Summary
In this paper we demonstrate the design and use of cooperative negotiation procedures by linking cooperative bargaining theory to models of fair division. The main feature of a fair-division approach is that the outcome is determined by a procedure rather than a formula. We generalize two fair-division procedures in order to apply them to multiple-issue, multiple-option negotiations. The procedures consist of two simple and intuitive steps: The first step ensures an efficient outcome, and the second step establishes “fairness” through redistribution.
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References
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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Raith, M.G. (2000). Cooperative Procedures for Multiple-Issue Negotiations. In: Inderfurth, K., Schwödiauer, G., Domschke, W., Juhnke, F., Kleinschmidt, P., Wäscher, G. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 1999. Operations Research Proceedings 1999, vol 1999. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58300-1_34
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58300-1_34
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