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Political Disarray and Conflicts Between New and Old Ideology in the First Years of the Republic

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An Introductory Study on China's Cultural Transformation in Recent Times

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Abstract

The establishment of the Republic of China was proclaimed in Nanjing on New Year’s Day of 1912, Sun Yat-sen assumed the post of provisional president, a provisional government was set up, relevant laws were drawn up, and in a few months’ time old institutions were dismantled and replaced with new ones. The ambience was very much like that of a new nation. However, the Qing Dynasty in Beijing did not step down from the stage of history just yet. The new Revolutionary Government had established control over a few southern provinces, but its armed forces were too few to force their way into the old haven of the Qing Manchus and unify the whole country. Yuan Shikai, who had rapidly built up his strength in the last years of the Qing Dynasty, took advantage of this situation to seize actual power from the Qing government. Peace negotiations then took place between north and south. The two sides bargained repeatedly over the conditions for the Qing emperor’s abdication before reaching agreement. On February 12, 1912, the young Qing emperor Pu Yi announced he was ceding the throne. However, to his abdication edict was added the words: “Yuan Shikai is to have full powers to organize a temporary republican government.” Yuan Shikai made the most of this proviso and ceremoniously instated himself as the legal successor to state power and the putative ruler of the country. Most intermediate forces in the country at the time wanted unity and peace as soon as possible and pinned their hopes on the relatively powerful Yuan Shikai. Besides, after the 1911 Wuchang Uprising, Sun Yat-sen had more than once expressed willingness to step aside in favor of Yuan Shikai. This formed a consensus that Yuan was the sole person fit to unify and pacify the country. The day after the abdication of the Qing emperor, Sun Yat-sen issued a proclamation of resignation and recommended that Yuan replace him. Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionary party members called on Yuan Shikai to announce his political views, abide by the provisional constitution, uphold the republic, and proceed to Nanjing to take over the presidency. Yuan agreed to all of these requests, but then resorted to a ruse. After stage directing a mutiny in Beijing, he claimed instability in the north and refused to go to Nanjing. On March 10, he was, in Beijing, sworn in as provisional president of the Republic of China. Thereafter, he used his legal position and his new powers to build up his strength, persecute dissidents, push forward reactionary policies, and institute himself as emperor. What ensued was nationwide political disorder and widespread outbreaks of chaos.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The statistics on the mutinies and popular revolts presented here were obtained by searching through vol. 1, 1912–1914, of the Major Events in the Republic of China edited by Han Xinfu and Jiang Kefu. This book was published by the Chinese Literature and History Press in 1997.

  2. 2.

    The contents of the Twenty-one Demands presented by Japan consisted of five sections, known respectively as groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Group 5 contained demands that Japanese advisors be appointed for China’s politics, finances and military affairs; that China and Japan jointly administer China’s police force and armaments factories; that Japan be given the right to build railways between numerous cities in South China and so forth. Since Japan was fully aware that the other imperialist powers would strenuously object to these contents, it put them forward merely to apply pressure without intending to compel China’s acceptance. Officials of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs dropped hints about this to the Japanese personnel in charge of the negotiations. Hence, Yuan Shikai’s acceptance of the first four groups of demands was in fact tantamount to acceding to all of Japan’s demands.

  3. 3.

    A considerable amount of data shows that Yan Fu was manipulated by Yang Du and that he personally did not make any individual statements to play up Yuan Shikai.

  4. 4.

    See Collected Works of Yinbingshi: Collection No. 33, p. 88.

  5. 5.

    See Collected Works of YInbingshi: Collection No. 33, p. 90.

  6. 6.

    See Collected Works of Yinbingshi: Collection No. 33, pp. 54–55.

  7. 7.

    See Selections from the Writings of Chen Duxiu, vol. 1, p. 66; Sanlian Bookstore, 1984.

  8. 8.

    The Truth about the Political Situation of This Last Year, see A Posthumous Collection of Huang Yuansheng’s Works, vol. 1, p. 87.

  9. 9.

    Under pressure from public opinion and fearful that his overall dispositions might be compromised, Yuan Shikai selected for punishment Song Yuren, an assistant at the National Historical Library and agitator for “restoring political power to the Qing imperial household,” ostensibly for his “spreading absurd comments and being mentally disturbed, necessitating his return to the custody of officials in his native town for surveillance.” Song himself, however, was “advised to return to his ancestral home for rest and recuperation” and given 3,000 yuan for the journey, and the local officials were ordered to grant him 300 yuan per month for recuperation expenses.

  10. 10.

    “On the Contention that the Tumult in China is Due to the Mistake of Imitating Europe and America in All Matters and Abandoning the Quintessence of Chinese Culture,” see Kang Youwei’s Political Essays, vol. 2, pp. 890–891; Zhonghua Book Company, 1981.

  11. 11.

    “Correspondence with Xu Shichang,” see same as above, p. 992.

  12. 12.

    “A Constitutional Monarchy Will Save the Nation,” vol. 1. See Unofficial Stories of Modern History, 3rd edition, p. 131. Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1985.

  13. 13.

    “A Fair Appraisal of the Back-to-the-Ancients Trend of Thought.” See Collected Works of Yinbingshi: Collection No. 33, pp. 70–71.

  14. 14.

    Gong he ping yi (Proposals for the Republic), see A Complete Collection of Zhang Shizhao’s Works, vol. 3, p. 471, Wenhui Press, 2000.

  15. 15.

    “On Republicanism and Monarchism,” quoted from Unofficial Stories of Modern History, vol. 3, p. 127, Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1985.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., p. 128.

  17. 17.

    “A Constitutional Monarchy Will Save the Nation”, vol. 1. See Unofficial Stories of Modern History, 3rd edition, p. 133.

  18. 18.

    “Proposals for the Republic”, see A Complete Collection of Zhang Shizhao’s Works, vol. 3, p. 460.

  19. 19.

    “On Republicanism and Monarchism,” quoted from Unofficial Stories of Modern History, vol. 3, p. 126.

  20. 20.

    “A Constitutional Monarchy Will Save the Nation”, quoted from Unofficial Stories of Modern History, 3rd edition, p. 143.

  21. 21.

    Strange! The So-called Issue of National Polity,” see Collected Works of Yinbingshi: Special Collection No. 33, pp. 91–92.

  22. 22.

    Di zheng bo yi (A Refutation of Imperial Governance), see A Complete Collection of Zhang Zhizhao’s Works, vol. 3, p. 565.

  23. 23.

    Strange! The So-called Issue of National Polity,” see Collected Works of Yinbingshi: Special Collection No. 33, p. 93.

  24. 24.

    “A Constitutional Monarchy Will Save the Nation,” vol. 1, quoted from Unofficial Stories of Modern History, vol. 3, p. 133.

  25. 25.

    Strange! The So-called Issue of National Polity,” see Collected Works of Yinbingshi: Special Collection No. 33, pp. 90–91.

  26. 26.

    “Proposals for the Republic”, see A Complete Collection of Zhang Shizhao’s Works, vol. 3, p. 476.

  27. 27.

    “On Building up a Religion,” Yong yan (Justice), vol. 1, 1st issue; published on Feb. 16, 1913.

  28. 28.

    Kang Youwei once wrote an article entitled “Bu xing er yan zhong, bu ting ze wang guo (Words Spoken in Times of Misfortune: If Not Listened To the Country Will Fall),” see Collected Writings of Kang Nanhai.

  29. 29.

    “Introduction to the Confucian Church (1)”, see Collected Essays on Politics by Kang Youwei, vol. 2, p. 733, Zhonghua Book Company, 1981.

  30. 30.

    Letter to Members of Parliament,” see above, p. 960.

  31. 31.

    “Instating Confucianism as the State Religion Harmonizes with Heaven’s Will,” see above, p. 846.

  32. 32.

    See Collected Writings on Statecraft from the Republican Period, vol. 39; Religions, pp. 48, 49, 51.

  33. 33.

    “Introduction to the Confucian Church,” (1) see Collected Essays on Politics by Kang Youwei, vol. 2, p. 738.

  34. 34.

    “Letter of Reply to the Ministry of Education”; same as above, p. 864.

  35. 35.

    “Foreword to the China Xue Hui Bao,” same as above, p. 800.

  36. 36.

    “On the Relationship between Discarding Confucianism and the Political Situation,” see Compilation of Writings on Government Administration during the Nationalist Republic, vol. 39; Religions, pp. 39, 40 and 42.

  37. 37.

    See Compilation of Writings on Government Administration during the Nationalist Republic, vol. 39; Religions, pp. 58, 59.

  38. 38.

    Ai Zhiming: “Petition to the State Council and the Senate and House of Representatives on Religious Freedom and Not Establishing a State Religion,” see Compilation of Writings on Government Administration during the Nationalist Republic, vol. 39; Religions, pp. 59–60.

  39. 39.

    Edward Waite Thwing: “Will Religious Calamities Spread to China?” See same as above, pp. 61–63.

  40. 40.

    “In Reply to Chang Naide’s ‘Ancient Writings and the Confucian Religion’,” New Youth, vol. 2 no. 6.

  41. 41.

    “A Fair Appraisal of the Back-to-the-Ancients Trend of Thinking,” see Collected Works of Yingbingshi: Collection No. 33, pp. 70–73.

  42. 42.

    “The Constitution and the Confucian Religion,” see New Youth, vol. 2, no. 3.

  43. 43.

    “The Dao of Confucius and Modern Life,” New Youth, vol. 4, no. 4.

  44. 44.

    Wanmucaotang edition of Annotations to the Analects, vol. 4, p. 4.

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    Wanmucaotang edition of Annotations to the Analects, vol. 9, p. 11.

  47. 47.

    “Notes on Travels in Italy,” Notes on Travels in Eleven Countries in Europe: Vol. 1, p. 71; Hunan People’s Publishing House, 1980.

  48. 48.

    Introduction to the Confucian Church (1), see Collected Essays on Politics by Kang Youwei, vol. 2, p. 732.

  49. 49.

    Wanmucaotang edition of Annotations to the Analects, vol. 6, p. 10.

  50. 50.

    Introduction to the Confucian Church (1), see Collected Essays on Politics by Kang Youwei, vol. 2, p. 733.

  51. 51.

    “My Views on Confucianism,” Compilation of Writings on Government Administration during the Nationalist Republic, vol. 39; Religions, p. 6.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., p. 7.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., p. 9.

  54. 54.

    “Petition Against Making Confucianism the State Religion,” Compilation of Writings on Government Administration during the Nationalist Republic, vol. 39; Religions, p. 59.

  55. 55.

    “Petition to the State Council and the Senate and House of Representatives on Religious Freedom and Not Establishing a State Religion,” same as above, p. 60.

  56. 56.

    “Once More on the Issue of a Confucian Religion,” New Youth, vol. 1, no. 5.

  57. 57.

    “Speech at a Meeting on Freedom of Religion”, Complete Works of Cai Yuanpei, vol. 2, pp. 494 and 493; Zhejiang Education Press, 1997.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., p. 713.

  59. 59.

    “Letter to Explain How Kong Jiao Can Strengthen Morality,” see Compilation of Writings on Government Administration during the Nationalist Republic, vol. 39; Religions, p. 58.

  60. 60.

    “Letter to Explain How Kong Jiao May Strengthen Morality,” see Compilation of Writings on Government Administration during the Nationalist Republic, vol. 39; Religions, p. 57.

  61. 61.

    “The Authority of Chinese Morality,” Yong yan (Justice), vol. 1, nos. 3 and 5.

  62. 62.

    “The Reasons for the Decline in Morality,” see above; vol. 1, no. 12.

  63. 63.

    Fang Nangang: “My Strategy for Saving Our National Morality,” see Compilation of Writings on Government Administration during the Nationalist Republic, vol. 40; Religions, p. 20.

  64. 64.

    Que Ming: “Foreword on the Issuance of the Min De Bao,” see Compilation of Writings on Government Administration during the Nationalist Republic, vol. 40; Religions, pp. 34–36.

  65. 65.

    See Youth Magazine, vol. 1, no. 1.

  66. 66.

    See Youth Magazine, vol. 1, no. 6.

  67. 67.

    See Youth Magazine, vol. 2, no. 1.

  68. 68.

    “Proclamation of the Association for Reforming Society,” see Collected Works of Cai Yuanpei, vol. 2, p. 20; Zhejiang Education Press, 1997.

  69. 69.

    Youth Magazine, vol. 1, no. 1.

  70. 70.

    “The Conflict between New and Old Thinking,” see Posthumous Writings of Yuan Sheng, vol. 1, pp. 159–160; Commercial Press, photo-offset edition.

Reference

  • Wei Yi. (1915, February 15). Recent Pessimism in Society. Zheng Yi, 1(7).

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Geng, Y. (2015). Political Disarray and Conflicts Between New and Old Ideology in the First Years of the Republic. In: An Introductory Study on China's Cultural Transformation in Recent Times. China Academic Library. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44590-7_6

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