The Central Dogma Reformulated

Abstract

In this chapter we will occupy ourselves with the central statement of this book, namely the claim that the only thing we can know about the possibilities of advances in cognition must be that, in principle, we cannot know anything about it. It is only logical, some would agree with a saying that sounds as if it came from Socrates (469–399 B.C.): “I know that I know nothing” which they may have heard sometime. However, Socrates’wise saying misses the mark somewhat since, firstly, he claims something paradoxical and, secondly, he does not take the fundamental question of cognitive acquisition into consideration. With regard to the latter, it makes no difference if one maintains that one knows something or knows nothing. Both claims reflect at least some knowledge. This is generally valid for all ontological puzzles of philosophy that are based on the well-tried patterns “there is a reality of something (e.g., soul, intellect, thing per se, etc.)” versus “there is no reality of anything (e.g., soul, intellect, thing per se, etc.)”.

If it is true that the human intellect has reached its present height by the same slow selection process by which all developments have been guided and raised to their adaptational heights, we must see therein the strong indication that even the highest intellect among us cannot see beyond the relationships governing our ability to survive.

August Weismann