Abstract
For centuries the nation state has been the primary unit of political organization, but it seems to be the wrong size for today’s world. In a global economy, nation states are often too small to make a difference. Governments no longer control their economies because many economic decisions are now made outside their borders, in the capitals of other countries, the home of international organizations (e.g. the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund), or the headquarters of multinational corporations. The loss of control is less obvious in large nation states, but even they will loose their economic sovereignty if the integration of finance and commerce proceeds on an international scale. The only way for policy makers to recover a measure of influence is to form alliances with other nations, creating multinational organizations capable of operating over an entire continent or hemisphere.
I received many helpful suggestions from participants in a seminar at ARENA, and I particularly want to thank Johan Olsen, Andreas Føllesdal, and Janne Haaland Matláry.
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References
See D. Elazar, et al.: Federal Systems of the Word, London (Longman) 1994.
B. Barber: Jihad vs. McWorld, New York (Times Books) 1995.
Scandinavia may be an exception to this rule, although it is hard to imagine Norwegians, Swedes and Finns agreeing on all aspects of social policy. The level of consensus across nations is bound to be lower than it is within each nation, and that renders problematic any notion of a social democratic federation even in the most likely place of all.
National differences can lead to war, of course, but I am here concerned with multinational organizations that function in peaceful times.
J.S. Mill falls into this category, according to C.B. Macpherson: The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, New York (Oxford University Press) 1977. In contrast J.J. Rousseau embraces the state without reservation, although some may question his credentials as a liberal democrat.
W. Kymlicka: Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford (Oxford University Press) 1995.
This is not an empirical claim, but an analytical proposition. Those who value a way of life want to maintain it, and if incorporation offers the best chance of survival, compared to all available options, then unification is the most reasonable course of action.
According to Kymlicka, minorities in polyethnic societies are not entitled to group rights, except perhaps when migration to the society in question was forced, as in the case of slaves. I will return to the issue of group rights for ethnic and political minorities at the end of my essay.
See, for example, C. Taylor: “The Politics of Recognition”, in: A. Guttman (Ed.): Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton (Princeton University Press) 1994, pp.25–73.
These identities are not codes, they are scripts that allow for creativity. At some point, though, creativity becomes unrecognizable by those who are familiar with the script, i.e. other members of a culture.
Social sanctions are another matter; from a liberal democratic point of view “the problem arises when a group seeks to use governmental power, or the distribution of public benefits, to restrict the liberty of members.” See W. Kymlicka: “The Good, the Bad, and the Intolerable”, Dissent (Summer 1996), pp. 22–30.
See, for example, A. Føllesdal: “Minority Rights: A Liberal Contractualist Case”, in: Juha Raikka (Ed.): Do we need minority rights? Conceptual issues, The Hague (Kluwer Law International) 1997, pp. 59–84.
The parallel is exact. Kymlicka’s prescriptions for a multicultural society are consciously based on the idea of compacts between nations. In this essay I am reversing the argument, projecting Kymlicka’s description of a multicultural society onto a multinational federation.
J. Rawls: Political Liberalism, New York (Columbia University Press) 1993.
When nations withdraw from federations they are demonstrating the fact that sovereignty has not been ceded, but is ultimately reserved to themselves.
The legislature has, and should have, the most power in a democracy because it is the most representative organ of government. Its popular mandate is broader than any other institution’s, or so I presume.
E. Spitz: Majority Rule, Chatham, NJ (Chatham House Publishers) 1984, provides a helpful review of the problem of majority rule and its solutions.
I do not see any democratic grounds for giving a veto to some nations and not others, especially if every nation is entitled to group rights, as I am arguing here.
Thus, national vetoes and majority decision-making under the threat of secession can lead to the same outcome, but in the latter case the decision belongs to the majority. This is a crucial difference, for democrats.
An example from the United States illustrates what I have in mind. Education is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution, but it is in some state constitutions. In these states courts are often asked to remove barriers to equal education. When they fail to do so, the U.S. Supreme Court may intervene, because the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection under state laws, whatever those laws may be (and they are not the same in all states). 21 The answer may be yes in any case, but I think the case for intervention is particularly compelling when a nation is part of a federation.
M. Walzer: “Comment on The Politics of Recognition”, in A. Guttman (Ed.): Multiculturism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton (Princeton University Press),1994, pp. 99–103.
Would a democratic federation side with a cultural minority, driving a government from its fold, and then supporting war against it? An idealist hopes so, but the realist says no. In truth, everything depends on the political skill of federation members in fostering recognition without forcing a showdown.
Most monocultural nations are small, and this may increase their sympathy for cultural minorities in multicultural societies: they, too, have felt the weight of the offending majority in federation affairs. On the important differences between small, homogeneous states and large, diverse nations see J. Olsen: Europeanization and Nation-State Dynamics, Oslo (Arena Working Paper No. 9) 1995.
M. Nentwich and G. Falkner: “Intergovernmental Conference 1996: Which Constitution for the Union?”, European Law Journal, 2,1 (1996), pp. 83–102, discuss some of the controversies over voting rules in a diverse federation. See also their paper “The IGC 1996: The Moment of Constitutional Choice for a Democratic Europe?”, presented to a workshop on “The Political Theory of European Constitutional Choice”, Oslo, 29 March-3 April, 1996.
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Hanson, R.L. (1998). Democracy in Multicultural Societies and Multinational Settings. In: Føllesdal, A., Koslowski, P. (eds) Democracy and the European Union. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03622-8_7
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