Identity and Non-identity. Intergenerational Justice as a Topic of an Ethics of Epigenetics

Abstract

Obviously some effects of epigenetics are organized in a paradox way. We are aware of this since the famous Överkalix Studies at the latest. It became obvious that nutrition during the childhood of the father’s father significantly influenced the life expectancy of grandchildren: a rich diet between the 9th and 12th year of life, the slow growth period, significantly increased the grandchildren’s risk of catching diabetes and die. A poor diet, on the other hand, seemed to reduce the risk of their sons suffering from a cardiovascular disease. May we expect our child to put up with a – somewhat – poor diet, as long as this way a certain (and possibly not even completely grasped) general mortality risk of this child’s potential grandchildren might be statistically reduced? Do parents, when nourishing their child, even have a moral obligation of considering a risk of disease for a potential generation of great-grandchildren? Or should the parents’ view be exclusively on raising their own children which, however, would be a serious blow for general intergenerational justice? It seems to be immediately wrong to prevent one’s own children from a healthy diet only for the sake of possible great-grandchildren. However, ethics must be capable of explaining why this is wrong. Thus, by three steps I will attempt to demonstrate that this instinctive rejection is indeed justified.