), p. 6.

  178. 178.

    See para 44 of the EC Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Arts. 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, O.J. [2005] c 325/07.

  179. 179.

    Para 100.

  180. 180.

    Para 128.

  181. 181.

    Impala, para 274.

  182. 182.

    Case T-562/12, Jürgen Beninca v EC, 25 October 2013.

  183. 183.

    Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, O.J. [2001] L 145.

  184. 184.

    Para 24.

  185. 185.

    Case-404/10 P, Commission v Editions Odile Jacob, [2012] ECR I-0000, para 116.

  186. 186.

    Para 30.

  187. 187.

    Para 31.

  188. 188.

    Para 31.

  189. 189.

    Ibid.

  190. 190.

    Para 48.

  191. 191.

    Para 51.

  192. 192.

    Impala, para 176.

  193. 193.

    Case T-342/99, Airtours v Commission, [2002] ECR II-2585, para 47.

  194. 194.

    Ibid., para 47.

  195. 195.

    Impala, paras 177 and 325.

  196. 196.

    Para 178.

  197. 197.

    Para 181.

  198. 198.

    Impala, para 285.

  199. 199.

    Para 179.

  200. 200.

    Case T-79/12, Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet, 11 December 2013, para 108.

  201. 201.

    Impala, para 166.

  202. 202.

    Cisco Systems, para 109.

  203. 203.

    Ibid.

  204. 204.

    See Recital 41 MR.

  205. 205.

    C-27/88, Solvay v EC, [1989] ECR 3355, Recital 2; C-374/87, Orkem v Commission, [1989] ECR 3283, para 27.

  206. 206.

    See, e.g., Wils (2003), p. 567.

  207. 207.

    Wils (2011), p. 187, 204.

  208. 208.

    See Wils (2008), p. 22.

  209. 209.

    See Joined Cases T-125/03 R and T-253/03 R, Akzo Nobel Chemicals v Commission, [2003] ECR II-4771; Gray et al. (2006), p. 30, Blanco and Jörgens (2011), Holtz (2013).

  210. 210.

    Best Practices, 38.

  211. 211.

    See Art. 7 of the EC’s Decision of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain proceedings, O.J. L 162, 19 June 2001.

  212. 212.

    Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/hearing_officers/legislation.html.

  213. 213.

    Klees (2005), para 70, 150.

  214. 214.

    Ibid. 96. No procedural changes are recently envisaged see, EC, “Commission Staff Working Document: Towards more effective EU merger control”, Brussels, June 25, 2013, SWD (2013) 239 final.

  215. 215.

    Case COMP/M 2978, 7 January 2004.

  216. 216.

    See similarly Case COMP/M 3543, 20 April 2005; Goddin (2013).

  217. 217.

    Opinion of AG Mazák, 27 March 2012, joined Cases C-553/10 P and C-554/10 P Commission (C-553/10 P) Lagardère SCA (C-554/10 P) v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS, para 37.

  218. 218.

    Case C-288/96, Commission v Germany, [2000] ECR I-8237, para 101.

  219. 219.

    Case T-209/01, [2005] ECR II-5527, paras 48−50. See also Case T-210/01, General Electric v Commission, [2005] ECR II-5575, paras 42−45, 48, and 734.

  220. 220.

    AG Mazák, para 38.

  221. 221.

    Ibid., para 71.

  222. 222.

    Cases T-237/05, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, [2010] ECR II-02245; Case T-111/07, Agrofert v Commission, [2010] ECR II-00128.

  223. 223.

    See, e.g., Case R-380/08, Netherlands v Commission, 13 September 2013, J of Eur Comp L & Practice (2013).

  224. 224.

    Para 14.

  225. 225.

    Para 33.

  226. 226.

    Para 37.

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  1. Durham Law School, Durham, UK

    Anca D. Chirita

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  1. Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Caroline Cauffman

  2. China University of Political Science an, School of Rule of Law and Government, BEIJING, China

    Qian Hao

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Chirita, A.D. (2016). Procedural Rights in EU Administrative Competition Proceedings: Ex Ante Mergers. In: Cauffman, C., Hao, Q. (eds) Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China. China-EU Law Series, vol 3. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48735-8_4

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