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Optimization of an n -Person Game Under Linear Side Conditions

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Optimization, Dynamics, and Economic Analysis

Summary

This paper is concerned with n-person games which typically occur in mathematical conflict models [cf. [4], [7],[8]. These games are so called cost-games, in which every actor tries to minimize his own costs and the costs are interlinked by a system of linear inequalities. It is shown that, if the players cooperate, i.e., minimize the sum of all the costs, they achieve a Nash Equilibrium. In order to determine Nash Equilibria, the simplex method can be applied with respect to the dual problem. An important special case is discussed and numerical examples are presented.

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Krabs, W., Pickl, S., Scheffran, J. (2000). Optimization of an n -Person Game Under Linear Side Conditions. In: Dockner, E.J., Hartl, R.F., Luptačik, M., Sorger, G. (eds) Optimization, Dynamics, and Economic Analysis. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57684-3_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57684-3_7

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-63327-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57684-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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