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Collective Decision Making

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China’s Collective Presidency
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Abstract

The history of the new China tells us this: its greatest successes come from successful strategic decisions; its worst failures stem from poor strategic decisions. As Jiang Zemin observed, correct decisions on the part of the Standing Committee, and their comprehensive implementation, have a tremendous bearing on the party, the country, and the people (Zemin Jiang 2006a, p. 553).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On October 9, 1957, at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC, Mao Zedong pointed out that the CPC should promote progress just as the Kuomintang is a committee for promoting retrogression. The December 12 edition of the People’s Daily published an editorial entitled “We Must Stick to More, Faster, Better and Economical Ways of Construction,” which was revised by Mao Zedong and discussed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. This editorial criticized certain decisions and policies as well as the views of Zhou Enlai. In December of the same year at a meeting in Hangzhou, Zhou Enlai was once again singled out for criticism; he was attacked for showing rightist inclinations and being conservative. At the Nanning conference in January 1958, Zhou Enlai was again criticized. “You’re against rash moves? I am against moves that are not rash!” Zhou Enlai was willing to bear the full responsibility for his errors. In February 1958, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau was held in Beijing; Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Bo Yibo assumed responsibility for the conservative movement. In March the same year at the Chengdu conference, Mao Zedong’s two speeches were against conservative trends. On May 23 at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC, Mao Zedong made a closing speech in which he stated that “some comrades agreed at the time, but later they expressed their opposition, or disagreement, or suspicion, without going through legal procedures. They did not try to argue for changes through similar meetings before they openly expressed their opposition to the campaign. They opposed the rash advance”. Bo Yibo (1993).

  2. 2.

    Mao Zedong criticized Liu Shaoqi and others without singling them out on the night of January 3, 1965: “If we forget this one basic theory and practice of our party for the past 10 years and more, we will go astray.” Mao also discussed “some of the issues raised by the rural socialist education movement and criticism and revisions in the central circular,” in December 1964 and January 1965 (1996a).

  3. 3.

    In November 1963, Mao Zedong commented on the “combat mission of Zhou Yang’s philosophical social science researchers” in China. Mao held intense debates with various party members whom he believed were adhering to an opportunist line, and they came under criticism for their “narrow empiricism”; as well as being subjected to political attacks, they began to be isolated. Mao applied Marxist doctrines to the concrete realities of China’s revolution; he creatively developed Marxist-Leninist doctrines to meet the new conditions of the revolution. He did so in the December 27, 1963 edition of the People’s Daily (1996b).

  4. 4.

    In 1981, the Party Central Committee made a resolution that when Mao Zedong’s personal prestige was at its peak, he gradually became divorced from reality and the masses. His subjectivist, personal, and arbitrary style became increasingly serious. It affected the party’s Central Committee, the party as a whole, and the political life of the country. The principles of collective leadership and democratic centralism were weakened and damaged. This phenomenon gradually developed, and the party’s Central Committee also had to bear some responsibility for this. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Since the Founding of the Party’s Resolution on Certain Historical Issues (1982).

  5. 5.

    A detailed analysis appears in Hu Angang (2011a).

  6. 6.

    In 1987, a report by the Thirteenth National Congress of the CPC proposed that to improve the party’s collective leadership system and democratic centralism, we should begin with the central leading organs. “We should establish a system where the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau regularly reports to the Political Bureau, which in turn should regularly report to the plenary session of the Central Committee. We should also increase the number of plenary meetings of the Central Committee every year so that the Central Committee plays its role in collective decision making. We should establish the work code and political life code of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and the Central Secretariat so that collective leadership is institutionalized, and the supervision of the party leader is strengthened.” Zhao Ziyang (1991).

  7. 7.

    The Four Additional Requirements refer to emphasizing a people-oriented approach, emphasizing comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development, emphasizing overall plans, emphasizing ensuring and improving people’s well-being, and promoting social fairness and justice. See xinhuanet.com: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-09/28/c_13534101.htm

  8. 8.

    Mao Zedong declared in March 1949 at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh National Congress: “The secretary of a party committee has to be good at being a squad leader. The Tenth Party Committee has around 20 individuals; if the military can be likened to a class, the secretary is the class monitor. To take part in a class is not easy, but a good monitor should set an example by being good at learning and studying.” Mao Zedong (1991).

  9. 9.

    Hu Jintao said: “We must adhere to the principles of democratic centralism and the collective leadership system when discussing important issues. Democratic discussion and group decision making should be upheld when solving major problems of the party and the country.” Hu Jintao.

  10. 10.

    The “CPC Central Committee on Upholding and Improving the Leadership of the CPC, the System of Multi-party Cooperation and Political Consultation Opinions.” According to provisions passed in 1989, the basic approach for democratic parties should be as follows: participate in government, participate in national basic policy and consultations among national leaders, participate in the management of state affairs, and participate in the execution of national policies, laws, and regulations.

  11. 11.

    In February 2006, the CPC Central Committee’s opinion on strengthening the work of the people’s Political Consultative Conference pointed out the following: The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is a means of political consultation and multi-party cooperation led by the CPC. It is an important reflection of the real situation in the country. It is an important link between the party and the country in carrying out systematic and democratic decision making. It is an important way to improve the party’s ability to rule. Making political consultation part of the decision-making procedure related to state and local issues is an important principle of political consultation.

  12. 12.

    The party’s Central Committee pointed out that the party committee and government should frequently conduct research into major problems in the area of philosophy and the social sciences. They should also consider applying the excellent methods of philosophy and social science to decision making in solving problems related to reform development and stability. It was stressed that philosophy and social science should be part of the party’s and government’s work and that think tanks should be set up on these subjects. CPC Central Committee on “Further Prosperity and Development of Philosophy and Social Scientific Opinion,” January 11, 2010.

  13. 13.

    The lessons of the Cultural Revolution are very rich and diverse. The author only summarizes the information structure and decision mechanism as a framework for analysis. Hu Angang (2010).

  14. 14.

    Mao Zedong: “Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War,” December 1936. Completed.

  15. 15.

    In July 4, 1973, Mao Zedong and Wang Hongwen talked to Zhang Chunqiao, criticizing the Political Bureau of the Central Committee presided over by Zhou Enlai: “Small matters crop up every day but the major issues are not being discussed. This does not change. It is future revisionism. Don’t say I didn’t say it.” Zheng Qian, Zhang (2003).

  16. 16.

    On December 12, 1973, Mao Zedong said at a conference of the Political Bureau that the Political Bureau should discuss political affairs. The Central Military Commission should discuss both military and political affairs. The phenomenon that the Central Military Commission does not talk about military affairs and the Political Bureau does not discuss politics should be changed. Mao Zedong (2003).

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Hu, A. (2014). Collective Decision Making. In: China’s Collective Presidency. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55279-3_7

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