Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the amount of cooperation delivered by agents in a social dilemma may be explained by the shape of individual payoff surfaces and by how these surfaces are coupled in the structure of the game. Artificial agents performing simple adaptation on such surfaces generate patterns of cooperation that qualitatively match behavior in laboratory settings.
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Rossi, A., Warglien, M., Zaninotto, E. (1997). Cooperation as Illusory Hill-climbing: Co-adaptation and Search in Social Dilemmas. In: Conte, R., Hegselmann, R., Terna, P. (eds) Simulating Social Phenomena. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 456. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03366-1_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03366-1_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-63329-7
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