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Andere Lösungskonzepte für n-Personen-Spiele

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Spieltheorie

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Zusammenfassung

Da bisher kein allgemeiner Existenzsatz für n-Personenspiele bekannt ist, haben die Mathematiker nach anderen Lösungskonzepten gesucht. Eines dieser Konzepte ist der Shapley-Wert. Shapley definiert seinen Wert axiomatisch.

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Kapitel IX

  1. AUMANN, R.J., MASCHLER, M.: The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games, Annals 52.

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  2. LUCE, R.D.: ψ-Stability: a New Equilibrium Concept for n-Person Game Theory, Mathematical Models of Human Behavior (Proceedings of a symposium), Stamford, Conn. (Dunlap and Associates), 1955, pp. 32–44.

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  5. MASCHLER, M., PELEG, B.: A Characterization, Existence Proof, and Dimension Bounds for the Kernel of a Game, Pacific J. Math. 18, S.289–328 (1966).

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  6. MILNOR, J.: Reasonable Outcomes for n-Person Games, RM-916, RAND Corporation, 1952.

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  7. PELEG, B.: On the Bargaining Set M0 of m-Quota Games, Annals 52.

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© 1968 W. B. Saunders Company

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Owen, G. (1968). Andere Lösungskonzepte für n-Personen-Spiele. In: Spieltheorie. Hochschultext. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65244-8_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65244-8_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-05498-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-65244-8

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