Abstract
This chapter deals with two-player games in which each player chooses from finitely many pure strategies or randomizes among these strategies, and the sum of the players’ payoffs or expected payoffs is always equal to zero. Games like the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and Matching Pennies, discussed in Sect. 1.3.1 belong to this class.
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Reference
von Neumann, J. (1928). Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen, 100, 295–320.
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Peters, H. (2015). Finite Two-Person Zero-Sum Games. In: Game Theory. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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