Abstract
This chapter analyses constitutional amendments in the Russian Federation (1993–2014). We show that in the phase of constitution-making a problematic path was adopted when the El’cin administration promoted a basic law advantaging the executive. The praxis of constitutional amendment in the Russian Federation is discussed in three dimensions: First, concerning amendments to Art. 65, which regulates the structure of the federal republic; second, concerning changes to the structure or principles of the constitutional system; third, concerning de facto constitutional amendments through ordinary laws. In particular, a combination of amendments of the second and third dimensions substantially centralized the constitutional regime over the past 20 years, moving it toward an authoritarian state order. The Russian praxis of constitutional amendment is here classified as authoritarian constitutionalism.
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Notes
- 1.
To describe the two succeeding regimes following the collapse of the Soviet Union in Russia, scholars distinguish between the First Russian Republic (1991–1993) and the Second Russian Republic (1993 to present) (see Sharlet 1996, 495).
- 2.
Indeed, Yeltsin had ensured that the draft charter favored a strong executive, and the turnout numbers required for a legally certified referendum were apparently fudged, but contrary to dire predictions in Russia and abroad, there was no return to authoritarianism (Sharlet 2003, 123).
- 3.
The Constitutional Commission employed foreigners, but they did not have any significant impact. Through Perestroika, the impact of western ideas such as democracy, rule of law, and constitutionalism was exceptional. Russian scholars were, at least to some extent, familiar with these concepts. Furthermore, Soviet academia had been researching western constitutionalism for many years.
- 4.
These amend Art. 81 (term of office of the Presidency from 5 to 6 years), Art. 96 (term of office of Duma members from 4 to 5 years), Art. 103 (hearing of government reports by State Duma), Art. 114 (government now obliged to report to the State Duma annually).
- 5.
This model (the higher, the harder) implies the coherence between form—that is, the hierarchical level, and substance—that is, the significance of the rule.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
John Rawls (1997, 773) described this vision as citizens deliberating in a framework “(…) that expresses political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse”.
- 9.
For an intriguing study of bargaining in constitutional assemblies, see Elster (2000).
- 10.
- 11.
There is “an inherent paradox in the constitution-making process. On the one hand, because they are written for the indefinite future, constitutions ought to be adopted in maximally calm and undisturbed conditions. On the other hand, the call for a new constitution usually arises in turbulent circumstances. The task of constitution making demands procedures based on rational argument, but the external circumstances of constitution making generate passion and invite resorts to force” (Elster 1998, 117).
- 12.
In the turbulent transformation period, the falling apart of the old order was also reflected in the party system. The Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (KPRSFSR) was founded in 1990, so to speak as a Russian successor of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (KPSS), which also existed until 1991. Both parties were banned by President El’cin after the 1991 ʻAugust Putsch’. In 1993, a new Communist party was formed, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), which is today still the second biggest political party in Russia.
- 13.
- 14.
The executive authority has been modified in autumn 1993, introducing the institution of the prime minister and his proposal right with regard to ministers (Art. 83a, 83 g, and 83d).
- 15.
Some authors argue that it is not entirely clear whether or not the voter turnout was below 50 % of the electorate quorum required (see White et al. 2010, 158).
- 16.
There are 108 existing federal constitutional laws; 86 of them are amendment laws for existing federal constitutional laws.
- 17.
- 18.
Levada Poll estimated the public support for President Putin in April 2015 around 82 % (Gorbačev and Garmonenko 2015).
- 19.
Approximately 450 cases have been reviewed by the SAC every year.
- 20.
Ekaterina Mišina, a Russian lawyer and a visiting professor at the University of Michigan, is quoted in The New York Times saying: “The approach of the Supreme Court will prevail, which is much more conservative, much more Soviet.” (Reevell 2014).
- 21.
The appointment was legalized by a decree (or resolution) of the higher official of the subject. This should be presented to the legislative (representative) body of the state authority of the subject of Federation within 3 days. The decree (resolution) will come into force in case two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the subject’s legislative body vote for the appointment of that particular representative to the Federation Council in the following or extraordinary session.
- 22.
The Duma approved the proposal on November 20, 2012; the Federation Council approved it on November 28, 2012. The law came into effect December 3, 2012.
- 23.
Authors’ translation of a quote from Valentina Matvienko; translated from the Russian original as quoted by Jurij Politov (2014).
- 24.
E.g. Gennadij Andrejevič Zjuganov, the Chairman of the Communist Party, and Vladimir Volfovič Žirinovskij, founder and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, who are both considered to be loyal Duma leaders, were offered a post as presidential senators in the Federation Council, according to media rumors (see Izvestija 2014).
- 25.
For the influence of the state over civil society, see Tailor (2011, 204–250).
- 26.
In 2013, the Duma already unanimously approved the Federal Law “For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values” (2013, № 135-FZ), drafted by Jelena Mizulina of Just Russia.
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Appendix: Constitutional Politics in Russia 1993–2015
Appendix: Constitutional Politics in Russia 1993–2015
Dates of amendment and implementation | Article(s)/paragraph(s) | Constitutional subfields | Short analysis of the reform process |
|---|---|---|---|
01/09/1996a | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Name alteration pursuant to Art. 65 • Initiative coming from these subjects of the Federation. |
02/10/1996 | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Name alteration pursuant to Art. 65 • Initiative coming from these subjects of the Federation. |
06/09/2001 | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Name alteration pursuant to Art. 65 • Initiative coming from these subjects of the Federation. |
07/25/2003 | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Name alteration pursuant to Art. 65 • Initiative coming from these subjects of the Federation. |
03/25/2004 | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Name alteration due to merger of subjects of the federation pursuant to Art. 65 • Initiative coming from regional parliaments of these subjects of the Federation |
10/14/2005 | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Name alteration due to merger of subjects of the federation pursuant to Art. 65 • Initiative coming from regional parliaments of these subjects of the Federation. |
07/12/2006 | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Name alteration due to merger of subjects of the federation pursuant to Art. 65 • Initiative coming from regional parliaments of these subjects of the Federation |
12/30/2006 | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Name alteration due to merger of subjects of the federation pursuant to Art. 65 • Initiative coming from regional parliaments of these subjects of the Federation |
07/21/2007 | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Name alteration due to merger of subjects of the federation pursuant to Art. 65 • Initiative coming from regional parliaments of these subjects of the Federation |
03/21/2014 | Art. 65 | • Federalism | • Crimea (as subject of Federation) and Sevastopol (as a city with federal statusb) joined the Russian Federation as the result of referendum held • State Duma (final vote: 445-to-1 majority) • Federation Council (155-to-0 majority) |
12/30/2008 | Art. 81, 96 | • President and State Duma | • Extension of the presidential term to 6 years and the legislative term of the State Duma to 5 years • Codification of the government’s obligation to annually report to the Duma • State Duma (final vote: 392-to-57 majority) • Federation Council (final vote 114-to-1 majority) |
02/05/2014 | Art. 71, 83, 102, 104, 125–129 | • Judicial system | • Reform of highest courts and State Prokuratura • State Duma (final vote: 346-to-95 majority) • Federation Council (final vote: 148-to-7 majority) |
07/21/2014 | Art. 83, 95 | • Federation Council | • The new group of Federation Council’s members—Representatives of the Federation—is introduced. • Results have not been obtained yet. |
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Petersen, F., Levin, I. (2016). The Russian Federation. In: Fruhstorfer, A., Hein, M. (eds) Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13762-5_21
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