Zusammenfassung
Da bisher kein allgemeiner Existenzsatz für n-Personenspiele bekannt ist, haben die Mathematiker nach anderen Lösungskonzepten gesucht. Eines dieser Konzepte ist der Shapley-Wert. Shapley definiert seinen Wert axiomatisch.
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Kapitel IX
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© 1968 W. B. Saunders Company
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Owen, G. (1968). Andere Lösungskonzepte für n-Personen-Spiele. In: Spieltheorie. Hochschultext. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65244-8_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65244-8_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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