Abstract
In a game with transferable utility (TU-game) each coalition (subset of players) is characterized by its worth, i.e., a real number representing the payoff or utility that the coalition can achieve if it forms. It is assumed that this payoff can be freely distributed among the members of the coalition in any way desired.
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Notes
- 1.
See Sect. 11.1 for definitions.
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Peters, H. (2015). TU-Games: Domination, Stable Sets, and the Core. In: Game Theory. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_16
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