Abstract
We study scenarios in which consumers have several alternatives for using a shared resource. We investigate whether rewards can be used to motivate effective usage of the resource. Our goal is to design reward schemes that, in equilibrium, minimize the cost to society and the total sum of rewards. We introduce a generic scheme which does not use any knowledge about the valuations of the consumers, yet its cost in equilibrium is always close to the cost of the optimal scheme that has complete knowledge of the consumers’ valuations. We show that our scheme is essentially optimal in some settings while in others no good schemes exist.
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Dobzinski, S., Ronen, A. (2014). Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes. In: Lavi, R. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8768. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_9
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