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Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols Based on Factoring Assumption

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Provable Security (ProvSec 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8209))

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Abstract

This paper investigates authenticated key exchange protocols over signed quadratic residues group \(\mathbb{QR}_N^+\), which is originally used for encryption schemes. The key technical tool developed by Hofheinz et al. is that in group \(\mathbb{QR}_N^+\) the strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) problem is implied by the factoring assumption.

To apply group \(\mathbb{QR}_N^+\) to authenticated key exchange protocols in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, we extend Hofheinz et al.’s technique and introduce a new proof approach called k−th power.

The k−th power proof approach is almost generic, i.e., applying it to many, if not all, existing authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols in eCK model under gap assumption immediately produces protocols in eCK model under factoring assumption if they work over \(\mathbb{QR}_N^+\).

As one application of k−th power approach, we show that FS protocol, in which k is a constant, is provably secure in eCK model under factoring assumption if it works over \(\mathbb{QR}_N^+\).

Our technique also applies to other protocols, e.g., UP,HMQV and its variants, in which k is a non-constant, but at the cost of degrading a factor in the reduction.

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Huang, H. (2013). Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols Based on Factoring Assumption. In: Susilo, W., Reyhanitabar, R. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8209. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-41226-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-41227-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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